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Introduction:

To Preserve the Cosmos

At the end of the fourth century C.E. the decline of traditional pagan culture had come to focus on the temples of the gods, the last vestige of the "old ways." By 386 sacrifices to the gods had been outlawed and temples were being vandalized by Christian monks. To protect the pagan shrines the orator Libanius appealed to Emperor Theodosius, saying:

They [the monks] are spreading out like torrents across the countryside; and in ruining the temples, they are also ruining the countryside itself at one and the same time. For to snatch from a region the temple which protects it is like tearing out its eye, killing it, annihilating it. The temples are the very life of the countryside; around them are built houses and villages, in their shadow a succession of generations have been born up until the present day. It is in those temples that farmers have placed their hopes for themselves and their wives and children, for their oxen and for the ground they have sown or planted. A country region whose temple has been destroyed in this manner is lost, because the despairing villagers no longer have the will to work. It would be pointless to exert themselves, they think, because they have been deprived of the gods who made their labors prosper.

Despite Libanius's plea it was too late. The countryside had already been "blinded" and the gods were being driven from the land. For pagans, the loss of these shrines marked the end of a way of life: it severed their

contact with the gods, threatened their society, and disturbed the order of nature.

The sentiments of Libanius reflect the despair of a culture that only two generations earlier had been far more hopeful. When the Roman imperial court first came under Christian influence during the reign of Constantine (312–336 C.E.), the leading thinkers of the pagan world turned to the Syrian Platonist, Iamblichus (c. 240–325 C.E.), for spiritual and intellectual leadership. An official of Emperor Licinius praised Iamblichus as “benefactor of the entire world,” “universal blessing of the Hellenes,” and “[the] one appointed by the gods to be the savior of the entire Hellenic world.”

Such praise was not mere hyperbole. Only one generation after Iamblichus’s death, the emperor Julian employed the Platonic and theurgic doctrines of Iamblichus in an attempt to wrest control of the empire away from the “Galileans” and return it to the ancestral practices of the “Hellenes.” In “the divine Iamblichus” Julian saw a philosopher equal to Plato, for Iamblichus’s teachings had led Julian and other pagans to a deeper understanding of their traditional religious practices. Specifically, Iamblichus revealed the integral connection between the rituals of cultic worship and the intellectual disciplines of philosophic paideia. Such an integration had been the goal of Plato himself, and by the fourth century C.E. it was crucial for the survival of Hellenic (i.e., non-Christian) religions. Julian recognized this and intended to repaganize the empire on Iamblichean lines. In his short reign (361–363) he refurbished the temples, restored a state priesthood, and praised the gods in hymns following Iamblichean doctrine. Yet Julian’s enterprise ended abruptly with his death in 363 C.E. and by the end of the fourth century—apart from a small group of philosophical elite—the death of his world had all but transpired and the pagan gods had been exiled from the Christian empire.

Iamblichus lived at a critical juncture in the history of the late antique world. As foremost Platonist of his time and designated “savior” of Hellenic culture, one might expect the “god-inspired Syrian” to have been a leading figure in the pagan polemic against Christianity. After all,

5. I have benefited from Jay Bregman’s unpublished essay: “The Theurgic Bases of Late Pagan ‘Theologico-Political’ Theory.”

his teacher Porphyry had been one of Christianity’s most formidable opponents. Yet there is no extant writing of Iamblichus in which he criticizes, or even mentions, Christianity. For Iamblichus, the central issue of his age was not the polemic between pagans and Christians but the far more serious conflict between “old ways” and “new ways,” between the ancient traditions inspired by the gods and those recently invented by man.

Iamblichus was not a proponent of “Hellenic” culture in the manner of his enthusiastic student Julian. Indeed, writing in the persona of Abammon, an Egyptian priest, Iamblichus claimed in the De Mysteriis that “Hellenes” had already abandoned their religious heritage, and he blamed them for the loss of sanctity in his age:

At the present time I think this is the reason everything has fallen into a state of decay—both in our [sacred] words and prayers—it is because they are continually being changed by the endless innovations and lawlessness of the Hellenes. For the Hellenes are by nature followers of the latest trends and are eager to be carried off in any direction, possessing no stability in themselves. Whatever they may have received from other traditions they do not preserve, but even this they immediately reject and change everything through their unstable habit of seeking the latest terms. (DM 259, 5–14)

Iamblichus’s tirade against the Greeks should not surprise us, for Plato himself censured the Greeks with almost identical charges, and he blamed the cultural demise of his own era on the innovations of Hellenic thinkers (Laws 657a). Such anti-Hellenic criticism was, in fact, a topos in Plato’s writings, as well as his exaltation of barbarian races (especially Egyptian) in contrast to the unstable Greeks. Iamblichus similarly praised the Egyptians and explained the power of their hieratic rites:

Understand that since the Egyptians were first to be allotted the participation in the Gods, the Gods are pleased when invoked according to the custom of the Egyptians [DM 258, 3–6]. . . . The barbarians, since they are fixed in their manners, firmly continue to employ the same words. Thus they are beloved by the Gods

and offer invocations pleasing to them. To no man is it permitted to change these prayers in any way. (DM 259, 14-19)

For Iamblichus, the crisis of the fourth century had little to do with Christianity. As a Platonist he felt responsible to preserve humanity’s contact with the gods, so his concern was not with Christians or with any other group that promised to replace the “old” order with a “new” one. As Plato put it, such purveyors of “new styles” could never corrupt the “sacred” traditions rooted in the cosmic gods (Laws 657b). Yet Iamblichus was more than a Platonist, he was also one of the holy barbarians of whom he speaks. A Syrian by birth, Iamblichus chose not to hellenize his Semitic name, as was the fashion among educated and well-to-do families; rather, like his own pious barbarians he remained loyal to a holy ancestry. Descended from the royal blood of the priest-kings of Emesa—several of whom bore his name—Iamblichus possessed a unique perspective to reinterpret Plato’s esteem for those races who maintained an unbroken contact with the gods. In Iamblichus’s estimation the responsibility of Platonists to value and explore this contact had recently been ignored and Plato’s cosmological principles overlooked due to an excessive rationalism in Platonic schools. This rationalism exalted the powers of the mind while diminishing the prestige of the traditional cults of the gods that, in Iamblichus’s view, were the basis for all genuine culture and wisdom. It is ironic, but the exile of the Hellenic gods lamented by Libanius in the fourth century may well have been initiated by the antipathies of leading Hellenic thinkers toward the powers of the sensible cosmos and the cults that venerated them.9

To appreciate Iamblichus’s contribution to the late antique world and to the Platonic tradition we must understand the crisis of the age as he did. Only then can we understand why Iamblichus placed theurgia (god-work) at the heart of Platonic disciplines, why he preferred it to theologia (god-talk), and why his soteriology was intimately tied to the invocation of the natural powers of the cosmos. Iamblichus believed that the world described by Plato in the Timaeus was being torn apart by a new kind of Platonism that denied the sanctity of the world and elevated the human mind beyond its natural limits. According to Iamblichus such rationalistic hubris threatened to separate man from the activity of the gods, and he presented theurgia as the antidote to restore contact with the divine order.

Iamblichus’s distinction between theurgy and theology is crucial for understanding his Platonism.10 For theology was merely logos, a “discourse about the gods,” and however exalted, it remained a human activity, as did philosophy. Theurgy, on the other hand, was a theion ergon, a “work of the gods” capable of transforming man to a divine status. Although the term theurgia, originated with second-century Platonists to describe the deifying power of Chaldean rituals—some of which were believed to be transmitted by the soul of Plato himself—it was Iamblichus who provided a philosophic rationale for the performance of these rites and ensured that theurgy would become an integral part of the Platonic vocabulary. In Platonic terms, theurgy fulfilled the goal of philosophy understood as a homoiois the6. The rituals themselves, Iamblichus explained, varied according to the capacities of its participants, and though he provided little information about particulars, it is clear that many “theurgic” rites were already well known to the Hellenic world. In the hands of Iamblichus, theurgy represented a revaluation of traditional cult practices. Iamblichus maintained that the divine principles involved in these rites were exemplified abstractly and theoretically in the teachings of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, and that both cultic acts and philosophic paideia were rooted in one source: the ineffable power of the gods. In theurgy these divine principles were embodied and enacted, not merely contemplated, and in whatever context this occurred it was a “work of the gods,” a theurgia in which the human soul participated both as recipient and beneficiary.

As a Platonist, Iamblichus defended the practice of theurgy according to the canons of the Platonic tradition. Therefore, any attempt to understand Iamblichean theurgy must follow the Platonic themes that Iamblichus himself was so careful to explain. Of central concern to Iamblichus was Plato’s description of the cosmos and its role in the education and deification of the soul. As we shall see, it was the issue of the soul’s place in the sensible cosmos that divided Iamblichus and all subsequent theurgical Platonists from the nontheurgical Platonism of Plotinus and Porphyry.

In the De Mysteriis, Iamblichus the philosopher argued that Plato’s

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7. His contemporary, Porphyry, by contrast, was born with the Phoenician name Malchos; John Dillon, “Iamblichus of Chalcis,” 864.
8. The Syriac or Aramaic original is ya-mliku, which means “(El) is king” or “May he rule.” Dillon, “Iamblichus of Chalcis,” 863-65.
teachings were integrally related to the sacred traditions of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians; and as a theurgist, he explained and defended his tradition using Platonic categories. In so doing Iamblichus established a new synthesis of cult and philosophy, becoming the first leader of a Platonic school to function simultaneously as hierarch of a sacred cult. The synthesis of these diverse modes of thought in Iamblichus’s school deeply influenced and, in some measure, defined the soteriological thinking of the later Platonists and other inheritors of Platonic thought.

The great influence Iamblichus exercised over subsequent Platonists was due, in large part, to the theoretical framework he outlined in the De Mysteriis for a wide variety of divinational rites practiced in the late antique world. On the one hand it was a great theoretical achievement to have demonstrated how the abstract tenets of the Platonists were exemplified concretely in time-honored divinational rites. Yet in practical terms, as the Church increasingly began to persecute pagans and outlaw their religious practices in the later fourth century, Iamblichus’s apology for traditional pagan forms of worship and divination gained far more than theoretical significance. The De Mysteriis and Iamblichean theurgy became the foundation for the resurgence and continued life of Platonic communities until the closing of the Athenian Academy by Justinian in 529 C.E. and later—for Platonists in exile—in the frontier city of Harran where Iamblichean Platonism ultimately passed into Arab hands and thrived until the tenth century.

It should be recognized that the author of the De Mysteriis eventually came to play a far different role from any that he might have imagined as a Platonic teacher living on one of his estates in the predominantly pagan Apamea of the late third and early fourth centuries. Even the title of his best-known work, the De Mysteriis, is not his own but that of the Renaissance “magus,” Marsilio Ficino, who attempted to revive Iamblichean Platonism in fifteenth-century Florence. The true title of the work, though less sensational, more accurately describes its contents: “The Reply of the Master Abammon to the ‘Letter of Porphyry to Aneo,’ and the solutions to the difficulties that it contains.” In effect, this treatise, which today has become notorious as an apology for the practice of magic and divination, formed part of the correspondence between two of the most learned Platonists of the later third century. Porphyry, who directed a Platonic school in Rome, posed the questions and was therefore responsible for the structure of the work. Yet it was Iamblichus’s answers that changed the course of Platonism; in his lengthy replies to Porphyry’s questions Iamblichus solved problems that had long vexed Platonists, and he provided a philosophically viable framework for a religious way of life that Porphyry himself had longed to create.

Yet why would Iamblichus adopt the pseudonym of an Egyptian priest in order to explain his Platonic mystagogy? According to the later Platonists the answer was clear. Plato himself had acknowledged that his writings were merely a propaedia to deeper mysteries, and in several dialogues he spoke of the influence of “Oriental,” particularly “Egyptian,” wisdom on his thought. Although Plato probably never participated in Egyptian or Chaldean mysteries, he was believed to have done so by Platonists, and therefore the Oriental element in Iamblichus’s Platonism should not be seen as alien but as an attempt to reveal more completely the wellspring of Platonic wisdom. Just as Plato turned to his Lady of Prophecy, Diotima Mantinea, to reveal erotic mysteries, so Iamblichus deferred to his persona, the Egyptian priest.

16. In his Théologie platonicienne (Th. Pl.), vol. 1 (Saffrey–Westink, 1968), Proclus says that Plato received his philosophy from the gods (5, 1–6), and that in writing the dialogues he functioned as a mystagogue: “the primary leader and hierarch of those true mysteries into which souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated” (6, 2–7). It was a commonplace among Platonists that Plato received his mathematical and hieratic teachings from the Egyptians; see Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (4, 8–10), trans. L. G. Westink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1962), 8–9; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 981a, 21–26.
17. See esp. The Seventh Letter 341c–d.
18. Statesman 290c–e; Timaeus 21; Phaedrus 275b; Laws 819b; Philibius 18b; Charmides 156b–157c.
20. Ibid., 155–57.
Introduction

priest Abammon, to explain theurgic mysteries, the hieratikē technē. In the role of Egyptian mystagogue responding to the questions and criticisms of Porphyry the "philosopher," Iamblichus played "divine revealer" to the wayward Hellene, guiding Porphyry back to the primitive intuitions that Plato and Pythagoras received from the Egyptians. Since Plato's dialogues had already become a kind of scripture for fourth-century Platonists, the hieratic posture adopted by Iamblichus would not have seemed unorthodox.

To understand theurgical Platonism, however, one must first understand Iamblichus's cosmology and soteriology. He believed that it was necessary for the soul to inhabit its proper "place" in the cosmos, so we must try to picture the place of the soul according to the later Platonists. For Iamblichus, Plato's Laws provide the model of a community properly placed in the cosmos.

Plato says that in man's Golden Age humanity was ruled by a divine hierarchy that ensured the well-being of all. The god Kronos established religious and political law, and society was governed by daimons. Plato says:

Kronos gave our communities as their kings and rulers, not men but Daimones, beings of diviner and superior kind just as we still do the same with our flocks of sheep and herds of other domesticated animals. We do not set oxen to manage oxen, or goats to manage goats; we, their betters in kind, act as masters ourselves. So, the god, in his kindness to man, did the same; he set over us the superior race of Daimones. (Laws 713cd; trans. A. E. Taylor)

Guided by these daimons, man enjoyed peace, prosperity, and justice until he usurped their authority, began to rule himself, and ignored the daimons revealed the rhythms of the year through which human society must try to picture the place of the soul according to the later Platonists. For Iamblichus, Plato's Laws provide the model of a community properly placed in the cosmos.

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human society. Acting as intermediaries between the gods and man, daimons revealed the rhythms of the year through which human society contacted the gods in ritual and sacrifice and thus became properly "placed" within the unity of the cosmos. As Plato observes, for a city to be kept alive "its sacrifices and feasts must fit the true natural order (Laws 809d), and this coordination of human acts to the cosmos "increases the intelligence of men" (Laws 809e). Thus, Plato's homoiōsis theod, recognized as the goal of paideia, was measured by the soul's homoiōsis kosmē; to be assimilated to the gods one had to enter into communion with the daimons who revealed them in the natural world.

Plato's taxonomy of the cosmos and society exemplifies what Jonathan Z. Smith has termed a "locative" view of existence. Quoting Cornelius Loew's outline of this worldview Smith describes the locative orientation as centered in five basic propositions: (1) there is a cosmic order that permeates every level of reality; (2) this cosmic order is the divine society of the gods; (3) the structure and dynamics of this society can be discerned in the movements and patterned juxtapositions of the heavenly bodies; (4) human society should be a microcosm of the divine society; and (5) the chief responsibility of priests and kings is to attune human order to the divine order, the demonic was relegated to the province of the inverted soul, turned "upside-down" (anatropē) and alienated from the Whole.

Platonic paideia was supposed to reorient the soul to the cosmic (locative) order and exorcise it of its self-assertion. The "demonic," in the Platonic view, was a symptom of the soul's confusion, the cosmic order gone haywire. Since Platonic taxonomy was locative as well as monis-

24. Cf. Republic 441c where Plato says that the elements of the city are equal in number to the elements of the soul and that these are displayed perfectly in the order of the heavens.
27. The term "demonic," as employed here and by Smith in his taxonomy, represents chaos, disorder, and evil; in short, that which threatens the cosmos. It should not be confused with the daimons of traditional Platonism. The Platonic daimōn was a cosmogonic entity and certainly not evil, although the question surrounding its cosmogonic function did lead, eventually, to dualist interpretations that transformed the Platonic daimōn into a demon.
28. See Plato's description, Tim. 43b–e.
29. I have borrowed Jonathan Z. Smith's use of the term "demonic" as discussed in his article: "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity," ANRW 2, 16.1, see esp. 429–30. While I find Smith's terminology and analysis useful, I disagree with his description of the theurgist's worldview as "utopian" (438). The "utopian" view de-


and Plotinus were in the same camp and represent two possibilities within the utopian orientation: the Gnostics, by identifying the cosmos as evil and the soul as a fallen spirit; and Plotinus, by denying the soul's descent and identifying sensible matter as evil and the cause of the soul's confusion. They seemed to concur that traditional Platonic taxonomy was no longer valid, for both project the demonic outside the soul. For Gnostics the soul was pure but polluted by material demons; for Plotinus the soul never descends at all. And with the effects of anatropē denied, or presumed to inhibit only a nonessential aspect of the soul, Plotinus, as much as the Gnostics, rejected the locative taxonomy of his inherited tradition. By placing the demonic outside the soul, in the demon enchantress Nature (Enn. IV, 4, 43, 23–26) and by denying the soul's descent from the noetic realm, Plotinus reversed Platonic taxonomy. Whereas traditional Platonic paideia had traced an ascent to the gods through a deepening assimilation to cosmic orders, Plotinus's utopian orientation tended to devalue the cosmos as a divine revelation; this, in turn, denied the value of religious rituals tied to the rhythms of the sensible world.

A. C. Lloyd has argued that Iamblichus's metaphysics of the completely descended soul served to justify his practice of theurgic rituals, and conversely, that Plotinus's rejection of ritual practices and Porphyry's low evaluation of them reflected their view of the soul as undescended.

Important as this may be to distinguish the metaphysics of Plotinian and Iamblichean Platonism, it does not sufficiently account for the pronounced significance that Iamblichus gave to this issue. Iamblichus's doctrine of the completely descended soul may, in part, be explained as his intellectual justification for theurgic; but it was far more than that. Tied to this doctrine were issues central to the principles of the Platonic tradition. For Iamblichus, the doctrine of the undescended soul struck at the heart of Platonic paideia because it threatened to desacralize and demonize the cosmos. This consequence, clearly, was not foreseen by Plotinus, who would have opposed it. Indeed, Plotinus argued eloquently for the divinity of the cosmos against the Gnostics (Enn. II, 9), but for Iamblichus such arguments were futile without the corollary doctrine of the soul's descent. If, as Plotinus believed, the soul's confusion does not derive from the soul, if the soul does not undergo a complete change in embodiment, and if it does not, in fact, truly become embodied, then the manifestation of the divine as kosmos would have little or no role in the soul's paideia. In

scribed in his essay seems less a worldview than a view of the self and should not be equated with the utopian worldview as described in Smith's articles: "Birth Up Side Down or Right Side Up?" in Map Is Not Territory, or "The Temple and the Magician."


32. Smith pursues this theme with examples drawn from Gnostic and gnosticizing literature that demonstrate a reversed evaluation of the structures of the cosmos. See also Map Is Not Territory, 172–89.

addition, with the demonic projected from the soul to the sensible cosmos, Plotinus gave to it a permanence it never held in traditional Platonism. In effect, the doctrine of the undescended soul split the cosmos into two opposed worlds, and if the physical world was upside-down (anatropē) and not the soul, then the performance of sacrifices and rituals to assimilate oneself to its orders would be worse than useless; they would be positively harmful.34

The doctrine of an undescended soul also had significant social consequences. If the traditional agricultural and civic religious festivals were tied to nature's powers, to take part in them would commit oneself to the demonic order. The philosopher of thePlotinian school, therefore, should refuse to acknowledge demonic gods or participate in civic religious rites and all corresponding social customs. To paraphrase the words of Plotinus, it is for the gods of the cosmos to come to the philosopher, not for him to go to them.35

While traditional Platonism had long recognized hierarchical distinctions in one's ascent to the gods, it never opposed one stage of paideia to the next in the manner described above. From the soul's prenatal "lessons" given through the mother's rhythmic chants and movements (Laws 790d), to the increase of intelligence from daily rituals (Laws 809d) and the rigorous program of training in gymnastics, music, mathematics and dialectic (Republic 535a–541b), paideia was conceived by Plato as a hierarchical unfolding of the powers of the soul through a corresponding enfolding of the soul into the harmonies and powers of the cosmos. Higher degrees of paideia included lower degrees, just as primary orders of the cosmos contained subordinate orders. With the desacralization of the cosmos, however, this paradigm was lost, and despite Plotinus's profound testament to the divinity of the world in Against the Gnostics (Enn. II. 9), his doctrine of the undescended soul, in principle, has already severed the body from its head. A complete separation was inevitable, ontologically separating the sensible cosmos from the noetic, and politically pitting the philosopher against the common man.

Plotinus's position was reflected in the writings of his disciple, Porphyry, the historical and ideological mediator between Plotinus and Iamblichus.36 In his treatise On the Abstinence of Animal Food,37 Porphyry attacked the practice of animal sacrifice and said such rites did not pertain to gods but to evil daimons: "For he who is studious of piety knows very well that no animated being is to be sacrificed to the Gods; but a sacrifice of this kind pertains to Daimones and to other Powers" (De Abst. II, 36, 5). In an explanation that was sure to delight Christians, Porphyry attributed the origin of these rites to the devices of bloodthirsty daimons whose life depended on ingesting the vapors of blood sacrifice (II, 42, 1). He continued: "Falsehood is allied to these malevolent beings, for they want to be considered as Gods, and the power which presides over them is ambitious to appear as the greatest God. These are they who rejoice in libations and the savour of sacrifices" (II, 42, 2; trans. T. Taylor). The philosopher should stand aloof from this superstitious cult and become godlike by dissociating himself from daimons and their misguided worshipers (II, 43, 3–4). Employing the formula of his master Plotinus, Porphyry advised the philosopher to forgo all ritual activities in order to return "alone, through himself, to God alone" (II, 49, 1); while the philosopher should understand the enchantments of nature and the cults tied to its daimons, he should have nothing to do with them. "In every respect," Porphyry says, "the philosopher is the savior of himself" (II, 49, 2).

I would argue that Porphyry's repudiation of the value of cult sacrifice and his belief that man can save himself depend entirely on his accepting the doctrine of the undescended soul and its corollary that the human self is identical to the divine Nous. On this latter point Porphyry maintained flatly that "the true self is the Nous." (I, 29, 4). This new metaphysics undercut the traditional basis of paideia, for it transformed the Platonic homoiōsis theōs, measured by the soul's assimilation to the cosmic gods, into a homoiōsis heautō with the "self" understood as the divine Nous! The soul's identification with the cosmos, therefore, was no longer necessary or desirable, for the cosmos had been altogether short-circuited: it was something to escape from, not assimilate oneself to. Consequently, Porphyry conceived of salvation as the soul's permanent escape from the cosmos, "never again to find itself held and polluted by the contagion of

35. Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 10.
the world." In this, he abandoned the Platonic doctrine of rebirth, yet his unorthodoxy with respect to traditional Platonism was consistent with its "gnosticized" form where the cosmos, and not the soul, carried the burden of the demonic. Porphyry maintained that permanent escape was possible only for the philosopher, not for the common man, and this again exemplifies the social as well as ontological oppositions tied to the doctrine of the undescented soul. Those incapable of the philosophic escape, says Porphyry, performed theurgic rites to purify their irrational elements, but such souls were never free.

Iamblichus had been led to the higher reaches of Platonism by Porphyry, and although Porphyry also introduced Iamblichus to theurgy it was Iamblichus who discovered its deeper significance. For Porphyry, theurgy functioned as a mere preparatio for the philosophic life and was to be left on the periphery of his higher disciplines. Iamblichus, on the other hand, moved theurgy from periphery to center, not only in the life of the philosopher, but for anyone who worshiped the gods.

With theurgy Iamblichus hoped to recover Plato's positive orientation to the cosmos. At issue was the divine world, and for Iamblichus the most effective means to acknowledge this was through the performance of rites that conformed the soul to its orders. At issue as well was the future of the Platonic philosopher in society. Porphyry's metaphysics of an undescented soul and "demonized" cosmos opposed the philosopher to the sensible world and the social order. For Porphyry, Platonism was limited to an intellectual elite. The theurgical Platonism of Iamblichus, by contrast, allowed for gradations of religious experience that corresponded to the different levels of the cosmos and society. In theurgy, Iamblichus provided a soteriology that theoretically could touch any soul, from the most material to the most spiritual, while preserving their communal affiliations. With a more consistent metaphysics Iamblichus succeeded in restructuring Plato's teachings in a way that preserved the mystical elements of Plotinus's soteriology without losing contact with the physical cosmos or society.

To return to Smith's categories, Iamblichus's theurgical Platonism was "locative" in a highly sophisticated way. In both traditional and theurgical Platonism the demonic was not an external evil on the fringe of the cosmos, for the cosmos was all-embracing and entirely good. Iamblichus, like Plato, placed the demonic within the embodied soul, the only chaos untamed by the Demiurge. Yet, in Iamblichus's Platonism the purpose of this alienation was made clearer; while Plato's Demiurge gave to each soul a spark of himself (Tim. 41c), Iamblichus understood this to mean that each soul had the responsibility to perform its own demiturgia, that is to say, its own theurgy. The task for every soul was to partake in divine mimesis by creating a cosmos out of the initial chaos of its embodiment. Therefore, the "demonic" condition of the embodied soul was a felix culpa without which the soul could not participate in cosmogenesis, including its own creation and salvation.

Platonists of the second and third centuries C.E. had disowned this confusion of the soul. In direct contrast to the traditional taxonomy, Numenius had shifted the demonic from the soul to the sensible world and both Plotinus and Porphyry followed him. These twin doctrines of an upside-down world and an undescented soul were rejected by Iamblichus, who warned Porphyry that such teachings would destroy their entire way of life, saying: "This doctrine spells the ruin of all holy ritual and theurgic communion between gods and men since it places the presence of superior beings outside this earth. For it amounts to saying that the divine is at a distance from the earth and cannot mingle with men and that this lower region is a desert, without gods." Like Plato, Iamblichus believed his age was threatened by the loss of the gods, and he yearned for the time when gods and men were joined concretely through ritual. With theurgical Platonism, Iamblichus tried to recapture this Golden Age, and although he succeeded only within Platonic circles, his Syrian school presents probably the best synthesis of philosophy and ritual in the late antique world. In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus explained in a coherent and systematic way the raison d'être of the rituals he performed and prescribed for others, and he attempted to prove the necessity for these rites through a careful reflection on the intellectual canons of his time: the corpus of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Pythagorean writings.

Since much of Iamblichus's writing is fragmentary, I have had to make speculative interpretations concerning some aspects of theurgy. However, these have been made in accord with the extant literature, and if

40. Porphyry, De regressu animae 32*, 5-25.
41. For a discussion of the greater consistency in Iamblichus's metaphysics than in Plotinus's, see J. M. P. Lowry, The Logical Principles of Proclus' STOICHEIOSIS THEOLOGIKÆ (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1980), 18-25.
43. As attested to in Tim. 36b.
apparently contradictory or unintelligible material begins to “make sense” without doing violence to the extant literature then I believe the interpretive framework has been justified and may at least be considered a viable hypothesis for understanding Iamblichean theurgy. The ineffability of the “divine acts” means that although theurgy was the centerpiece of Iamblichus’s Neoplatonism, it remained undefined. I shall, however, reveal its significance through an examination of the issues that were directly relevant to theurgy and of crucial importance to Iamblichus and other fourth-century Platonists: the status of matter and the material world, the nature of the embodied soul, and the way to achieve salvation. By examining theurgy in each of these contexts successively, I believe we may begin to understand its function and meaning without violating its essentially indefinable character.

Without the goodness of a material world connected to the gods, Iamblichus, as a Platonist, could not have encouraged rituals that invoke the powers of the physical cosmos. If matter was the cause of evil and human suffering—as many argued—a Platonic theurgy would have been inconceivable. Therefore, in Part I, I examine Iamblichus’s arguments against Platonic dualists who had demonized the material world. Using Neopythagorean theories, which he presented as the “old ways” of the Egyptians, Iamblichus argued that matter derived from a divine principle and that the physical cosmos was directly generated by the gods.

Once the material world has been exorcised of evil and is seen to be an expression of divine activity, we turn to the confusion of the human soul, perhaps the most vexing problem for Platonists. In Part II, I examine Iamblichus’s understanding of the soul and his rationale for the performance of theurgic rites. The defining issue for Iamblichus and other Platonists was whether or not a divine soul descended completely into a mortal body, and profoundly different soteriologies developed depending on one’s answer. Since Iamblichus believed the soul fully descended and was, paradoxically, both mortal and immortal, he had to create a soteriological practice that incorporated the soul’s physical actions into a divine pattern—the specific function of theurgic rites. Theurgy allowed the embodied soul to tap the divine power hidden in its mortality and to realize that its paradoxical nature, being both mortal and immortal, allowed it to participate directly in the creation and salvation of the cosmos.

After a careful study of Iamblichus’s psychology and theurgy’s role in the cure of souls, I turn to the actual performance of theurgic rites and the guidelines suggested by Iamblichus. In Part III, I examine the tripartite schema Iamblichus employed to coordinate the mortal activities of souls with their immortal archetypes. For Iamblichus, the cosmos itself was the paradigmatic theurgy: the act of the gods continually extending themselves into mortal expression. Without first appreciating Iamblichus’s conception of the divinity of the material world as well as his views on the paradox of the embodied soul, the full significance of theurgy and the guidelines for its practice could not be properly understood. In short, theurgy was Iamblichus’s attempt to ensure the deification of souls through their assimilation to the orders of the cosmos—a traditional Platonic teaching.

It is with Iamblichean Platonism that my study of theurgy concludes. In Part IV, I argue that theurgy represented Iamblichus’s attempt to bring traditional pagan divinational practices in line with Platonic and Pythagorean teachings. Through discovering metaphysical principles in time-honored sacrifices and divinational rites, Iamblichus believed he was following the example of both Plato and Pythagoras. As the scion of Syrian priest-kings who were, themselves, oracular figures, Iamblichus was ideally suited to refashion the Platonic tradition to meet the cultural and intellectual needs of fourth-century pagans. Iamblichean Platonism, with its emphasis on theurgy, succeeded in incorporating pagan religious rites into the intellectual edifice of Platonism while, at the same time, infusing the Platonic school with the vitality of popular cultic practices. It was a synthesis that other Platonists—for a variety of reasons—had not accomplished, and I hope this study will shed light on the significance of Iamblichus’s achievement.
I

Matter and Embodiment
Embodiment in the Platonic Tradition

In his introduction to Egyptian theology in the *De Mysteriis*, Iamblichus says: "The Egyptians, imitating the nature of the universe and the creative energy of the Gods, themselves produce images of mystical insights—hidden and invisible—by means of symbols, just as nature symbolically reveals invisible measures through visible shapes and the creative energy of the Gods outlines the truth of the Forms through visible images" (*DM* 249, 14–250, 7). Writing under the pseudonym of "Abammon," an Egyptian priest, Iamblichus dedicated book VII of the *De Mysteriis* to the exegesis of the symbols and theology of Egyptian religion.¹ In this passage Iamblichus referred to the theme of

¹ H. D. Saffrey says that Abammon was a theophoric name combining the Syriac word for father "ab(ba)" with the Egyptian god Amon who had been assimilated by the Greeks to Zeus; see his "Abamon, pseudonyme de Jamblique," *Philomathes—Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 227–39. Thus, "Abamon" was a popularized transcription of the Greek *pater theou* or *theopator*, which Saffrey says was descriptive of the theurgist in the Iamblichean scheme of virtues. Iamblichus’s list differs from Porphyry’s in that his highest virtue was called “hieratic” or “theurgic” rather than “paradigmatic” as in Porphyry’s scheme.
divine mimesis, which is of central importance in his apology for theurgy.

Reverence for Egyptian wisdom was already well established in the Platonic tradition in the fourth century C.E., but Iamblichus’s Syrian school exhibited an unmatched admiration for their rites and theology. Iamblichus explained that he revered Egyptian theology because it possessed real power, “imitating the nature of the universe and the creative energy of the Gods.” In Platonic terms this meant taking an active part in the demiurgy of the cosmos and becoming a co-creator with the god of creation. The power and authority of Egyptian rites derived from this cooperative mimesis: according to Iamblichus, they embodied the eternal ratios (metra aida; DM 65, 6) which were the guiding powers of the cosmos. The Egyptians praised by Iamblichus worshiped the true gods of Platonism: the unchanging patterns of nature; they were a community perfectly integrated with the natural world, reproducing in cult and ritual the activity of the Demiurge in the cosmos.\(^3\) For Iamblichus, Egyptian mysteries represented the highest possible appropriation of the divine in mortal life, and he looked to their rites as a model for the religious rituals he introduced to the Platonic tradition under the name of theurgia, a term borrowed from second-century Chaldean Platonists.\(^4\)

Theurgical Platonism represents Iamblichus’s attempt to introduce the divine mimesis of Egyptian cult to the Platonic community and the Hellenic world. It was a contribution that Iamblichus believed was sorely needed by Hellenes because of their obsession with discursive novelties that lacked power and a vital connection to the cosmos (DM 259, 9–14). Like the Egyptian cult, theurgy imitated the gods, and Iamblichus said that every theurgic observance was a ritualized cosmogony (DM 65, 4) that endowed embodied souls—regardless of their station in life—with the divine responsibility of creating and preserving the cosmos. From a theurgical perspective, embodiment itself became a divine service, a way of manifesting the will and beauty of the gods.\(^5\)

Iamblichus’s position irrevocably changed the attitude of Platonists toward embodiment and the physical world, yet the basis for this change and the central role of theurgy in later Neoplatonism have largely been ignored. If theurgy is understood as cooperative demiurgy, then the attitude of a theurgist toward the physical world would be of decided importance. By sharing in the activity of creation the theurgist would participate in the ordering of matter, which was the specific function of the Demiurge as described in Plato’s Timaeus. One’s attitude to the body and matter, then, would be an index of the degree and manner of one’s participation in the Demiurge; more specifically, Iamblichus

\(^{2}\) Porphyry’s list of the virtues is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>virtue</th>
<th>activity</th>
<th>agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political</td>
<td>curbing of passions</td>
<td>virtuous man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cathartic</td>
<td>cleansing of passions</td>
<td>daimonic man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theoretic</td>
<td>intellectual activity</td>
<td>good daimon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paradigmatic</td>
<td>conjunction with the intellect</td>
<td>father of gods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iamblichus interpreted Porphyry’s theoretic and paradigmatic virtues as degrees of “human” intelligence and distinguished them from the hieratikai (or theurgikai) aretai (cf. Damascius, In Phaed. paras. 138–44, in L. G. Westerink, ed. and trans., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, 64–87; (New York: North-Holland, 1977). For Iamblichus, the theurgic virtues were “father, in the soul, of all in it which exists from god” (Saffrey, “Abamon,” 238), not intellectual virtues as listed by Porphyry. Thus, the term theopator, which Porphyry gave to the one who practiced “paradigmatic” virtues, was transferred by Iamblichus to the theurgist.

By using the pseudonym Abamon (father of gods) Iamblichus avoids the indiscretion of refusing his teacher directly; at the same time, he plays on Porphyry’s scheme of the virtues, adopting a name as an apologist for theurgy, which describes the highest degree of virtue in Iamblichus’s own system.


4. Though Porphyry was the first Platonist to adopt theurgical practices, it was Iamblichus who elevated its importance. For a discussion of the origin of the term, see Hans Lewy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy, ed. M. Tardieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), 461–66.

held that the worship of embodied souls was determined precisely by their degree of material involvement (DM 219–228, 13).

The theurgist’s highest good was not realized by escaping from materiality but by embracing matter and multiplicity in a demiurgic way. In this, Iamblichus virtually reversed the symbolic language of his age: apotheosis in theurgy could no longer be imagined as the ascent of the soul (the well-known Plotinian metaphor), without a corresponding descent and demuturgy. The pivot on which the metaphor turned was Iamblichus’s understanding of the soul’s relation to matter, and his solution to this question is critical for understanding the central role he gives to theurgy. Indeed, in the view of Iamblichus and other hieratic Neoplatonists, embodied souls were able to attain salvation only through the theurgic use of matter.

That the soul’s ritual use of matter could itself bring about the salvation of the soul was certainly a new development in the Platonic tradition, yet despite its apparent unorthodoxy, there are elements in the dialogues that lend it support—most obviously the doctrine of *anamnesis*, the core of Plato’s epistemology (Phaedo 75e; Meno 81cd). In the doctrine of recollection, the soul’s education is described as a process of reawakening by means of contacts with the sensible world that functioned as mnemonic prods, reminding the soul of the Platonic Forms. Theurgy should be seen as the development and translation of this epistemological theory into a ritual praxis where the prods of sensate experience were carefully controlled in rites designed to awaken the soul to the Forms. While the doctrine of recollection lent itself specifically to a theurgic development, the cosmology of the *Timaeus* provided the necessary framework: without the descent of souls into mortal bodies and the physical appearance of Forms Plato says the work of the Demiurge would remain incomplete. The embodiment of the soul and its perfection in theurgy was seen by Iamblichus as essential to cosmogenesis.

Although there is evidence in Plato’s dialogues that seems to contradict Iamblichus’s positive view of matter and embodiment, this conflict is in the dialogues themselves and was the inheritance of any Platonist who attempted to resolve the problem of embodiment. Plotinus, for example, in his discussion of embodiment, said that the *Timaeus* supported an optimistic view of the soul’s descent, while the Phaedo and

6. For an illuminating discussion of ritualized recollection among neoplatonizing Muslims, see Henry Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, tr. W. Trask (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1980), 115–16. Pierre Hadot says that the notion of innate or pre-intellectual knowledge of the Forms had assumed a “mystical value” for Iamblichus since, for him, each soul has “innate knowledge of the gods” (DM 7, 14); Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1968), 1:117 n. 6.


Iamblichus solved the Platonic problem of matter and embodiment as a "Pythagorean," for he viewed all aspects of creation, however dense, as expressions of the primary and divine principles: peras-apeiron. Theurgic rites allowed the soul to enter these measures directly, ritually enacting divine principles whose power was shared by those who embodied them.

Iamblichus’s solution must also be seen in the context of the late third and fourth centuries and the increasing popularity of religions of radical dualism exemplified in Gnosticism, Manichaeanism, and, to some degree, Christianity. The question of the value of life in a body and the status of the physical world had become highly charged issues on which often depended the salvation or damnation of one’s soul. In this light, it was not Iamblichus as Platonic scholar and mathematician that attracted the adulation of his successors. It was Iamblichus as savior, theios lambichos, who revealed mysteries that transformed the suffering and weight of material experience into a foundation for communion with the gods. The body-as-tomb (sôma = sêma), “riveted to the soul by sense experience” (Phaed. 83d), became the vehicle through which the soul found its proper limits, thereby “saving itself” and “becoming liberated while still in a body” (DM 41, 10). Thus, matter and the soul’s use of matter played an indispensable role in theurgy as it did in cosmogony. The soul could no more realize its salvation without embracing matter than the Demiurge could create the cosmos without the formless receptacle that gave expression to the Forms (Tim. 48e–49a). The difference, however, is that while the soul’s embrace of matter was piecemeal, following the cycles of time, the act of the Demiurge on matter was simultaneous and complete, and it is precisely in this “difference” that Iamblichean theurgy must be understood.

At this point we should bear in mind that Iamblichus’s term for “matter” was coined by Aristotle who said that Plato’s material principle, which was called “space” (chôra) (Tim. 52b), “receptacle” (hupodochê), “mother” (mêtêr), and “nurse” (thînê) (Tim. 49b), was equivalent to the term hulê: “the receptive space (chôra) of Plato’s Timaeus is the same as matter (hulê)” (Physics 209b, 11–13). Hulê, originally meaning “wood” or “timber,” henceforth became the technical philosophical term used by Platonists to refer to “matter.” Like most Neoplatonists, Iamblichus believed Aristotle and Plato were essentially in agreement, and he translated many of Aristotle’s theories about the physical world to the intelligible. Aristotle’s influence on Iamblichus, however, remained terminological and to some degree structural, for his meanings were transformed entirely in Iamblichus’s theurgical Platonism.
Matter as Cosmic Instrument

Iamblichus's description of the origin of matter in the *De Mysteriis* concludes his explanation of Egyptian and Hermetic theology. After asserting a primordial and ineffable god, Iamblichus describes the “first God and king” (DM 261, 10), “God and principle of God” (DM 262, 4), who derived self-begotten as a “monad from the one” (DM 262, 4–5); and it is from this god, the “father of essence” (DM 262, 6), and “principle of intelligibles” (DM 262, 7–8), that matter is created. He says: “God produced matter out of the scission of materiality from substantiality, which the Demiurge, receiving as a living substance, fashioned into simple and impassible spheres and organized the last of this into generated and mortal bodies” (DM 265, 6–10). This is repeated almost verbatim in Iamblichus’s commentary on the *Timaeus* quoted by Proclus: “The divine Iamblichus relates that Hermes wishes materiality to be created out of substantiality; and it is likely that it is from this source that Plato derived such a doctrine of matter.”

Iamblichus’s portrayal of matter here is clearly positive, and the reference to Hermes was meant to lend authority to his view. Iamblichus’s metaphysical position was monistic, as can be seen in his summary of the Egyptian hierarchy: “And thus, from on high to the lowest things, the Egyptian doctrine concerning principles (archai) begins from the One and proceeds into multiplicity, and the multitude in turn is governed by the One; and everywhere the indefinite nature is ruled by a certain defined measure and by the highest uniform cause of all things” (DM 264, 14–265, 6). Not only was matter divinely created; even its furthest sensible expression was dominated by the supreme principle.2

Iamblichus’s Hermetic position opposed Platonic dualists such as Numenius, who viewed matter as autonomous and evil, and Plutarch, who postulated an evil soul that preceded the World Soul.3 Iamblichus also disagreed with Plotinus’s portrayal of matter; although Plotinus said that intelligible matter was divine and essentially good (*Enn.* II, 4, 5, 12–22), he condemned sensible matter as the “cause of all evils” and “evil in itself” (*Enn.* I, 8, 3, 38–40). Plotinus left a breach between intelligible and sensible matter, with the latter carrying the pejorative imagery of his dualist predecessors.4 Iamblichus, on the other hand, asserted an unbroken continuity between divine and sensible matter. The implications of this argument will be treated later, but in sum, Clemens Bäumker has characterized the difference by pointing out that while the Plotinian cosmos was diminished in value in proportion to its degree of sensible expression, in the Iamblichean world sensible matter represented no subtraction of intelligible power because it was derived directly from the highest intelligible being, the *aoristes duas*.5 Iamblichus, under the influence of Pythagorean arithmology, viewed all manifestation, sensible or intelligible, as reducible to numerical principles, and it is possible that many important differences between pre- and post-Iamblicheans were due more to the influence on Iamblichus of an “immanentist” Pythagorean...
ean metaphysics than to his reputed “Oriental” predisposition to “alien ideas.”

Festugière demonstrated that Iamblichus’s description of the origin of matter was a well-known Pythagorean teaching, as evidenced in the writings of the Neopythagorean Moderatus of Gades (first century C.E.). In Moderatus’s description of first principles, “quantity” (posōtēs) is derived from Unifying Reason (henētai logos), after it has been separated from it and deprived of all “formal qualities,” and in Iamblichus’s system materiality is derived from the Paternal Monad when it is separated from substantiality (i.e., all formal qualities).7 The posōtēs of Moderatus and the hulē/hulotēs of Iamblichus were functionally the equivalents of the material principle in the Timaeus, which was able to receive the Forms without distortion because it lacked all “formal” qualities (Tim. 49b).

In his Introduction to the Arithmetic of Nicomachus Iamblichus again discussed the origin of the matter that was shaped by the Platonic Demiurge: “The God, Demiurgos, is not the creator of matter, but when he receives it, as eternal, he molds it into forms and organizes it according to numerical ratios.”8 Having already explained that form and matter in the cosmos are analogous to the monad and dyad in number (In Nic. 78, 11–14), Iamblichus maintained that just as numbers are derived from combinations of the monad and dyad, the manifest world is derived from a demiurgic activity that he called the “rhythmic weaving” of monadic and dyadic archai.9 Arithmogony, for Iamblichus, was the analogue of cosmogony, and both expressed the harmony of opposed principles.10 Thus Iamblichus: “If, as the Pythagoreans say, ‘there is a combination and unification of disagreeing parts and a harmony of things naturally at war,’ the essence of harmony necessarily holds rule.”11 Quoting another Pythagorean dictum, Iamblichus says: “There is nothing in existence in which opposition is not present.”12 These oppositions, held in measured grades of tension and proportion, made up the framework for physical manifestation.

Iamblichus maintained that the “wisest men” (the Pythagoreans) grasp all things according to number (In Nic. 72, 6–9), and following their example, he believed that all matter—from its intelligible to sensible expression—simply manifested the dyadic principle.13 In his treatise On General Mathematical Science, Iamblichus gives an account of this principle and describes the place of evil in the cosmos:14

Now, of the mathematical numbers let the two first and highest principles be set forth: the One (which one must not yet call “being” on account of its being simple, the principle of beings and not yet that sort of being of which it is principle), and the other is the principle of the Many which—of itself—is able to provide division. Because of this, as much as it is in our power to say, we compare it to a completely fluid and pliant matter.15

6. C. J. Vogel has discussed the difference between Plato’s “metaphysics of the transcendent” and the Pythagorean “metaphysics of immanent order”; see de Vogel, Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966), 197–200. In the hands of Pythagoreans such as Iamblichus the transcendence/immanence distinction of Plato and Pythagoras was fused into an ineffable principle at once transcendent and immanent. As regards Iamblichus’s supposed infection by alien (Oriental) ideas, see E. R. Dodds, “Iamblichus,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 538. Festugière, however, argues that Neopythagorean notions of a transcendent god and material dyad need not derive from Oriental sources: “On le voit donc, quelque route qu’on suive, qu’on distinguait Monade et Dyade aoristos comme un couple antithétique, ou qu’on les réunait en une même Monade arsentathus, on réverait à la notion de l’Hen absolument transcendant. Ces speculations, purement grecques, sont antérieures à Éudore. Et il n’est donc nul besoin de recourir à l’Orient pour expliquer la transcendance de Dieu.” La. Rev. 4:53.


10. Iamblichus said that according to the Pythagoreans there were “ten” such kinds of relations (schēseis) being explained arithmetically as the ten proportions or “means” that developed out of the initial opposition of the “odd” and “even” (In Nic. 72, 9–13). “Ten,” for the Pythagoreans, was the glyph for the perfectly manifested cosmos; it culminated the arithmogonic progression symbolized in the tetractys. All manifest possibilities were contained in the decad-tetractys.


14. Philip Merlan was the first to argue that chapter IV of De Communi Mathematica Scientia Libri (DCMS) was taken directly from Speusippus. John Dillon has recently supported Merlan’s thesis against Tarán’s criticism. See J. Dillon, “Speusippus in Iamblichus,” Phronesis 29, no. 3 (1984): 325–32. Whether chapter 4 of DCMS draws directly or indirectly from Speusippus, Iamblichus certainly stands behind it.

The archai, One and Many, were nonexistent in themselves, but in combination they gave rise to intelligible differentiation and being. Evil arose as a subsidiary and was not identified with matter. Thus Iamblichus:

Let it be thus for us. In the elements from which numbers arise neither beauty nor the good yet exist, but out of the combination of the One and the causal matter of the Many, number subsists. In these first existences [numbers], being and beauty appear, and, in turn, from the elements of lines, geometrical existence appears in which being and beauty are similarly found and in which there is nothing ugly or evil. But, in the last of things, in the fourth and fifth levels, which are composed from the last existences, evil appears, not as a guiding principle, but from something falling out and not maintaining the natural order.  

Evil came to exist only accidentally, from a falling out and lack of control in the fourth and fifth grades of existence, not, as Tarrant translates: “from ... failing to control nature’s way,” as if nature were evil, for in the Theology of Numbers, attributed to Iamblichus, he says that phusis is good and the same as pronoia, that is, nature is providence and manifests the order of the gods. Although Iamblichus gives no explanation for the fourth and fifth levels, Merlan, Kramer, and Tarrant suggest that he was following a Speusippan design but they disagree on its

ontological order. John Dillon argues that Iamblichus is either quoting Speusippus directly or paraphrasing him.

Iamblichus flatly denied that the material principle of number was evil. In On General Mathematical Science he says: “It is not appropriate to contend that this [material principle] is evil or ugly. It would be far from true to suggest that the material principle is evil.” Iamblichus argues that if the One is praised on account of its independence (autarcheia) and being the cause of beauty in numbers, “would it not be senseless to say that the natural receptacle of such a thing is evil or ugly?” Just as the principles of the “same” and “different” were mixed together by “persuasive necessity” in the Timaeus (35a), so, Iamblichus said, the principles of unity and multiplicity were combined by “a persuasive necessity” (tinos pithanēs anagōgēs; DCMS 15, 17) and in both cases the resulting harmonia served as the framework for the manifest world.

The dualism that Iamblichus described in On General Mathematical Science held only at the level of mathematical numbers; the Theology of Numbers said that the dyad itself, the principle of multiplicity and matter, not only is derived from the One, but, in a certain sense, is the One: “According to one designation they [the Pythagoreans] call the monad ‘matter’ and ‘receptacle of all’ since it is the cause of the dyad and of all receiving ratios.” In short, prior to the two primary principles of the One and the Many (DCMS 15, 6–14) Iamblichus asserts a monad from which these principles derive and in which they remain essentially contained. This was consistent with what we know of Iamblichus’s metaphysics in the De Mysteriis where he described a paternal monad (itself derived from a higher unity) that gave rise to the division of materiality and substantiality (DM 265, 6–10). The consistency of Iamblichus’s metaphysics is borne out by Damascius, who said that Iamblichus asserted an “entirely ineffable” One (pantellēs arrethton) prior to the simple unity (H 1).


24. DCMS 16, 4–6. Text: ὁς σὺν ἠλείων ἐν ἐπὶ λέγων τὸ κακὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δεικνύμεν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ ταῖον πρέγματος εἶναι;

haplōs hen) that preceded the limit (peras) and unlimited (aperion) and whose mixing gave rise to the One-Being (to hen on).26

The dyad, amblichus said more specifically, served as a borderland (metathemion) between the multiple arithmoi, represented by the triad, and the monad.27 This he demonstrated by the fact that while the monad is made greater by addition than by multiplication (1 + 1 > 1 x 1), and all other numbers become greater by multiplication than addition (3 x 3 > 3 + 3; 4 x 4 > 4 + 4, etc.), the dyad alone remains equal by addition or multiplication (2 + 2 = 2 x 2) (TA 10, 10–11, 1). It was the "mother of numbers" and served as the matrix that transformed the monad into arithmoi.28

Though amblichus held a positive view of matter, as a Platonist, he needed to account for Plato’s description of matter as the discordant and chaotic mass ordered by the Demiurge.29 In his commentary on the Timaeus (30a), amblichus argued that this passage should not be taken literally so that chaos is understood to exist prior to an ordered cosmos. This, amblichus says, would be "impious, not only about the cosmos, but about the Demiurge himself, utterly abolishing either his supremely good will or else his creative power."30 Rather, amblichus said that Plato described a cosmos after chaos in order to emphasize the dependence of the sensible world on: (1) the providence of the Demiurge, (2) the choreography of the Nous, and (3) the presence of the soul, without which the cosmos would fall into disarray. The separation of corporeality from its form-giving qualities was merely a necessity of discourse. amblichus explains: "although the cosmos is eternally in the being of its


28. Iamblichus gave the dyad the epithets “Isis” based on the false etymology with isos “equal” (TA 13, 12) and “Rhea” because of the “flowing” (rhÃ¿s) of the material principle (14, 7). Though the dyad was needed to mediate the appearance of the intelligible arithmoi, in itself it was without “form” either en dunaei, as the monad (TA 1, 9), or en energeis, as all other numbers (1, 10).

29. Tim. 30a. It was from this passage that Plutarch developed his theory of a discordant World Soul that was brought to order by the Demiurge. See On the Generation of the Soul 1014bc, ed. Cherniss.

30. J. Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidensis, 141.

31. Ibid., 140.
an intimate connection with the composite lives that it sustains. Despite the fact that the soul, *kath' heautēn*, is ungenerated and free of suffering, it nevertheless “inclines and is turned to the generated composites over which it has jurisdiction” (*DM* 21, 6–7), and to the degree that the soul’s attention falls into these lives it is subject to the suffering and evils that are their lot.\(^{36}\)


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**Matter as Obstacle to the Embodied Soul**

What good . . . can be generated from matter?

It is precisely in the turn to composite lives that the perspective on matter changes from that of the World Soul to that of particular embodied souls; in turn, the portrayal of matter becomes pessimistic. Even the “optimistic” *Timaeus* touched briefly on the cause for this pessimism in its description of the confusion that attends the embodiment of the soul (*Tim. 44*). In this regard, the pessimistic language of the *Phaedo* should be understood within the context of the soul’s entire incarnational itinerary. The perception of the body as a “prison” would be an important and necessary step in the soul’s progress toward a complete incarnation. The negative imagery functioned as a catalyst to purge the soul of an identity anchored in the sensible world; in light of Iamblichus’s itinerary for the study of the Platonic dialogues, where the *Phaedo* is read early on,\(^1\) its negative view of embodiment should be seen as a medicinal shock, intended to disturb the soul’s complacency and later to be ameliorated with a more complete understanding.\(^2\)

1. Iamblichus’s itinerary for the reading of the Platonic dialogues and their relation to the development of the virtues is explained in *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, intro., text, and trans. L. G. Westerlink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1962), xxxvii–xl.
2. In support of this interpretation I refer the reader to Iamblichus’s definition of *katharsis* in *De Anima* where he contrasts the “lesser” perfections of catharsis, which are
That matter and embodiment were described both negatively and positively by Plato suggests that his writings were not to be taken as univocal truths but—as Iamblichus believed—spiritual exercises employed by students at different stages of development and under the careful guidance of teachers. While one student would be encouraged to dwell on the ascetic themes of the Phaedo, another would be directed to the Symposium to contemplate erotic connections that would be impossible unless the soul had already practiced the asceticism and withdrawal encouraged by the Phaedo. The Platonic worldview was hierarchical, and in Iamblichus’s Syrian school each dialogue had a specific purpose (skopos), the realization of which was dependent upon the student fulfilling its precedents. They were not simply intellectual exercises but demanded profound transformations in the students who practiced them as part of their spiritual discipline.

Without taking into consideration Iamblichus’s hierarchical understanding of Platonic education and its relation to the cosmos, his negative descriptions of matter in the De Mysteriis would appear inconsistent with his position on matter outlined above. For example, in book III, chapter 28, Iamblichus condemned the makers of magical talismans and idols on the grounds that their work was artificial (technikōs) and not theurgical (theurγikōs) (DM, 170, 9–10). Iamblichus dissociated theurgy from such artifice with a twofold critique, expressing concern for (a) the character of the idolmaker, and (b) the material of his work. Iamblichus argued that while theurgy revealed the creative powers of the Demiurge and was rooted in uniform essences, the art of the idolmaker concerned merely the last efflux of nature and attempted to manipulate the material world with sympathetic attractions. The creator of the stars and planets, simply purgative and remove the soul from somatic attachments, with the complete catharsis that follows purification and withdrawal with a reinvestment into particulars in a divine manner (Stob. I, 435, 25–456, 8).


true images of the gods, was *theos*, but of artificial idols Iamblichus says: “God is not their maker, but man. Nor are they produced out of uniform and intelligible essences, but from matter which has been acquired. What good, therefore, can be generated from matter and from the corporeal powers around matter and in bodies?” (DM 168, 3–8). Iamblichus no doubt meant to refute Porphyry’s depiction of theurgy as a material manipulation of the gods, and therefore emphasized the indigence of material things as compared to divine beings; nevertheless he does ask: “What good can be generated from matter?” (DM 168, 6), which seems to contradict his remarks in the *Theology of Numbers* and *On General Mathematical Science*. It is clear that the context of Iamblichus’s discourse has changed significantly; here his description of matter was unquestionably negative.

Throughout his exposition of theurgical sacrifice in book V, Iamblichus referred to matter as a pollution from which souls must be cleansed. For example, he says: “the contamination from material things falls upon those who are held in a material body; and as many souls as are subject to defilement by matter should necessarily be purified” (DM 204, 4–7). Matter was the obstacle that kept souls from communion with the gods. Since the gods were free from the pollution of matter, to reach them souls had to break free from material bonds. Iamblichus says:

> "Just as the Gods split matter with lightning and separate from it things which are essentially immaterial but have been dominated and bound by matter, and from being passive render them impulsive, so also our [sacrificial] fire, imitating the activity of the divine fire, destroys everything material in the sacrifices, purifies the offerings by fire, and frees them from the bonds of matter. It makes them suitable for communion with the Gods through the purity of nature and in the same manner it frees us from the bonds of generation, assimilates us to the Gods, makes us fit for their friendship (philia), and leads our material nature up to the immaterial." (DM 215, 15–216, 8)

In these passages matter is opposed to the gods and the body is seen as the prison from which souls are freed. Yet Iamblichus also said that matter was an impediment only for individual souls, not for the World Soul or celestial souls (stars). For these, embodiment produced no “injury” nor “obstacle” (DM 200, 7–8), but “to a particular soul the communion with the body is demeaning in both these respects” (DM 200, 8–10). What determined whether or not matter impeded souls was the kind of
body they inhabited and the perspective this allowed them. While human souls were particular and had a partial perspective, the World Soul and celestial souls were “wholes,” complete worlds with a global perspective—a critical difference to which we will return.

The “bonds of generation” from which souls had to be cleansed were personified by Iamblichus as daimones, mediating entities that tied souls to their bodies. In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus says: “One must assign to daimones the jurisdiction over generative powers, as well as the responsibility over nature and of binding souls to bodies” (DM 67, 15–68, 1). To free the soul from the bonds of generation theurgic sacrifice had to overcome the daimonic powers of nature. For, Iamblichus says, “Daimones lead souls down into nature” (DM 79, 9–10), not up to the gods. Yet, these same daimons followed divine will. “[They] bring into manifest activity the invisible good of the Gods . . . reveal what is ineffable in the Gods, shape what is formless into forms, and render what is beyond all measure into visible ratios” (DM 16, 16–17, 4). In the De Mysteriis daimones were portrayed both as agents of the Demiurge and as powers that defiled the soul by tying it to matter. This ambivalence was due to their centrifugal activity: in being agents of the Demiurge in the “procession” of the gods, it was their task to exteriorize specific aspects of the divine, and in disseminating the divine presence into matter daimons also led the attention of particular souls into a centrifugal and extroverted attitude. This was what bound them to their bodies and caused them to suffer.

In his opening remarks to Porphyry in the De Mysteriis Iamblichus said that he would reply to his questions theoretically, philosophically, or theurgically (DM 7, 2–6). Iamblichus’s description of daimones surely was drawn from his theurgic vocabulary: daimones were the personified powers of matter, entities whose centrifugal influence on souls was encountered and turned around in theurgic rituals. Iamblichus, therefore, allowed for a functional dualism within his monism. In the imagery of theurgic rites he pitted spiritual gods against material daimons, but as the soul was gradually freed from the bonds of generation it began to participate in the fundamental unity of the cosmos. By fulfilling the commands of a theurgic rite, the soul began to share in the continuity that extended from the gods to matter and in which the materializing daimones played an important and beneficial role.

The dualistic language of the De Mysteriis was even more evident in the Chaldean Oracles. Based on the extant fragments, the Oracles seem to have been more “hieratic” than the De Mysteriis and less “philosophical”; they pertain strictly to ritual phenomena and are in no way an apology for ritual practices as was the De Mysteriis. Hans Lewy and Frederick Cremer have proven that these oracles, “recorded” by second-century Platonists, had a significant influence on Iamblichean theurgy. Their negative portrayal of the material world is evident in the following logos:

Fragment 88: [Nature] persuades us to believe that daimones are pure, and that the offspring of evil matter are good and useful.

Fragment 90: from the hollows of the earth leap chthonian dogs (i.e., daimons), who never show a true sign to a mortal.

Fragment 135: they [daimones] enchant souls, forever turning them away from the [holy] rites.

Yet, as in the De Mysteriis, the Oracles also said that matter was derived from the highest divinity, the “source of sources” (πηγῆ πηγῶν). Faced with this ambiguity, Cremer asks: “Wen die Materie von Gott kommt, wodurch ist sie ein kakon?” and answered that Iamblichus attempted to resolve this problem by recourse to the notion of “unsympathetic sympathy,” of a “matter alien to the gods” (ἡ ἀλλωτρία τῶν θεῶν; DM 233, 17). Lewy said that the development of an “evil matter” represented the attempt by late antique thinkers, under Gnostic influence, to correct the portrayal of matter in Plato’s Timaeus. This resulted in a conflation of monist and dualist themes whose precise origin, he says, “can no longer


6. “Continuity” was the sine qua non for all theurgy. See DM 31, 18–32, 7. For the role of daimons in this continuity see DM 16, 6–20, 19.


8. Majercik, Chaldean Oracles, 82.

9. Ibid., 85.

10. Ibid., 101.

11. des Places, Oracles chaldaïques, frag. 30, p. 73.

12. Cremer, Die Chaldäischen Orakel, 30 n. 73.

13. Ibid., 28 n. 73.
be known."\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, in his study of the Chaldean goddess Hecate, Lewy provides the key for understanding the role of matter in the \textit{De Mysteriis} as well as in the Oracles.\textsuperscript{15}

According to the Oracles, Hecate was queen of the daemons, and as such she personified all the powers of nature and matter. Lewy explains: “The Chaldean Hecate encountered the human souls in forms always adequate to their internal condition: for those sunk in the body she was necessity; for the erring, demonic temptation; for the renegade, a curse; for those who recalled their divine nature, a guide; and for those who returned home, grace.”\textsuperscript{16} Hecate was a mirror of the embodied soul, reflecting the soul’s experience of matter and its own internal condition. In this sense, matter (Hecate) functioned as an index of the soul’s spiritual condition and was evil only in proportion to the soul’s attachment to its material existence. From a theurgic perspective, therefore, matter could not be considered apart from the soul’s existential situation.

In the \textit{De Mysteriis} Iamblichus used the terms \textit{hulê, phusis, sôma, and genesis} nearly synonymously to define the “place” of the soul’s extension.\textsuperscript{17} They made up the field in which the soul’s faculties were developed and tested, and its use of power in a corporeal existence determined its evaluation of matter. Embodied life could be experienced as a bondage to fate or as an opportunity to live under divine providence, depending on how the soul used its powers. For Iamblichus, providence (\textit{pronoia}) and fate (\textit{heirmarmenê}) were functional terms describing the soul’s experience of one divine law: salvific for those who obeyed and embodied it, oppressive to those who resisted it.\textsuperscript{18}

In a letter to his student Macedonius, Iamblichus explained the nature of the soul and its relation to fate and providence. He says:

\begin{quote}
The essence of the soul, in itself, is immaterial and incorporeal, entirely ungenerated and indestructible, possessing in itself Being and Life; it is completely self-moved and yet is the principle of nature and of all movements [Cf. DM 35, 9–11]. The soul, therefore, to the degree that it is itself, contains in itself self-authority, freedom, and life. But, to the degree that it gives itself to generated things, it is put under the sway of the cosmos, and to that degree it is led by fate and serves the necessities of nature. (\textit{Stob. II, 173, 5–13})
\end{quote}

Fate ruled only those whose attention had been given over to generated things, not those who participated in their guiding principle. Iamblichus continued:

To be brief, the movements of fate around the world may be likened to immaterial and noetic activities and revolutions, and the order of fate resembles this intelligible and pristine order. Secondary powers [encosmic gods] are joined with primary causes [hypercosmic gods] and the multitude in generation, and thus all things under fate are joined with undivided essence and with providence as a guiding principle. In accord with this same essence, then, fate is interwoven with providence and, in reality, \textit{fate is providence}, is established from it and around it.

This being the case, the principle of human actions moves in concert with both these principles of the cosmos [fate and providence]. But there is also a principle of action liberated from nature and free from the movement of the cosmos. On account of this it is not contained in the motion of the world. Thus, it is not introduced from nature nor from any motion but is pre-established as more ancient, not having been derived from anything.\textsuperscript{19}

Wherefore, since the soul is allotted certain parts from all the parts and elements of the cosmos and uses these, it is contained in the order of fate, takes its place in this order, fulfills its conditions, and makes proper use of it. And to the degree that the soul combines in itself pure reason, self-substantiated and self-moved, acting from itself and perfect, it is liberated from all external

\textsuperscript{14} Lewy, \textit{Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy}, 382.
\textsuperscript{15} The term \textit{hulê} was used by Iamblichus interchangeably with \textit{phusis, sôma, and genesis} and, in the Oracles, one may add the deities “Hades” and “Hecate” to the list. On Hecate as salvific goddess see Sarah Johnson, \textit{Hekate Soteira} (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1989).
\textsuperscript{16} Lewy, \textit{Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy}, 365.
\textsuperscript{17} See Cremer’s remarks, \textit{Die Chaldäischen Orakel}, 91.
\textsuperscript{19} Iamblichus referred to this “more ancient” and “preexistent” principle to distinguish theurgical divination from human divination (DM 165, 14–166, 1). In the \textit{De Mysteriis} Iamblichus often referred to astrology, one of the important forms of divination in late antiquity, and this passage on “fate” should be understood in an astrological context. One’s fate was commonly believed to be determined by one’s astral nativity—a point Iamblichus denies (DM 270, 9–11). Note also in this passage that Iamblichus mentions repeatedly that the soul is free from astral determinism; the soul is apolites (Stob. 174, 12), apheitos (173, 14), and authaires (173, 15). Iamblichus’s argument draws, in large part, from the Stoics’ accommodation of “fate” and “providence.” Cf. Augustine Bouche-Leclercq, \textit{Astrologie grecque} (Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1963), 31–32.
things. But to the degree that the soul extends into different modes of life, falls into generation, and identifies with the body, it is sewn into the order of the world. (Stob. II, 173, 26–174, 27)

The "parts" given to each soul from the totality of the cosmos made up its astrological portrait, and it was this confluence of elements at a particular juncture in time and space that made up the soul's localized self, the somatic testing ground that measured the soul's ability to integrate corporeal existence into a divine pattern. Failure to fulfill the conditions of the body resulted in fixations, unfulfilled conditions, and the subsequent suffering of "fate." The proper care of the body and somatic life, however, freed the soul from these bonds and allowed it, as Iamblichus says, to see "the turnings of fate to be like the perfect revolutions of the stars" (Stob. II, 173, 26–28).

In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus described the human soul as the eschatos kosmos, the last world and reality: "Recognize, if you will, the lowest of divine beings: the soul purified from the body" (DM 34, 8). Because the human soul was the lowest divinity it suffered with the mortal lives that it sustained. Identified with only "certain parts" of the cosmos, the soul lost its perspective of the "whole" and became absorbed into the flux of mortal life.

Since matter cannot be discussed, from an existential perspective, apart from the soul's experience of it, one may assume that Iamblichus's negative remarks about matter in the De Mysteriis describe, in fact, the soul's experience of matter. Though Iamblichus used the same term, \( \text{hulē} \) (or its functional equivalents: \( \text{sōma}, \text{physis}, \text{genesis} \)), it was not the \( \text{hulē} \) of the Theology of Numbers or the \( \text{hulē} \) produced from the paternal monad in the De Mysteriis. It is one thing to speak about matter philosophically or theologically—in an abstract or theoretical way—quite another to experience matter and to outline a practical discipline to free souls from its constraints. However, apart from telling Porphyry that he will answer questions philosophically, theologically, or theurgically as he deemed appropriate, Iamblichus did not explicitly signal the shifts in his discourse (DM 7, 2–6). What was undoubtedly clear to himself and his readers is not always clear to us. Being accustomed to a more univocal
use of terms, the modern reader of the De Mysteriis will likely miss these contextual shifts and find Iamblichus’s use of terms inconsistent and confusing.1

Therefore, in spite of Iamblichus's pejorative descriptions of matter in the De Mysteriis, it was not viewed negatively, nor was embodiment per se. For later Neoplatonists, the body was understood as an integral part of a larger process. As Trouillard put it: "The body that the soul animates and through which it is placed in the cosmos is not an extrinsic addition but the circuit that it travels in order to be united with itself."2 The body was connatural (sumphénes) with the soul, the soul with the intellect, and the intellect with god. The physical body was simply the "point of condensation" in a long process/prohodos that followed the material function of creative dispersion.3 Nevertheless, Iamblichus was aware of the problems of embodiment and believed that theurgy was able to cure souls of somatic identification by guiding them into divinely sanctioned postures. He believed that the soul’s "fall" into a body followed a divine impulse, a cosmogonic law, and that this same impulse, leading souls into bodies through daimonic urges, could be rerouted and transformed by theurgic rites. Theurgy limited and redirected the soul's daimonic attractions, transforming these intermediary beings into the soul’s receptacle of salvation.

In an excellent analysis of the role of matter in the Chaldean Oracles, Stanislas Breton says that the negativity of matter was compensated by the Chaldean view of an unbroken continuity that extended from the gods to matter. He says:

Matter and the body, consequently, are subject to a two-fold interpretation according to whether one descends or ascends the degrees of an ontological and divine hierarchy. . . . [The negative gravitation of the daimons] is equilibrated and compensated by an inverse pressure which makes of matter, in its "very fury," a homeopathic remedy for the degradation that it provokes. This is the profound meaning of theurgy which, relying on the continuity and connaturality of which we have spoken, discovers and

and other sacred, perfect, and deiform objects of a similar kind. Then, from all these it produces a perfect and pure receptacle. (DM 233, 7–16; cf. DM 235, 6–12)

Such objects served as receptacles of the gods because they preserved an intimate relation with them and bore their “signatures” (sunthêmata) in the manifest world. As such they were pure specimens of divine presence in matter, and for souls suffering a specific imbalance within the administration of a divine being, the objects that bore its symbol/sunthêma became homeopathic antidotes if handled in a ritually appropriate manner. Iamblichus explains: “Therefore, whether (it is) certain animals or plants or any of the other things on earth governed by Superior Beings, they simultaneously share in their inspective care and procure for us an indivisible communion with the Gods” (DM 235, 5–9). Through the appropriate use of the gods’ sunthêmata in nature the soul could awaken in itself the power of their corresponding symbols (DM 136, 6–10). This realigned the soul with the manifesting energies of a deity and freed it from servitude to the daimons who watched over its physical expression (DM 174, 9–10).

Iamblichus’s extant writings do not describe these theurgical practices in detail, but it is unlikely that they could have been explained discursively, for Iamblichus said that theurgic knowledge was gained only through “practical experience” (DM 229, 17–230, 1). Nevertheless, Iamblichus’s theoretical justification for the use of material objects in theurgy may be summarized under three principles:

1. The gods illuminate matter and are present immaterially in material things. (DM 232, 14–16)
2. There exists a filial and beneficent bond between the gods who preside over life and the lives which they produce. (DM 235, 3–5)
3. The sacrificial order in theurgy was connected to the order of the gods. (DM 217, 3–4)

Proclus includes more specific information in his treatise On the Hieratic Art, an introduction to theurgic taxonomy that identified sunthêmata in nature with their ruling gods. Proclus’s best-known example of a sunthêma is the “heliotrope” that bears the signature of the sun god Helios. As Proclus puts it:


Like the heliotrope, other things in nature bore the imprint of the sun god: cock (CMAG IV, 150, 4), lotus (CMAG IV, 149, 12), lion (CMAG IV, 150, 3), and bel stone (CMAG IV, 149, 22), each revealing different characteristics of the god hidden in its premanifest unity. For example, while the bel stone demonstrated a solar affinity by its mimesis of the sun’s rays, the lotus and heliotrope imitated its diurnal revolution (CMAG IV, 150, 26–30).

Iamblichus explained that the power of the gods who “illuminated matter” was undiminished by their manifestations (DM 140, 19–141, 4). The use of “base” objects in theurgical rites in no way degraded the god who was present in them. In fact, the use of inanimate objects in divination was all the more proof and guarantee that a god was responsible for the prognosis since the objects themselves could not have provided it. Iamblichus says:

If the power of the Gods extends in revealing itself as far as to inanimate things like pebbles, rods, pieces of wood, stones, corn or wheat, this very fact is the most striking aspect of the divine prognostic in divination, for it gives soul to soulless things and motion to things without the power of movement. It makes all things clear and known, participate in reason, and be defined by the measures of noêsis although they possess no reason in themselves. (DM 141, 14–142, 3)

That things without intelligence should be vehicles of divine wisdom followed a principal tenet of theurgy that communion with the gods did not take place through man’s mental efforts or power (DM 97, 1–9). Iamblichus continues: “Just as God sometimes makes an innocent fool speak words of wisdom—by which it is clear to all that the speech is not human but divine—in this same way God reveals ideas (noêmata) that transcend all [human] knowledge through things deprived of knowledge” (DM 142, 5–10).

Iamblichus’s use of material objects in theurgy and his praise of their divine power was a correlate to his critique of human intellectual power. Man’s incapacity to achieve union with the gods was made particularly evident in rites that employed insentient objects to achieve an experience that surpassed reason. The point, in short, was that theurgy is “divine action, not human” (DM 142, 7), and the use of inanimate objects in theurgic divination clearly demonstrates this point.

The sunthēmata embedded in nature were not limited to dense matter but were also present in certain incantations (DM 133, 18), concoctions (DM 133, 18), characters traced [on the earth] (DM 129, 15–17), and in the ineffable names that were able to draw souls into the presence of the gods (DM 157, 13–16). Iamblichus also mentions certain melodies and rhythms that gave the soul direct (euthus; DM 119, 6) participation in the gods.9 The sunthēmata, in whatever expression, were divinizing, and for the same reason: they bore the impress of the god and were able to awaken souls to the divinity they symbolized.

In theurgy, anything that received the god and mediated its presence functioned as a sacred receptacle whether it was a stone, a plant, a smell, or a song. All functioned as hulē with respect to the divine agent which they received and revealed.10 Thus, even a “vision” that mediated the presence of a god was a kind of hulē. Iamblichus explains:

One must be convinced by secret teachings that a certain matter is given by the Gods by means of blessed visions. This matter is somehow connatural (sumphũnēs) with those who give it. The sacrifice with this sort of matter stirs the God’s up into manifestation and immediately invokes their appearance, receives them when they come forth, and reveals them perfectly. (DM 234, 7–14)

Iamblichus compares this visionary matter to the “pure and divine matter” (hulēn tīna katharan kai theian) that receives and reveals the gods in cosmogony (DM 232, 17). As the soul became increasingly purified by

9. Cf. DM 118, 17–119. 5. Iamblichus’s theurgic interpretation of the possession through music or rhythmic speech (cf. Plato’s Ion 536c; Symp. 215e) might be considered by historians of religions as a viable alternative to the theory that such occurrences are the effect of “anxiety states.” See, for example, E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), 79 n. 108.

10. Each level on the chain of continuity became the “receptacle” of its superior. Thus, the role of any level would be alternately “formal” or “material,” depending on whether the movement was up or down the chain. This “functional” view of matter had been outlined by Aristotle in the De Anima (430a, 10–15), where he says that the soul’s cognitive powers are “matter” for the forms which they receive, i.e., insofar as anything is receptive to an informing principle, it is matter/hulē with respect to that principle.

Theurgy as Demiurgy

Theurgy so that it received such visions, its experience of matter became less like that of the Phaedo and more like the cosmological matter of the Timaeus, transforming the entire world into an immense receptacle, a sunthēma revealing the “will of the gods.”11 From a theurgic perspective, the cosmos was a temple whose sacrificial orders were designed by the Demiurge (DM 65, 6–8).

To be in a body, for a theurgist, was to have a place in this temenos, and even union with the gods was not impossible for those whose embodiment was properly consecrated. Iamblichus says: “By means of this [divine] will, the Gods, being benevolent and gracious, shine their light generously on theurgists, calling their souls up to themselves and giving them unification (henōsis), accustoming them—while they are yet in bodies—to be detached from their bodies and turned to their eternal and noetic principle” (DM 41, 4–11). To be in the body in a divine manner was to be out of the body (i.e., free of its material constraints), and Iamblichus maintained that this paradox was integral to every theurgic experience. He says:

All of theurgy has a two-fold character. One is that it is a rite conducted by men which preserves our natural order in the universe; the other is that it is empowered by divine symbols (sunthēmata), is raised up through them to be joined on high with the Gods, and is led harmoniously round to their order. This latter aspect can rightly be called “taking the shape of the Gods.” (DM 184, 1–8)

The theurgist was simultaneously man and god; he became an icon and sunthēma in precisely the same way as the other pure receptacles described by Iamblichus.

By means of appropriate rites the theurgist directed the powers of his particular soul (mikros kosmos) into alignment with the powers of the World Soul (cf. DM 292, 5–9), which gave him direct participation in the “whole.” He became a theios anēr, universal and divine yet particular and mortal (DM 235, 13–14); in somatic terms this was the result of having filled the measures of his immortal augoeides sōma, the soul’s “star body,” which was visualized as a sphere.

The doctrine of the “soul vehicle” (ochema) in the Platonic tradition is essential for understanding the manner in which the later Platonists visu-
alized immortality.12 Referred to by Iamblichus as a vehicle (ochêma) (DM 132, 12), or breath (pneuma) (DM 125, 6), the perfection of this aetheric and luminous body effected the soul’s immortalization. Through the purifying light given by the gods in theurgic the embodied soul was freed of its particularity and established in its starry vehicle, the augoeides ochêma (DM 312, 9–18). Like the spherical bodies of the universe and stars, for whom embodiment was simply adornment and revelation,13 the spherical body gained in theurgic rituals established the soul as immortal yet still allowed for the multitude of activities engaged in by a mortal and embodied soul.

Iamblichus often repeats the Neoplatonic principle that “like approaches like,”14 and in the case of a particular embodied soul the only way to reach the universality of the World and celestial souls was to become like them, that is, spherical. Thus, Iamblichus says: “Wherefore, also our vehicle (ochêma) is made spherical and is moved circularly whenever the soul is especially assimilated to Nous.”15 It was within this luminous and spherical vehicle that the theurgist received visions and was unified with the gods, yet this unification did not deny the multiplicity of his mortal life, for the sphere, Iamblichus says, “is capable of containing multiplicity (to plêthos), which indeed makes it truly divine, that not departing from its oneness it governs all the multitude.”16 The theurgist became spherical. He “took on a divine appearance” (DM 184, 8) but remained a man. His apotheosis demanded not only that he activate his aetheric and immortal body but also that he remain bound to his mortal life.

To the degree that a theurgist was divinized and assimilated to the Demiurge (DM 292, 14–17) he necessarily shared the benign interest of the Demiurge in generated life, including his own. Any aversion he may have felt toward his mortal existence was therefore overcome by his experience of the “whole,” and his physical body became the nexus through which he expressed this divine benevolence. In his person, he preserved a continuity between the “whole” and its “parts,” between the gods and man. Iamblichus outlines this process in his description of catharsis in the De Anima. The cleansing of the soul’s particular fixations by purgation and withdrawal from the body was merely a preliminary stage, to be followed by a positive reinvestment in particulars. Iamblichus says:


Of the eight attributes, only the first is negative, and Iamblichus specifically faults the view of those who defined catharsis as a withdrawal from matter. He says: “Some give greater value to separation from the body, freedom from [material] bonds, liberation from mortality, release from generation and similar lesser goals of catharsis” (Stob. 1, 456, 6–8). The

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13. DM 200, 7–8; cf. 202, 13–203, 9 for the ungenerated and impassive “aetherial body” of the heavens, and 212, 5 for the “impassive light-vehicle” of daimons.

14. References to the notion of similis similibus are seen in the DM 16, 11–13; 20, 4–8; 46, 13–16; 49, 1–3; 211, 15–18.

The mistake of an embodied soul was not in having a body, nor in being fully aware of physical existence. The error lay in the weighing of the soul’s attention. Its consciousness was to be anchored in the whole, the harmonic unity of the Demiurge, with only minimal attention given to one’s localized self. The experience of the theurgist would still include suffering and evils, but these would be incorporated into the whole. Iamblichus says: “Therefore, due to corporeal necessities, certain evils and corruptions occur to parts, but they are salvific and good with respect to wholes and the harmony of the universe” (DM 192, 3–6). Even the imposition of one “part” on another, while apparently distressful to that part, was necessary and beneficial to the harmony of the “whole,” a principle which, Iamblichus says, “we see exemplified clearly in a dance” (DM 56, 14–15).

Evils rooted in corporeal necessities were inevitable and unavoidable, but moral evils and perverse acts derived from man’s poorly receiving the emanations of the celestial gods, manipulating them for selfish ends, or suffering them in an unbalanced way (DM 194, 4–6; 13–15). These evils, however, did not come from the gods themselves. Iamblichus explains: “That which is given in one manner [from above], is received in another by the things here below. For example, the emanation of Kronos tends to stabilize and that of Ares is kinetic, but the passive and generative receptacle in material things receives the former as rigidity and coldness and the latter as exaggerated inflammation” (DM 55, 4–11; cf. DM 192, 18–193, 2). Though the gods descended with unified sameness to preserve the cosmos (DM 55, 17–18; 194, 8–12) their powers were received by mortals in a partial and passionate manner; as Iamblichus says, “parts are incapable of receiving the energies of the whole” (DM 192, 7–8). Through his participation in the whole the theurgist became immortal and universal, but as a part he lived and died. He ritually encircled his mortal life with the providential care of a creator.

The whole/part dichotomy was of central importance to Iamblichus, allowing him to reconcile experiences of evil and corruption within a good cosmos. Cosmologies that opposed spirit to matter or assigned to evil a positive evil force erred, in the view of Iamblichus, by assuming that the cosmos could be adequately measured by the dialectical opposi-

17. Iamblichus refers to this theme throughout the De Mysteriis; see, for example, book IV, chap. 9.
Matter and Embodiment

Throughout the theurgist's lifelong labor (see DM 92, 8–10; 131, 9–10) of building a divine body, matter was the mirror that reflected the condition of his soul. It was, as Iamblichus says, the "index" (deigma; DM 80, 15) of divine presence, and the intensity of the soul's contact with the gods was in direct proportion to its receptive capacity. In his explanation of appearances (phasmata) in divination Iamblichus explains that the higher the divinity, the more completely it consumes matter: "Take the immediate consumption of matter by the Gods as no small indication for you; with Archangels it is consumed in a short time; with Angels there is a dissolution and elevation from matter; by Daimones matter is beautifully organized; Heroes bear a proportionate adaptation to matter in fitting measures and give a skillful attention to it" (DM 80, 15–81, 4). The rank of a divinity was indicated by its relation to, and command over, matter. Matter was the index that measured the degrees of divinity, and for particular souls their relation to matter also determined the kind of theurgy they were to practice. The materia of the rites varied from stones and plants to the visionary matter given directly by the gods, but in all stages matter was not something reluctantly accepted in the rites, but was the necessary vehicle through which souls were divinized.

In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus portrays the soul's experience of matter through the Egyptian hieroglyph of a young god seated on a lotus. The material principle, represented by "mud" (ilus) under the lotus, serves as the "foundation" (puthmen) to nourish the lotus until it develops a circular throne for the god. Just so, each embodied soul, rooted in the "mud" of embodiment and the waters of psychic change, is nourished by this very condition until it is capable of receiving the god.

The matter of the Phaedo with all its negative effects was revealed progressively to the theurgist as the matter of the Timaeus, but only by virtue of the theurgist himself becoming demiurgic and ritually enacting the "eternal measures" (metra aidia; DM 65, 4) established in creation. His perfection, as soul, was realized only by first assimilating himself to the world, coordinating his "particular" attractions, somatic or intellectual, with their causal principles. As the "lowest" divinity, the human soul achieved its highest condition only when it was conscious of being lowest, for only then did it realize its place in the divine hierarchy. When the soul's "receptacles" were cleansed of the accretions added in embodiment it could become a proper receptacle of the gods and, like the pure matter of the Timaeus, transfer this order to the phenomenal world. The perfect theurgist became an embodied Demiurge whose presence was enough to create harmony out of discord and drive away evil. Iamblichus says:

Every vice and every passion is entirely removed by theurgists, for a pure participation of the good is present with the pure, and they are filled from on high with the fire of truth. For theurgists there is no impediment from evil spirits, nor are there hindrances to the goodness of the soul. Nor does any affectation, or flattery, or the enjoyment of vapors or violent force annoy them. But, all these, as if struck by lightning, yield and recede without touching the theurgists, nor can they even approach them. (DM 178, 8–16)

Having situated his particularity into the circle of the whole, the theurgist was immune from particular threats in precisely the same way as the gods (cf. DM 201, 16–202, 2). In imitation of divine beings, the body of the theurgist became a vehicle through which the gods appeared to the physical world and through which he received their communion.

22. Though this point shall be pursued later in arithmogonic terms, a suggestive ritual parallel existed in the example of the pharaoh (and his priest functionaries) in ancient Egyptian cult. He was, as Serge Sauneron says, "the guarantor of the universal balance"; see Sauneron, The Priests of Ancient Egypt, trans. Ann Morrissett (New York: Grove, 1960), 31.
II

The Nature of the Embodied Soul
The Descent of the Soul

Iamblichus's teachings on the soul were an essential correlate to his theurgical system, yet to be understood properly they must be seen in the context of alternative developments in Platonic schools from the second to the fourth century C.E. Iamblichus's emphasis on the descent of the soul was a response to what he perceived as unorthodox and dualistic forms of Platonism. The most significant in Iamblichus's era was the Gnostics' reversal of the Platonic creation myth and their reinterpretation of the Demiurge and World Soul. Though Gnostics drew their dramatis personae from Jewish myths, their cosmological framework was taken from Plato's *Timaeus*, and to some degree from the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. For the Gnostics, creation was no longer the beneficent expression of the Demiurge but the result of primal sin and error. The sensible world was a maleficent prison, and the orders of the heavens, which for Plato served as media for a return to the divine, were transformed into spiritual oppressors who held souls captive in matter.\(^1\) This inverted

1. Recent scholarship has shown that this anticosmic characterization of Gnosticism, while generally accurate, is not universally applicable. The tractate *Marsanes* (Nag
Iamblichus says, "the soul descends because of derangement (parekbasis)." Doxography of the descent of the soul in the University Press, Vandenhoech and Ruprecht, Archontic Gnostics (see Reference to Marsanes (NHC 1978), Pearson, "The Tractate Marsanes (NHC X) and the Platonic Tradition," in Platonic thought in line its relation to Platonism, see Birger Iammadi.

Hans Lewy contends that these remythologizing of the Timaeus were attempts to improve on a myth that failed to provide satisfactory answers to the problem of evil and human suffering. The obvious appeal of Gnostic dualism was its dramatic clarity and the solution it offered through gnosis. Gnostics promised salvation to those who felt dominated by foreign and insensitive rulers, social as well as cosmic. Although Iamblichus never explicitly argues against the Gnostics, his description of the soul, as well as his theurgical society, were surely influenced by the Platonic-Gnostic debate, particularly as it was taken up by Iamblichus's predecessor Plotinus. Plotinus's arguments against the Gnostics, and the solutions he suggests for the problems of the embodied soul provide the appropriate context to evaluate Iamblichus's position.

In his Treatise Against the Gnostics Plotinus charged that the Gnostics failed to differentiate between the ontological levels of the World Soul, which is a whole, and individual souls, which are parts. Contrasting the


2. The only extant evidence of Iamblichus's familiarity with the Gnostics is in his doxography of the descent of the soul in the De Anima. "According to the Gnostics," Iamblichus says, "the soul descends because of derangement (paranoia) or deviation (parekbasis);" Stob. I, 375, 9.
3. Enn. II, 9 is listed as thirty-third in the chronology of Plotinus's writings.

According to Plotinus, the Gnostics projected their psychological condition on the cosmos and shifted the burden for their suffering to the Demiurge and his astral regents. In other words, they mistakenly took the "part," the particular soul, for the "whole," the World Soul. The cause for this, Plotinus argued, was the Gnostics' attempt to go beyond their capacities as individual souls and "set themselves up next to god" (Enn. II, 9, 9, 48). This was nothing more than wishful thinking (hésper oneirasi petesthai; Enn. II, 9, 9, 49), Plotinus said, and it diverted their souls from making the only possible ascent to the gods, realized not by rejecting the stars and World Soul but by imitating them as much as possible (Enn. II, 9, 18, 31–35). The cause for evil and the suffering of the soul did not come from the World Soul or its regents but from the inability of the individual soul to harmonize itself with the ordered movements of the whole. Plotinus says: "If any of the parts of the universe is moved according to its nature, the parts with whose nature the movement is not in accord suffer, but those which are moved on well, as parts of the whole; but the others are destroyed because they are not able to endure the order of the whole."6

Iamblichus would have agreed with Plotinus's distinction between universal and individual souls. It was a position argued by Iamblichus himself—probably with some degree of irony—in his defense of theurgy

They [the Gnostics] blame the soul for its association with the body and censure the director of this universe and identify its maker with the soul, and attribute to this universal soul the same affections as those which the souls in parts of the universe have (Enn. II, 9, 6, 59–63; trans. Armstrong). . . . But to apply conclusions drawn from our soul to the Soul of the All is as if somebody were to take the tribe of potters or smiths in a well-ordered city and make them a reason for blaming the whole. But one must take into account the differences between the universal soul and ours, in its management of the body: it does not direct it in the same way, and is not bound to it. (Enn. II, 9, 7, 5–9)

5. It is interesting that Plotinus refers to the authority of the "Ancients" (palaioi) (Enn. II, 9, 6) over against the new opinions of the Gnostics, for Iamblichus refers to the "Ancients" in the De Anima in contrast to the views of Numerius (and possibly Plotinus) (Stob. I, 458).
6. Enn. II, 9, 33–36. This is essentially the same argument that Iamblichus employs. Like Plotinus (II, 9, 9, 37–40), Iamblichus uses the analogy of a "dance" to account for evil, though in a slightly different manner (DM 56, 7–13).
against Plotinus's pupil, Porphyry. Yet the basis for Porphyry's reversal of this teaching probably lay in the thinking of Plotinus himself, who, apart from his distaste for Gnostic views, had never found a satisfactory answer for the cause of human suffering and evil.7

In his treatise on the descent of souls into bodies (Enn. IV, 8) Plotinus followed Platonic tradition by contrasting the somatic experience of partial souls (para meros) (Enn. IV, 8, 7, 24), who move gradually from embodied confusion to tranquility, with the Soul of the All (tou pantos; Enn. IV, 8, 7, 27), which is never distressed and remains in the divine world. Plotinus then admittedly diverged from Platonic doctrine: "And if one may be so bold as to express more clearly one's own conviction against the common opinion of others, even our soul has not sunk entirely, but there is always something of it in the Intelligible World."8 In his later Enneads9 Plotinus continued to maintain this opinion and denied that the soul completely descends into a body. Describing "descent" as an "illumination" he says:

If the inclination (neusis) is an illumination (ellampsis) to what is below it is not a sin; what is illuminated is responsible, for if it did not exist the soul would have nowhere to illuminate. The soul is said to go down (katabainein) or decline (neuein) in the sense that the thing which receives the light from it lives with it. (Enn. I, 1, 12, 25–29; trans. Armstrong)

Plotinus's position betrays the influence of the Gnostic myth of Sophia's fall, which he had condemned in his Treatise Against the Gnostics. There he says: "It [Sophia] did not come down itself, did not decline (me katelthein) but only illuminated the darkness (ellampsai monon id skoti) and so an image from it came into existence in matter" (Enn. II, 9, 10, 25–27; trans. Armstrong [modified]). The undescended soul of Plotinus exhibits the same traits and is described with the same metaphors as the Gnostics' Sophia. These similarities cannot prove that Plotinus's doctrine of the undescended soul was influenced by Gnostics, but Plotinus himself admitted that his view was unorthodox and it was condemned by nearly all post-lamblicean Platonists.

8. Enn. IV, 8, 8, 1–4; cf. Enn. IV, 3, 12, 1–5 where Plotinus says that although the soul descends, its "head" remains above in heaven; cf. Enn. I, 1 where Plotinus portrays the higher soul as undescended.
9. Following the accepted chronology, the treatise on the descent of souls is early in the Plotinus corpus, no. 6 of 54; Enn. IV, 3, 12 is no. 27, and Enn. I, 1 is no. 53, next to the last in the corpus.

The problem Plotinus was attempting to solve with his doctrine of the undescended soul was how to account for the soul's suffering and experience of evil. His solution, that the soul never really descends into a body, proved unsatisfactory to anyone faced with the reality of suffering. According to Iamblichus, the answer could be reached only by first understanding the nature of the soul as embodied. After one gained a proper grasp of the soul's condition, its activities could be redirected into theurgic rites that transformed the passions of the soul into divine actions. For Iamblichus the pain of embodiment was not dismissed but ritualistically transformed into an act of cosmogenesis.

In strictly Platonic terms the novum for Plotinus was his view of the soul as undescended, which may have been influenced by his encounter with Gnostics; for Iamblichus it was ritual theurgy. Why Iamblichus felt that theurgy was more consonant with Platonic teachings may be made clearer against the following outline of Plotinus's debate with the Gnostics. The three positions on the suffering of the embodied soul represent the views of (1) the Gnostics, (2) Plotinus's counterposition, and (3) Plotinus's later views on the soul:

1. Gnostics (as described in Ennead II, 9)
   (a) The suffering of individual souls is due to the fall of the World Soul (b) Individual souls (collectively) = the World Soul
2. Plotinus (A) (against the Gnostics)
   (a) The suffering of individual souls is not due to the fall of the World Soul because the World Soul cannot fall [Enn. II, 9, 7, 9–19]. The relation of individual souls to their bodies includes a temporary period of suffering and confusion [Enn. II, 9, 7ff.], which can be overcome by education and an increasing mimicry of the gods [Enn. II, 9, 18, 32–35].
   (b) The World Soul is not equal to the sum of individual souls [Enn. II, 9, 8, 36–39].
3. Plotinus (B)
   (a) The World Soul does not fall and neither do individual souls. The suffering of individual souls, therefore, is merely the suffering of their "images"; in truth, individual souls remain above, at the level of the World Soul.
   (b) The World Soul = unfallen individual souls.

Iamblichus believed that the Gnostics and Plotinus (B) erred by confusing ontological levels. To account for the experience of suffering, the Gnostics confused the part with the whole and interpreted the condition
of the World Soul as if it were an individual soul. Plotinus (B) erred no less, but in the opposite way: he raised the part (the individual soul) to the level of the whole (the World Soul), perpetually fallen. In contrast, theurgy may be seen to be in agreement with the principles of Plotinus (A). For Iamblichus, the problem of human suffering had to be solved without changing the ontological status of the soul.

Iamblichus’s view of the embodied soul was influenced by the Pythagorean principle of the “mean.” Explaining this principle in mathematic terms Iamblichus says: “If the Many is conceived as a triad and that opposed to the Many is conceived as a monad, the dyad would be a borderland between them. Therefore, the dyad possesses the characteristics of both.”

Iamblichus held that every realm of being followed this law and Proclus applied Iamblichus’s principle of the “mean” to the nous and soul in Timaeus 37e, saying “he (Iamblichus) takes issue with those who connect the soul directly with the Absolute Intelligence (for the transition from the transcendent to the participating should not be immediate, but there should be as media those essences which are combined with things that participate).”

Following the law of the mean, every hypostasis had three expressions: (1) unparticipated (to amethexon); (2) participated (to metechomenon); and (3) participating (to metechon), at every level of the cosmos.

In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus used a threefold distinction of souls according to wholes and parts:

The conflict of views in the issue at hand may easily be solved by demonstrating the transcendence of wholes with respect to parts and by recalling the exempt transcendence of the Gods with respect to men. For example, I mean that the entire corporeal world is ruled by [a] the World Soul, and that the celestial body is pre-

Iamblichus’s celestial gods (souls) mediate between the World Soul and individual souls. Like the dyad in the mathematical example, celestial gods are the “borderland” (metaichmion) between the exempt wholeness and unity of the World Soul and the multiplicity and division of individual souls. Celestial souls possess the characteristics of their extremes: like the World Soul they exist in noetic perfection, never departing from their pure condition, but like individual souls, they each possess a single and moving body.

Iamblichus believed that the perfection of an individual soul occurred only through its return to the celestial orders, and through them, to the Demiurge (Cf. DM 292, 5-18). This was an elaboration of the Platonic teaching that the ratios of the embodied soul, twisted at birth, were identical to the ratios revealed in the heavens (Tim. 90c). Indeed, what distinguished the theurgical Platonism of Iamblichus from the “exalted soul” Platonism of Plotinus were their interpretations of how the soul attained its celestial identity. Unlike Plotinus, Iamblichus maintained a need for mediation and a triadic distinction of souls, as seen in his description of their appearances in rites of divination:

[If the soul is universal and does not belong to any particular species, it appears as a formless fire revealing—the whole world—the total, one, indivisible, and formless Soul of the World. But a purified soul [i.e., like the stars] exhibits a fiery form and a pure unmingled fire, its inner light and form appear to be pure and stable, and it follows in the company of its anagogic Leader, rejoicing in his good will while revealing its own rank through its activities. But the soul which verges downward drags with it the signs of bonds and punishments, is weighed down with the conflicts of material spirits, is possessed by irregular troubles of matter, and appears to have placed before itself the authority of generative Daimones.

The mediating entities in this schema are described as purified souls instead of celestial. Since theurgists were able to attain the spherical purity of the celestial gods while still living a mortal life (Cf. DM 41, 4-11), their souls, qua theurgic, were equal to these divinities. According to
lamblichus they were "seated in the order of the angels,"\textsuperscript{13} and their appearance provided corporeal souls with "sacred hope" (DM 83, 4–5) to attain salvation. The angelic soul of the theurgist was the functional equivalent of Plotinus's undescended soul, yet the realization of this divine status was explained by the two Platonists in strongly contrasting terms. For Iamblichus, the theurgist attained this rank through ritual practices and a demiurgic assimilation of all the powers that he encountered in embodiment. For Plotinus, it was less an assimilation of cosmic powers than a realization that the soul, as undescended, somehow never really encountered them.

This admittedly portrays a distorted picture of Plotinus's view of the soul and its relation with the Nous. We should remember that Iamblichus's portrayal of Plotinus's views was polemical. While it is true that Plotinus does speak of the soul as undescended and as possessing a continued contact with the Nous, he also says that Nous transcends the soul's discursive awareness (Enn. V, 3, 3, 22–28). "The Nous," he says, "is ours and not ours" (Enn. V, 3, 3, 27–28), so there is a tension in Plotinus's position that Iamblichus does not sufficiently take into account.

For both Plotinus and Iamblichus, the background to their views on the soul's apotheosis was the Phaedrus (246–48) where Plato describes the celestial circuit of the gods and the vain effort of human souls to imitate them. Due to the unruly character of one of his steeds the charioteer of the soul cannot follow the gods and falls into a body. Since Plotinus denied that this fall was complete, he had to explain why the soul identifies with the body if—as he also maintained—evil only occurs to the soul through its association with the body (Enn. I, 8, 15, 12–21). Iamblichus criticized Plotinus's position and the contradiction it posed with regard to the soul's experience of suffering. Proclus reports:

The divine Iamblichus is quite correct, therefore, in attacking those who hold this opinion [that there is something of the soul which does not fall], for what element in us is it that sins when the unreasoning principle in us is stirred, and we chase after a lawless notion? Is it not our free will (prohairesis)? And how would it not be this? For it is by reason of this that we differ from those beings that follow impressions without reflection. If the free will sins, then how would the soul remain sinless? . . . And what is the Charioteer of the soul? Is it not the noblest, and, one might say, consummate part of us? And how can we avoid this conclu-


The agent of the soul's descent was prohairesis, its "free will," "choice," or "disposition."\textsuperscript{15} In his letter on fate lamblichus again used this term to account for different conditions in human life: "Why, you ask, are goods undeservedly distributed? Rather, to begin with, is it not impious even to ask this? For the goods of life do not depend on anything else but on man himself and on man's choice (haireasis), and the most important goods are determined by free-will (prohairesis) alone."\textsuperscript{16} For Iamblichus prohairesis was neutral. It verged to what was better or worse and its choices were a reflection of the character of the soul. In some sense the soul was its prohairesis, at least with respect to its spiritual condition,\textsuperscript{17} and if its prohairesis determined the quality of its life, then for the soul to change—for better or worse—it had to change its prohairesis. This is why lamblichus says that theurgy did not act through the intellect but through one's entire character to allow the soul to exchange one life for another, to sacrifice its mortal life for the life of a god.\textsuperscript{18} Theurgy transformed the soul's prohairesis by conforming it to the divine actions communicated in theurgic symbols: the sacred stones, plants, animals, prayers (DM 48, 5–6), and names (DM 255, 4–15; 157, 13–16) that "preserve the will of the gods" (cf. DM 209, 14–17).

\textsuperscript{14} In Tim. IV, frag. 87, Dillon, trans., Iamblich: Chalcidensis, 198–201.


\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Rist, "Prohaireseis," 104.

\textsuperscript{18} See. DM 270, 17–19. Plotinus also speaks of the exchange of one life for another, though for Plotinus it is the exchange of the fallen for the unfallen soul. Plotinus calls the former the inferior companion of the higher soul. See Enn. I, 2, 6.
Soul as Mediator

The existence of souls is lowest, deficient, and imperfect...

In the De Anima Iamblichus outlined his differences with Plotinus on the doctrine of the soul and developed his own position in more detail. Although the treatise is valuable as a doxography of the philosophical schools of antiquity, Iamblichus's own position is evident, and the rationality for his psychology lends support to his adoption of theurgy as the praxis necessary for the embodied soul.

The first part of the treatise discusses the essence (ousia) of the soul and the philosophers who define it as incorporeal, including those who equate the soul with all other incorporeals. Iamblichus says:

There are some who maintain that all parts of this incorporeal substance are alike and one and the same, so that the whole exists in any part of it. They even place in the individual soul the Intelligible World, the Gods, the Daimones, the Good, and all races superior to the soul; and in each soul they contend that all these exist in the same way, though for each in a manner appropriate to its essence. Holding this opinion without question is Numenius, and Plotinus agrees with it, though not entirely, Amelius vacillates towards it, and Porphyry is in doubt about it, sometimes he earnestly rejects it and sometimes he follows it completely as having been handed down from on high. According to this view, the soul, considering its entire essence, is in no way different from the Nous, the Gods, or the Superior Races. (Stob. I, 365, 7–21)

According to Iamblichus this view failed to make distinctions within the incorporeal realm itself, so that from the human soul to the Good all incorporeals were considered as more or less equivalent. In contrast Iamblichus drew clear distinctions between ontological levels of the incorporeal realm.² He says:

The doctrine opposed to this, however, makes the soul a separate entity, inasmuch as it is generated second after the Nous as a different hypostasis, and that part of it which is noetic is explained as being dependent on the Nous along with the power of subsisting independently on its own, and it separates the soul also from all the classes of being superior to itself and assigns to it, as the particular definition of its essence, either [1] the mean between the divisible and indivisible, the corporeal and the incorporeal beings, or [2] the totality of the universal logos, or [3] that which, after the Forms, is at the service of the work of creation, or [4] that Life which has Life of itself, which proceeds from the Nous, or [5] again the procession of the classes of Real Being as a whole to an inferior status. Indeed, Plato himself, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and all of the Ancients whose great names are praised for wisdom, were absolutely convinced of these doctrines (as anyone would discover if he were to study their teachings with care). And truthfully, we will attempt to construct our entire treatise around these teachings.³

Iamblichus defined the essence of the human soul with characteristics that describe its function as mediator between irreconcilable extremes


2. Cf. DM 50, 6 where Iamblichus says that it would be out of place to put such things as “time,” a “line,” and “god” in the same genus simply because they are “incorporeal.”

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(Tim. 34c–36e). In the Timaeus it is through the mathematical mediation of soul that the indivisible appears as ordered divisions of the cosmos. The human soul's essence, therefore, lay precisely in its mediating role, and Iamblichus's strict adherence to this teaching led him into paradoxes that were resolved only in theurgical ritual. If mediation defines the essence of the soul as Iamblichus believed, it is clear why he did not identify soul with Nous as Plotinus did, for Nous is entirely free of the "lower" end of the oppositions mediated by the soul. Consequently, for Iamblichus, the deification of the soul could not be effected by introspection because the embodied soul had no immediate access to the divine. In light of this, Iamblichus developed a soteriological practice that by its very name, theourgia, defines not what the soul does, but what gods do through the soul.

Iamblichus's De Anima was clearly influenced by the language and the method of Aristotle; its significance, however, remained Platonic. Like most Neoplatonists, with the exception of Plotinus, Iamblichus believed that Aristotle's teachings were entirely harmonious (sumphōnās) with Plato's. Iamblichus even integrated Aristotle's seemingly un-platonic view of the soul as entelecheia of the body into his theurgical Platonism. In his commentary on the Alcibiades Iamblichus employed the Aristotelian distinction of ousia, dunamis, energeia but transformed it into an emanative triad typical of later Neoplatonism. Having explained that the essences (huparxeis) of daemons and the superior races were extremely difficult to grasp Iamblichus says:

Even the essence (ousia) of the [human] soul is not easily perceptible to everyone. (Only) the Timaeus at any rate has given a full revelation of its essence . . . but to make clear the powers (dunameis) of Daimons is easy enough. We attain to a perception of them through their activities (energeiai) of which the powers are the immediate mothers; for a power is a median between an essence and an activity, put forth from the essence on the one hand, and itself generating the activity on the other.6

Using this method to differentiate species of "soul" by reference to their activities, Iamblichus placed human souls near the bottom of the psychic hierarchy and maintained that their actions revealed their ontological rank. This was in opposition, he says, to the opinion of the Stoics, Plotinus, and Amelius who did not distinguish between the acts of particular souls and the acts of the World Soul (Stob. I, 372, 7–14). Thus Iamblichus says:

There may be another opinion which may not be rejected, one which, according to classes and kinds of souls, distinguishes between the perfect acts of universal souls, the pure and immaterial acts of divine souls, the efficacious acts of daimonic souls, the great acts of heroic souls, and the mortal acts performed by animals and men.7

What distinguished embodied souls was the separation of their ousiai and energeiai, a hypostatic rupture that condemned them to mortality and separated them from the gods. Theurgy was able to bridge this gap by uniting the energeia of mortals with the energeia of the gods. Iamblichus explained that each soul began its corporeal life in a fallen and separated state due to the weakened consistency of human souls portrayed by Plato in his metaphor of the demiurgic mixing bowl (Tim. 41d). Although every human soul carried the divine ratios (logos) established by the Demiurge, its "measures of coherence" (metra tēs sunochῆs) were no longer uniformly preserved but were broken apart into divisions of time. Following a suggestion by Proclus, Dillon says that Iamblichus conceived the hierarchy of souls according to their respective allotments of the elements "essence" (ousía), "sameness" (tautothèque), and "otherness" (heterothèque). The distribution of these three elements, respectively, determined the rank of all souls: divine, daimonic, and human, with human souls carrying the greatest proportion of "otherness."8 Iamblichus believed that inattention to this

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7. Stob. I, 372, 15–20. This passage employs the fourfold hierarchy typical to the De Mysteriis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal Souls</td>
<td>perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divine Souls</td>
<td>pure and immaterial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimons</td>
<td>efficacious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroes</td>
<td>great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>mortal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Tim. 41d and In Tim., frag. 82, Dillon, trans., Iamblich Chalcidensis, 194–95.

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5. The Aristotelian dictum that essences are known by their activities (De Anima 146, 21) had precedents in the Platonic dialogues (Rep. 477c; Soph. 247e), a point that was certainly not overlooked by the later Neoplatonists. See P. Shorey, "Simplicius de Anima 146, 21," Classical Philology 17 (1922): 143–44; cf. Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 32–45.
passage of the _Timaeus_ (41d) caused Plotinus and Amelius to miss important distinctions among souls (Stob. I, 372, 23–26). Outlining his own position Iamblichus says:

Others make a more prudent distinction and insist that the different essences of the soul continually proceed according to a downward sequence of primary, secondary, and tertiary processions—such as one would expect of those who discuss these matters with arguments which are unfamiliar but unshakeable. They say that the operations of universal, divine, and immaterial souls are completely realized in their essences, but they will by no means agree that individual souls, _confined as they are to one single form_ and divided out among bodies, are immediately identical with their acts.10

Like all entities in tertiary procession from the Demiurge, the acts of embodied souls were separated from their essences and completed only within the cycles of generation. Iamblichus says: “In accord with the opinion just espoused the acts of those souls which are self-perfect, uniform, and independent of matter are naturally connected to their powers (dunameis), but the acts of imperfect souls, who are divided among parts of the earth, are like plants producing fruit” (Stob. I, 373, 10–15). The “plant” in which the soul’s actions were brought to fruition was the human body, which gradually manifested the powers of the soul. As Andrew Smith puts it, “the manifestation of the soul in a body _is_ the activity of the soul.”11

Since the body reflected the activity of the soul, it also indicated the kind of soul that animated it.12 The bodies of celestial souls, for example, were perfectly receptive to their lords and revealed them by their circular activity.13 These were the self-perfect souls (autoteles) whose actions were realized within their essences. Their archē and telos were simultaneous. The activity/manifestation of the embodied soul, however, lacked the capacity to receive the powers of the soul at once; they had to be developed over time as the soul gradually bore the fruit of its different psychic powers. Iamblichus describes this progressive animation:


12. Following the principle that matter was the index of the spiritual state of the soul.

13. As Aristotle puts it: “for the body whose motion is circular, the place where it ends is also the place where it begins” (De Caelo 279b, 4–5).
To make bodies principles in determining the specific properties of their own first causes seems terribly out of place (DM 23, 16–24, 1). . . This argument makes bodies superior to divine races, since they would provide superior causes with their foundation and would impart to them their essential characteristics. (DM 24, 15–18)

Iamblichus argued that each divine genre defined itself, and its activity neither exhausted nor determined it. What distinguished divine races was not their material manifestation but their priority and independence with respect to one another:

If you conceive the unique characteristic [of each divine genre] to be a certain simple state defined in itself as in prior and posterior orders which change entirely and essentially in each genre, this conception of characteristics would be reasonable (DM 11, 2–6). . . Those of them which are prior are independent of those which are inferior. (DM 14, 11–12)

In effect, Iamblichus distinguished divine entities following Aristotle’s distinction of Plato’s Ideal Numbers and his own Unmoved Movers. According to Aristotle, each was a species unto itself, not under a common genus, and not to be synthesized or combined. Following this mathematical model, Iamblichus tells Porphyry that the correct way to conceive the relations between divine orders is by following a proportional method: “Anyone using proportional methods to determine the analogous sameness in the genres under consideration, i.e., to the many races among the Gods and in turn to the races among Daimones, Heroes, and finally Souls, will be able to determine their defining characteristics” (DM 14, 15–20).

In Iamblichus’s estimation, the human soul was unique because of its radical self-division. Unlike divine souls, the human soul was bound to the generative cycles of its body; yet it projected for itself the mortal life that bound it. Therefore, although the material body defined the soul’s characteristics, it did so by proxy, given by the soul when it descended into a body. In each of its incarnations, Iamblichus says the soul projects immortal logos from itself in its descent, and these in turn were combined with mortal lives acquired from the cosmos. Thus, each incarnation produced an entirely new identity.

As a mean between divine and mortal realms the Iamblichean soul had the unique distinction of being both mortal and immortal. This has led to many difficulties in making sense of Iamblichus’s psychology, for depending on the context being discussed the soul could be described with opposite characteristics relative to what it is being compared. Referring to this problem Iamblichus says: “someone might say the soul in bodies is divisible with regard to Nous, not because it is only divisible but because compared to the Nous it appears to be so, whereas with regard to the divisible essence it appears indivisible.”

Although all genres of soul mediated, certain souls did so in a more unified manner than others. The human soul, as we have seen, carried a greater degree of heterotès and therefore suffered a separation unexperienced by other souls. Only in the case of the human soul did its “otherness” (heterotès) bring about a separation in its essence, for only in the case of a human soul did its manifestation produce a mortal vehicle. Consequently, the human soul was the lowest of all divine hypostases for below it (e.g., animals and plants) there was no independent or sustained identity.

16. The term used by Aristotle is asumblétol, “incombinable,” “incomparable” (Meta. 1080a, 29) to describe numbers in themselves, prior to their being considered in relation to one another. See Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols., text and commentary by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), iii and 2:426–27. Merlan argues convincingly that Aristotle identified these “monads” with his unmoved movers and that these were later identified by Saint Thomas with “angels” (9–10). For Thomas’s angelology and its background, see Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough, ed. G. A. Ewing (New York: Dorset Press, 1948), 175–77. The equation of Platonic divine numbers with the angels of medieval Christianity was probably the result of the arithmogonic and theurgic speculations of later Neoplatonists passed on to the West by Muslim philosophers such as Avicenna. In the theologoumena Arithmeticæ Iamblichus describes numbers in their “incombinable” essences, as monadic “gods.” In the De Commentari mathematica scientia the mathematical expressions of these monads are discussed in their “relations.” Since Iamblichus’s daemons, angels, and heroes bore the signatures of their presiding deities, the relations of their orders were understood on analogy with the principles they expressed and obeyed.

20. The technical term to describe the “self-subsistence” or “self-constitution” of the human soul is autósteposion, which Iamblichus coined in his treatise on fate (Stob. II 174,
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The diminished status of the human soul is clearly drawn out in the De Mysteriis where Iamblichus compares the properties of the highest and lowest classes of souls, that is, the souls of gods and souls of humans, by referring to the ou sia-dunamis-energeia triad in each class. His distinctions are as follows:

The Gods

ou sia: The gods' existence is highest, transcendent, and perfect. (DM 21, 1–2)

dunamis: The gods have the power to do all things at once, uniformly, and in an instant. (DM 21, 3)

energeia: The gods generate and govern all things without inclining to them. (DM 21, 5)

Humans

ou sia: The existence of souls is lowest, deficient, and imperfect. (DM 21, 2)

dunamis: Human souls do not have the power to do all things, neither at one time, nor in an instant, nor uniformly. (DM 21, 4)

energeia: Souls have the nature to incline and turn toward what they generate and govern. (DM 21, 6–7).

Iamblichus also includes the following distinctions. The gods

(a) are the cause of all things (DM 21, 8)
(b) already embrace perfection (DM 21, 10–11)
(c) are superior to every measure and form (DM 21, 4–5)

Humans

(a) are suspended from a cause (DM 21, 8–9)
(b) move from imperfect to perfect. (DM 21, 12–13)
(c) are conquered by inclination, habit, and tendency, and take their form from the measures of secondary orders. (DM 21, 18–19)

Iamblichus said that the existence of daimons and heroes between these extremes ensured an unbroken continuity between the gods and man. While gods and human souls were distinguished by unity and multiplicity respectively, daimons were “multiplied in unity” (heni pléthwomenon; DM 19, 12–13), and heroes, while more manifestly divided, still preserved uniformity and continuity in their divisions and motions (DM 19, 15–20, 2). Although gods and humans had no characteristics in common, the mediation of daimons and heroes provided communion with the gods. Later in the De Mysteriis, perhaps in response to Porphyry’s terminology (DM 70, 10–12), Iamblichus adds two classes of “angelic” souls between the gods and daimons and two classes of “archontic” souls between heroes and human souls resulting in the following stratification:

1. gods
2. archangels
3. angels
4. daimons
5. heroes
6. archons (sublunary)
7. archons (material)
8. human souls

Unlike the system of Plotinus, where the soul could transcend its hypostasis and attain union with the One, Iamblichus fixed the soul in its ontological rank. He allowed it to rise higher than its given class but

The Gods

21. The “gods” described as one of the “extremes” in Iamblichus’s fourfold hierarchy are the neoi theot of the Timaeus (41a) and thus part of the creative work of the Demiurge. As such they would be “cosmic gods,” but for Iamblichus these encosmic deities were themselves the vehicles through which the “supracosmic gods” (huperkosmikoi theoi) revealed themselves. (Cf. DM 271, 10–12 for their distinction; DM 59, 15–60, 8 for their connection.) Like most Neoplatonists, Iamblichus’s use of terms such as theos or psuche was not entirely consistent. Plotinus, for example called the human soul the “last god” (Enn. IV, 8, 5, 25), and Hierocles referred to human souls as “mortal gods” (thnefoi theoi); Hierocles in Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius, ed. E. G. Koehler (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1974), 9, 8. In his explanation of the terminology of the “middle genres” Hierocles said that “Daimons,” “Heroes,” and “Angels” were interchangeable terms depending on the author and the context (Car. Aur. 19, 9–27).

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only through the benevolent will of the gods; regardless of its degree of ascent the soul remained distinctly soul:

The soul is attached to the Gods with other harmonies of essences and powers than those by which Daimones and Heroes are joined to them. And though it possesses an eternity of life and activity similar to, but in a less degree than Daimones and Heroes, due to the good will of the Gods and the illumination of light imparted by them the soul often is elevated higher and is lifted up to a greater order, the angelic. Indeed, then it no longer remains within the limits of “soul,” but the whole of it is perfected into an angelic soul and an immaculate life. Whence indeed, it seems, that the soul comprehends in itself all manner of essences, activities, ratios, and ideas of every kind. But if it is necessary to speak the truth, the soul is always limited according to one certain class, but by joining itself to its ruling causes it is sometimes aligned with one group, sometimes with another. (DM 69, 5–19)

Iamblichus almost allows the soul to embrace all the higher essences like the Plotinian soul. This, however, would give it the characteristics of a god, not a soul (DM 28, 18–20); what separated Iamblichus from Plotinus in this regard was his cautionary dokei and subsequent explanation.

Each class of soul defined its own activity (Cf. DM 11, 2–6; 12, 6–14) and therefore determined the receptacle through which its capacities were expressed. The manifestation of a soul-as-body was itself an activity of the soul, and therefore the kind of body that a soul animated indicated its class. These classes, Iamblichus says, do not change. As lowest of divine beings, the human soul had an unstable and mortal vehicle that alienated it from its own divinity. In embodiment, the soul literally became other to itself.

Aristotle’s conception of the soul as entelecheia of the body may well have influenced Iamblichus more than his Platonic predecessors; the limits of the soul as conceived by Iamblichus were the limits of its mortal body. Yet despite this, Iamblichus did not limit the soul’s existence to its corporeal form, and in the De Anima he says that sometimes the soul is not in a body: “The soul, of itself, possesses its own actions which, freed from the composite life [soul-as-body] and self-contained, activate the essential powers of the soul: enthu&isms (enthusiasms), immaterial intuitions (ahulqi noZs&s), and all those spiritual acts which join us to the Gods” (Stob. I, 371, 19–24). Iamblichus refers to an independence from the body prior to death, when the soul was “joined to the Gods” (Stob. I, 371, 23–24) by divine enthu&isms. Such activities were the concern of theurgic divination, and Iamblichus provides several examples in the De Mysteriis to demonstrate their authenticity. His method of proof, as in the De Anima, followed the energieia-reveals-ousia formula applied to various kinds of enthu&isms.

Porphyry had challenged the authenticity of theurgic divination and suggested in his letter to Anebo that divination through dreams did not provide contact with the gods. Iamblichus responded by distinguishing ordinary dreams from those sent by the gods (theopempto) (DM 103, 9). Only the latter were divine and they were superior to contacts made...
with the gods while awake (DM 105, 9–11; cf. Synesius, De Insomniis 151, 18–152, 1). Iamblichus explains:

Since the soul possesses a double life, the one with the body and the other separate from all body, when we are awake, for the most part in our ordinary life, we make use of the life in common with the body (except when we are somehow entirely free of it by intuiting and conceiving in pure thought). But in sleep we are completely liberated, freed as it were, from certain bonds closely held on us, and we employ a life separated from generation. At this time, therefore, whether intellectual or divine are the same, or each one exists with its own characteristic, this kind of life is awakened in us and acts according to its nature. (DM 106, 4–15)

Iamblichus added that since sleep liberated the soul from the body the presence of the gods was clearer (saphesteran) and sharper (akribesteran) in dreams than when awake (DM 105, 9–11).

Iamblichus applied the energeia-reveals-ousia formula to more dramatic forms of divination to prove that the miraculous feats of the possessed were, in fact, divine acts and not human, saying:

This is the greatest proof: many are not burned even though fire is applied to them, for the fire does not touch them because of the divine inspiration. And many, though they are burned, do not respond because they are not living the life of a [mortal] creature. And some, while being pierced with spits, and others, while striking their backs with sharp blades, do not feel it. Still others, while stabbing their lower arms with daggers, are completely unaware of it. Their activities (energeiai) are in no way human—for the inaccessible things become accessible to those possessed by a God—and they throw themselves into fire, walk through fire, and pass through water just like the priestess at Castabalis.1 From these examples it is clear that those inspired by the gods are not conscious of themselves; they live neither a human life nor an animal life according to sensation or impulse, but they have taken in exchange a more divine life from which they are inspired and perfectly possessed. (DM 110, 5–111, 2)


It may be difficult to see how such phenomena met the goals of Platonic philosophy, but they clearly demonstrated Iamblichus's point that the divine came to the soul from without, and this principle also explained the more subtle possessions experienced in Iamblichus's own life.2 For example, in discussing theurgic prayer, Iamblichus says: "If [prayer] quietly (erema) lifts up the habits of our thought and bestows on us the habits of the Gods" (DM 239, 5–6), for the activity, life, and habits of the theurgist exemplified the activity and life of the gods. Thus, "the soul . . . takes in exchange (allattetai) another life and establishes itself in another order, entirely giving up its former existence" (DM 270, 17–19).

Iamblichus rejected the possibility that contact with the gods was effected by the soul. He says:

If, therefore, genuine divination were the liberation of the divine part from the rest of the soul or a separation of the intellect or a sort of attainment—an intensity and effort either of activity or passivity or an acuity and application of thought or a fervor of the intellect—all such things would be awakened by our soul, and it would be correct to assume that divine inspiration (enthousiasmos) was a property of the soul. (DM 115, 16–116, 4)

Iamblichus explained that if inspiration were awakened by somatic conditions it would derive from the body (DM 116, 9–11), and if from the soul-body conjunction it would derive from that common life (DM 116, 11–13): He rejected these possibilities: "Inspired action is (derived) neither from the body nor from the soul nor from the two combined, for these do not possess in themselves the cause of divine inspiration; for it is not the nature of superior things to be generated from those which are inferior" (DM 116, 14–17).

The upshot of Iamblichus's argument is that of the soul's two activities it was capable of performing only one: the animation of the body as its vehicle (schēma) and instrument (organon). The other activity, the inspired acts and intuitions that pertain to the soul's essence (cf. Stob. I, 371, 19–21), did not derive from the soul but from the gods who use the soul as their vehicle. Iamblichus says: "For the act of divine inspiration is not human, nor does all its authoritative power rest in human members or actions, but these are otherwise disposed, and the God uses them as his

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Just as the corporeal body was the instrument of the soul and depended on it to receive its “more perfect life” (DM 25, 12–13), so the soul was the instrument of the gods and depended on them for its perfection. This is why theurgic activities were ineffable to the soul; they completely transcended its composite life. The activities that joined the soul to the gods were accomplished by the gods themselves, and in a polemical statement that seems clearly directed to the teachings of Plotinus and Porphyry, Iamblichus says:

The actions performed in a theurgic rite were the erga of the gods actualized by an embodied soul. Participation in this action depended entirely on the soul’s “suitability” (epitêdeiotês) as an organon of the gods; from a theurgic perspective, the embodied soul was a receptacle (hußpodochê) of the god like the other receptacles used in theurgic divination. In the divinatory practice of drawing light into the soul (phôtografía),5 theurgists used “diaphanous water” (DM 134, 2), a “wall on which sacred characters are inscribed” (DM 134, 5–6), or “any solid place” (DM 134, 8), to enable the soul to receive the light and see the “will of the gods” (DM 132, 13). Lest Porphyry misunderstand the purpose of using ritual objects to effect this reception, Iamblichus explained that the sign of genuine theurgy was the manifestation of divine characteristics in the habits of a

4. Epitêdeiotês was a technical term to describe the mystical or theurgic “capacity” of a soul. Cf. DM 125, 5, 29, 1; 105, 1; 127, 9; 233, 1. See Nock’s discussion, Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe, ed. with prolegomena and trans. A. D. Nock (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966), xci, n. 9.
5. Phôtos agôgê, the “leading” or “gathering up” of “light” is the rubric under which Iamblichus includes various kinds of divination.

The Constraints of Embodiment

The Platonists around [Calvenus] Taurus say that souls are sent to earth by the Gods. Some, following the Timaeus [39e, 41b] teach that it is for the perfection of the universe, that there be as many living things in the [sensible] world as in the intelligible. Others think the purpose of the soul’s descent is to reveal the divine life, for this is the will of the Gods: to be revealed through souls. For the gods come forth into bodily appearance and reveal themselves in the pure and faultless life of souls. (Stob. 1, 378, 25–379, 6).

As a receptacle of the gods, the soul reflected their activity and habits (DM 239, 5–6; 176, 10–13). These were symptoms of theurgic exchange, and because of this Iamblichus vigorously condemned any attempt to perform a theurgic invocation for selfish reasons (DM 115–16). Although “ineffable symbols” and not “our thinking” established theurgical union (DM 97–98), Iamblichus believed that the power of these symbols could not be tapped without the moral and intellectual preparation of the theurgist. For “ineffable acts” to be “perfectly accomplished” they had to be “religiously performed” (DM 96, 17–19). In other words although the intellectual effort of the soul was not sufficient to effect a theurgic union, it was a necessary auxiliary (DM 98, 8–10).

In his letter to Anebo, Porphyry implied that theurgic rites attempted to manipulate the gods and that theurgists stood on magical characters (charakteres) to impose their will on the gods. Iamblichus replied that any attempt to control the gods was the antithesis of theurgy:

When you say “those who stand on characters” you have put your finger on nothing less than the cause of all evils concerning theurgic invocations. For certain persons, disdainning the entire task of completing their theoretic knowledge about the one who invokes and the overseer,7 and disregarding the order of the ritual and the most sacred and extensive perseverance in labors over a long period of time, reject sacred laws and prayers and other holy preparations and believe that standing on charac-

6. DM 239, 5–6. Iamblichus maintained that the soul’s illumination was not produced by a mechanical manipulation of images in mirrors or water (DM 94, 3–5; 174, 10–11). Such phenomena were psychic and unworthy of the gods.
7. While the union with the gods was purely theurgical, the preparation for theurgy demanded a theoretical knowledge of the gods and ritual procedures; cf. DM 267, 5ff.
ters alone is sufficient. Having done this for an hour, they think that a spirit will enter. Such reckless men fail to accomplish anything and are not worthy to be counted among diviners. (DM 131, 3–132, 2)

Others, Iamblichus says, were less fortunate:

All those who are offensive and who awkwardly leap after divine mysteries in a disordered way are not able to associate with the Gods due to the slackness of their energy or deficiency of their power. And on account of certain defilements they are excluded from the presence of pure spirits but are joined to evil spirits and are filled by them with the worst possession. They become wicked and unholy and, being glutted with undisciplined pleasures and filled with evil, they affect habits foreign to the gods. (DM 176, 13–177, 4)

The equation of theurgy with *ex opere operato* activity, therefore, must be qualified. Following the Neoplatonic principle that like can only be joined to like, the theurgist had to purify the future vehicle of the god in order to receive its power, for the presence of the god was always in proportion to the purity of its receptacle.

*Epitēdeiotēs* was the term Iamblichus used to describe the “fitness” or “aptitude” to receive a form. Coined in the second century C.E. to describe the kind of Aristotelian “potency” (dunamis) sufficient for “actualization” (energeia) of a form,8 *epitēdeiotēs* came to be used by Neoplatonists to account for differences in mystical experience.9 Just as “dry wood” provided the capacity (*epitēdeiotēs*) for fire to be actualized,10 so, analogously, the purity of a soul provided the capacity for a god to become manifest. Plotinus accounted for different experiences of souls in the presence of the Intelligible as follows: “One must understand the [degree of] presence as something depending on the fitness (*epitēdeiotēs*) of the recipient” (Enn. VI. 4. 11. 3–4), and he compared it to the reception of light in clear or muddy water (9–10). For Iamblichus also, *epitēdeiotēs* described the fitness of a passive element to receive the influence of an active one, regardless of spatial distance or proximity.11

*Epitēdeiotēs* was a component in every theurgy, which is why the mere performance of ritual acts could not join the soul to the gods. Although the gods were everywhere (DM 27, 9), their powers could not affect souls that lacked an appropriate receptacle. Only when the vehicle was prepared could divine possession occur. Iamblichus says: “Whenever terrestrial things—which possess their being from the totalities of the Gods—become fit for divine participation they immediately possess, prior to their own essence, the Gods who preexist in it” (DM 28, 20–29, 3). Consequently, Iamblichus explained that the authority of the oracles at Delphi, Colophon, and Branchidae was not caused by the places themselves but by the careful purification of their oracular vehicles, making them “fit” (*epitēdeiotēs*) to give voice to the god (DM 125, 5–127, 9). Similar purifications were necessary for every soul. Iamblichus says, for example, that “the time one spends in prayer nourishes the intuitive mind and greatly enlarges the soul’s receptacles for the Gods.”12 The soul itself was a receptacle of the gods, and in Iamblichus’s response to Porphyry’s questions about famous oracular shrines he makes it clear that it is the purity of the receiving soul—not the geographical place—that allows for divine possessions, including those experienced privately by every theurgist.13 To equate this “possession” with the spiritualist phenomena of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as Dodds has done, is misleading.14 For the spiritualist was no more a theurgist than was the fourth-century *goēs*, and although all of them share superficial similarities, the purposes of theurgy were altogether different.


12. DM 238, 17–239, 1. Iamblichus almost always employs *epitēdeiotēs* in the *De Mysteriis* to describe the soul’s “readiness” for divine transformation: 105, 1 to describe conditions of the soul that are “fit” to receive the god; 125, 5 to describe the cleansing of the soul to make it “fit” and 127, 9 explicitly for the reception of a god; 233, 1, the matter sent from the Demiurge is described as “fit” to connect the soul with the gods; in 237, 10–15, however, *epitēdeiotēs* is described in a purely physical way, not theurgic.
14. See Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), 297–99; and A. Smith, *Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 89. Iamblichus’s explanation should have been sufficient to deter this interpretation; see DM 93, 10–95, 14; esp. 95, 10–12.
The Freedom of Immortal Bodies

The aetherial body is free from centrifugal or centripetal tendencies.

Receiving the gods was not without danger. For Iamblichus, the incorporeal world was just as complex as the corporeal, and one could easily be misled without a discerning guide. Iamblichus is reported by Eunapius, for example, to have exposed a fraudulent seance led by a deceased gladiator posing as the god Apollo (Eunapius, Vit. Soph. 473). According to Iamblichus, such phenomena were caused by errors in the theurgic art, “for inferior entities assume the appearance of more venerable orders and pretend to be those entities whose appearance they have adopted and hence they make boastful claims that exceed the power available to them.”

Communication with the “other world” would not have been as exotic or unusual for Iamblichus as it might be for moderns who generally deny the existence of spirits, let alone contacting them. Yet a guide was indispensable; not only was he able to determine the imbalances in a soul and the purifications it needed but was also able to determine the deity who possessed the soul:

1. DM 91, 12-15. Part of the repertoire of the theurgist was the ability to discern true apparations and possessions from the false.

There are many kinds of divine possession, and divine inspiration is awakened in several ways. Wherefore, there are many different indications of it. On the one hand, the Gods who inspire us are different and each produces a different inspiration, and on the other hand, the difference in each mode of enthusiasm produces a different sort of divine appearance. For either the God possesses us, or we become completely the property of the God, or we act in common with him. (DM 111, 3-16)

What appears constant among the varieties of divine possession was the manner in which a god joined an embodied soul. Significantly, Iamblichus says their conjunction was effected “circularly” (en kükli):

In dreams:
Sometimes an incorporeal and intangible pneuma encircles those lying down so that there is no sight of it but its presence is felt by a sensing awareness. It sounds like a rushing wind (rhoizomenos) when it enters, permeates everything without any contact, and performs wondrous acts leading to liberation from the passions of the soul and body. (DM, 103, 14-104, 4)

In acts of divination:
For if the presence of the fire of the Gods and an ineffable form of light descend on the possessed from outside (exðthen), entirely fills and dominates him, and circularly embraces him from everywhere at once so that he cannot perform any action proper to his own order, what personal perception or awareness or intuition could occur to someone possessed by the divine fire. (DM 113, 8-14)

For the priestess at Delphi:
When the abundantly gathered fire ascending from the mouth of the cave circularly embraces her on all sides, she is filled with its divine splendor. (DM 126, 11-14)

In his Timaeus commentary Iamblichus said that circular activity indicates an assimilation to the Nous, “for the intuitive thinking of the soul and the circular motion of bodies imitate noetic activity.” An embodied noesis was revealed in the orbits of stars, whose archē and telos were simultaneous (DM 31, 18-32, 7), and this énergia was shared by the soul until it “broke the circle” to enter the rectilinear and contrary movements of generated life. The stars were vehicles of the encosmic gods who themselves were the vehicles of the hypercosmic gods (DM 57, 7-58, 1).

2. In Tim., frag. 49, 15, in Dillon, trans., Iamblich Chalcidensis.
The Nature of the Embodied Soul

The heavenly bodies, therefore, were visible shrines (agalmata) of the demiurgic Nous, and to join these gods the soul had to regain the circular shape of the vehicle (ochêma) it possessed prior to embodiment. In schematic terms the soul’s fall from the Nous was equivalent to its loss of circularity. The correlation of circular motion with the divine was a recurrent topos in the Platonic dialogues, and Iamblichus said that the entire cosmos was defined by a circular movement (DM, 31, 13–32, 7):

“The sphere is the only shape that can include all the elements . . . it takes in all shapes . . . (and embraces within itself) secondary and tertiary natures.” If an entity had a spherical body its activities were completed within itself: its archê and telos were simultaneous (DM 31, 13–32, 2). To move out of the sphere to complete one’s actions was to fall from the Nous and this was the condition of embodied souls.

The circular movements of the encosmic gods were the first and most

4. Iamblichus uses the term agalma (shrine, statue) to describe the stellar manifestations of the gods. These agalmata, he implies at DM 168, are true icons of the divine because they are “drawn out of uniform Forms and intelligible Essences” (168, 4–5) by the Demiurge in the act of creation. Agalma is taken from the Timaeus (39e) where it is used to describe the bodies of the gods. See Cornford’s discussion of this term, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato, trans. and comm. Francis C. Cornford (London, 1937; reprint, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1999), 99–102.

5. That is, when souls were the “companions” of the gods in the celestial round described in the Phaedrus (246c, 2). In the DM (145, 7–9) Iamblichus says that the god is superior to Necessity and so is the “entire choir of superior beings attached to him”; cf. Phaedrus 248a, 1–3.

6. Cf. Lynn Ballew, Straight and Circular: A Study of Imagery in Greek Philosophy (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1979), 79–107. In the Timaeus, for example, Plato says the head was made spherical in imitation of the divine revolutions. It is the first and “most divine” body of man to which was added a body with four limbs and length (Tim. 44d).

In the Symposium the fall of man was figuratively described by Aristophanes as the loss of man’s spherical shape (190a–e), and, of course, the World Soul was a sphere as was every creator god. It is significant that prior to the splitting of man in Aristophanes’ tale his mode of movement was to “whirl like a cartwheel” with “eight” legs. For a Platonist who recognized the human soul as a microcosm of the World Soul, the eight-legged circulation of pre-fallen man might indicate his participation in the World Soul with its “eight” celestial spheres. Note as well, Iamblichus provides “eight” attributes for the sphere in his encomium to sphericity, and lists “eight” powers of the pre-essential Demiurge at DM 292, 5–18.


9. DM 118, 16–119. 4. Iamblichus refers to stellar motions as “rushing harmonious voices” (rhoizoumenen eunomionous phônes).

10. See two fine translations: Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, trans. with notes and commentary by Gillian Clark (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1989), and Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life, text, translation, and commentary by John Dillon and Jackson Hershbell (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1991). Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own following Deubner’s text and pagination, VP.


13. Stohl, I, 373, 28–374, 1. Autoeidês is a synonym of mónoi deîs in contrast with poloi deîs at 374, 1. As we shall see, this autoeidês ochêma is created by the Demiurge as the first vehicle of the soul.

14. Marcus Aurelius, 11, 12. See Festugière’s comments on this passage, La Rév. 3:206 n.

4. It is possible that the autoeidês was a scribal error of autoeidês as G. R. S. Mead suggests in The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in the Western Tradition (Wheaton, Ill.: Theosophical Publish-
employed the image of the sphere to describe the vehicles of celestial souls and also referred to their freedom from inner and outer attractions. He says: "It is acknowledged that the aetherial body is outside of every contrariety, free from every change, completely purified from the possibility of being transformed into something else, and entirely liberated from a centripetal or centrifugal tendency, either because it has neither tendency or because it is moved circularly" (DM 202, 13-18). To move in a circle was to embrace at once the contraries of embodied life, and the translation of the theurgist to his aetheric body was manifest by his symptoms in the generated world: the apatheia and ataraxia of a sage whose will revealed the will of the gods (DM 21, 2-9).

According to Iamblichus's view of embodiment the recovery of the soul's divine and spheric body was impossible without theurgic ritual, and although enthousiasmos was the soul's most appropriate condition it did not ordinarily experience it (Stob. I, 371, 17-22). Identification with its corporeal image imprisoned the soul in the contrary tendencies of generated life and separated it from itself. As embodied, the soul was alienated from the enthousiasmos proper to it. Plotinus described this inverted condition as the soul's attachment to a part (i.e., its corporeal image) and "separation from the whole" (Enn. IV, 8, 4, 16-17; trans. Armstrong). For Plotinus the embodied soul "comes and turns to that one thing battered by the totality of things in every way, and has left the whole and directs the individual part with great difficulty . . . It sinks deep into the individual part. Here the 'moulting' as it is called [Phaedrus 248], happens to it and being in the fetters of the body" (Enn. IV, 8, 4, 18-25). Yet, for Plotinus, a part of the soul remained free of this condition and continued to enjoy full participation in the Nous, though its "shadow," the embodied soul, was not aware of it.15

For Plotinus the breach between divine and human souls was bridged by the soul itself. The Plotinian soul has appropriately been compared to "a floating ego"16 capable of rising by contemplation to its undescended

level with the Nous. For Iamblichus this was not possible. The gap between divine and human souls was far more than a matter of consciousness. The embodied soul could coordinate its somatic and intellectual energies, but these only prepared it for theurgic initiation.17 Of its own power, Iamblichus says, the soul cannot ascend to the gods:

For if somehow we seem to be capable of doing this it is by participating in and being illuminated by the Gods, and only in this way we rejoice in divine activity. Accordingly, the soul does not participate in divine actions through possessing its own virtue and wisdom, yet if such [divine] acts were the province of the soul, either every soul would perform them or only the soul which possessed the perfection appropriate to it. But, as it is, neither of these are sufficiently prepared for this, and even the perfect soul is imperfect with respect to divine activity. Consequently, theurgic activity is different, and the successful accomplishment of divine actions is given by the Gods alone. Otherwise it would not at all be necessary to worship the Gods, but according to your view divine blessings would exist for us of themselves without the performance of ritual. (DM 149, 4-17)

The differences between the soul's "philosophic" ascent as conceived by Plotinus and Porphyry and the "theurgic" ascent of Iamblichus seem striking, yet recent studies have shown an underlying similarity not only in the goal of their respective ascents but also in the means to attain it. A. H. Armstrong was the first to note that "it is possible to develop a theory of theurgy from one side of the thought of Plotinus,"18 and he refers to passages in which Plotinus speaks of union with the One, not as a "rational" event but as something that occurs when the soul is "erotically charged by the One" and goes "out of its mind" to achieve a mystical union.19 Andrew Smith develops this theme in an excellent study of Porphyry20 that includes a comparison of the mysticism of Plotinus and

15. For a discussion of the "unconscious" presence of the higher soul in the lower for Plotinus, see Andrew Smith, "Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus," Phronesis 23, no. 3 (1978): 292-301.
16. Ibid., 293.
17. The soul's inversion was outlined in the Platonic dialogues where the transformation of the will is expressed in the form of an "erotic" role-reversal with profound ethical symptoms. See for example Alcibiades' relationship with Socrates, the divine sage who "knows nothing" (Symposium 215e, 4-6; 217c, 7-8).
Iamblichus. What separated the two Neoplatonists, Smith argues, was not their mystical thinking but their respective use of terms such as noēsis, gnōsis, and nous. Plotinus argued that the soul ascends to the One by means of the erotic presence of the One in the soul, and Iamblichus said the ascent occurs through the beneficent presence of the gods. Smith argues that the differences between Plotinus and Iamblichus were semantic, not substantive, and this view has been corroborated recently by Clemens Zintzen who argues that Iamblichus transformed Plotinus’s description of the soul’s “noetic impulse” into “theurgic grace,” a gift of the gods. Zintzen maintains that Iamblichus translated Plotinus’s and Porphyry’s description of the soul’s “philosophic” ascent into the magical terminology of the Chaldean Oracles and Egyptian cult.

These studies have corrected the facile and once-fashionable distinction that praised Plotinus as the last Hellenic rationalist before Iamblichus corrupted the Platonic school with ritual worship. Having eliminated this false distinction, these authors suggest that what distinguished Iamblichus was his genuine respect for the “magico-religious practices of his times,” which probably resulted from his own “vivid experience of the divine in some ritual.” Doubtless, this is true, and Hans Lewy and Friedrich Cremer have demonstrated the profound influence of the Chaldean Oracles on the theurgy of Iamblichus.

The question that has not been addressed, however, is why Iamblichus would have been drawn to ritual practices in the first place. It is, of course, a question that cannot be answered completely, but it is not enough to say that Iamblichus’s Platonism was read into the ritual material of the Oracles, or to suggest that this was due to Iamblichus’s Syrian background.

The re-ascent of the soul to the Good, which Plato described as a dialectical process (Republic 511b–c), was replaced by Iamblichus with the practice of ritual theurgy, yet the dialekтикé, which Iamblichus dismissed in the De Mysteriis as a “mere intellectual

27. As Iamblichus puts it, the embodied soul is “enformed by all the various measures which come from secondary lives” (DM 21, 17–22, 1; cf. 18, 16–17).
possess an authority and power that transcends human understanding and initiative. Iamblichus defends are, in any case, well attested to as "old strong, "Tradition, Reason," theology and symbols of the Egyptians (DM, books VII-X), not those of the Chaldeans. S C Mutinus's language concerning union with the One reveals a conflation as an attempt to resolve philosophical problems left by Plotinus. Plotinus's language concerning union with the One reveals a conflation


33. In Tim. IV, frag. 87, 20–21; in Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chalcidensis, 200–201.

34. Cf. DM 171, 11–13 where Iamblichus emphasizes that "human" and "divine" are mutually exclusive terms.

35. After all, the persona that Iamblichus adopts in the De Mysteriis is that of an Egyptian priest "Abammon," not a Chaldean. Further, Iamblichus proposes to explain the Egyptian rites at Abydos on the theurgy of Abammon (Iamblichus). Yet Iamblichus's adoption of theurgic rites was not merely the result of his following Aristotle's definition of the soul. Theurgy was also an epistemological necessity. For Iamblichus, "knowledge" worked within a dualistic structure: "knowing an 'other' as 'other' " (DM 8, 4–6), so it could never engender a union with the divine.

It is on this issue that Iamblichus's theurgic Platonism may be seen as an attempt to resolve philosophical problems left by Plotinus. Plotinus's language concerning union with the One reveals a conflation of mystical impulses that derive from the One itself, with the philosophic language of Platonism. Such a conflation might lead to the rationalization of mystical ascent if the discourse that Plotinus used to describe his union with the One were confused with the experience of that union. As Armstrong says, it would constitute the error of making conceptual idols out of evocative icons, and it was precisely this kind of rationalistic idolatry that Iamblichus perceived in Porphyry's teaching and which he attempted to combat by distinguishing theurgical from philosophical language.

The supposed "irrationalism" of Iamblichean theurgy39 therefore, may well derive from Iamblichus's keener sensitivity for precision in rational discourse. After all, if a discursive statement about the One functioned evocatively40 rather than descriptively, its conceptual content would be transparent and, in that sense, would function theurgically. It was not its meaning that effected hēnōsis but its ability to transcend meaning,42 and if the discursive meaning became central its evocative power would be lost.43 In Platonic terms, the opacity of discursive meanings, however exalted their subject matter, were nothing more than the "shadow language" of Plato's cave (Rep. 515). Therefore, Iamblichus's subordinating of philosophy to theurgy was simply making explicit a distinction that was already implicit in Plotinus's mysticism but that he failed to work out.

38. For an explanation of Armstrong's use of these terms against the background of Neoplatonic negative theology see Armstrong, "Negative Theology," Downside Review 95 (1977): 188–89.


41. In precisely the same way that material artifacts in theurgy are not worshiped for their "physical" properties, neither is the discursive icon valued for its conceptual truth or accuracy.

42. One must take care, however, not to confuse the anagogic "negation" of meaning with its mere "privation." For a clear exposition of these terms from Aristotle to the Neoplatonists, see Christian Guérard, "La Théologie négative dans l'apophatisme grec," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 68 (1954): 183–200.

43. Armstrong, "Negative Theology," 188–89.

44. Describing this, Lowry says: "What Iamblichus did was to develop this mystical side of Plotinus more systematically than Plotinus himself had done. . . . It could be argued that Iamblichus, in trying to make sense out of Plotinus, developed philosophical principles which make possible mystical unity with the divine. By doing this he could then be said to have showed that this unity was not primarily philosophical. This should perhaps be the position that any Neoplatonist, especially Plotinus, should have made explicit. There does not seem, to me at least, to be any point in belaboring Iamblichus for being less philosophical than Plotinus. He simply carried the obvious Plotinian philosophical standpoint to its limits and tried to validate it." Lowry, Logical Principles, 20–21.
The Paradox of Embodiment

That which is immortal in
the soul is filled completely with
mortality . . .

The repercussions of viewing the Platonic soul through Aristotle's doctrine that essences (ousiai) are revealed by activities (energeiai) have been examined by Carlos Steel in a brilliant monograph on Neoplatonic psychology, The Changing Self. Steel outlines Iamblichus's view of the soul by examining the Iamblichean fragments preserved in Priscianus's (Simplicius's?) commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. At the outset of his commentary Priscianus says that he "will hold to the truth of the matter as much as possible according to the interpretation of Iamblichus set out in his teachings on the soul." For Priscianus, Iamblichus was "the best critic of the truth" (ho ariston tês alitheias kritês; DA 89, 33-37), and his extensive quotations and discussions of Iamblichus's views form the basis of Steel's analysis.

Steel throws light on the disturbing complexity of Iamblichus's psychology. He shows that Iamblichus followed the energeia-reveals-ousia formula not only to distinguish incorporeal classes but also to focus on the specific case of the human soul. It led Iamblichus to the conclusion, especially difficult for a Platonist, that because the energeia of embodied souls were mortal and subject to change so their ousiai, being the source of this activity, were also mortal and subject to change! Even more problematic was Iamblichus's belief that the soul's separation from the Nous also separated the soul from itself and its immortality. Priscianus says:

If, however, as Iamblichus thinks, a perverse and imperfect activity would not proceed from an essence which is impassive and perfect, the soul would be, even in its essence, somehow subject to passion. For in this view the soul is a mean, not only between divided and undivided, the remaining and the proceeding, the noetic and the irrational, but also between the ungenerated and the generated. For on account of its verging outside, the soul simultaneously remains as a whole and proceeds as a whole, and it is neither entirely involved in, nor free from, either trait. Wherefore, that which is immortal in the soul is filled completely with mortality and no longer remains only immortal. Somehow the ungenerated part of the soul becomes subject to

2. For the attribution of this commentary to Priscianus rather than to his contemporary, Simplicius, see F. Boussier and Carlos G. Steel, "Priscianus Lydus en de 'In de Anima' van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1972): 761-822. Ilse Traut Hadot accepts the hypothesis of Boussier and Steel on the basis of the striking similarities between the De Anima commentary and Priscianus's Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, ed. T. Bywater in Supplementum Aristotelicum 1, no. 2 (Berlin, 1886): 1-37, but shows their argument of supposed doctrinal incompatibilities between Simplicius's other works and the De Anima commentary to be unfounded; see Hadot, Le Probleme du neoplatonisme alexandrin: Ibero cetes et Simplicius (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), 193-202. Blumenthal says he shall continue to call the author of the de Anima commentary "Simplicius" "as a matter of convenience"; Blumenthal, "The Psychology of (?)Simplicius' Commentary on the De anima," in Soul and the

3. Simplicius (Priscianus?), In Libros Aristotelis de Anima Commentaria (DA), I, 18-20, in CAG 9, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1885). Steel notes that the last part of this phrase could just as correctly be rendered: "in his own treatise On the Soul." The question of whether or not Iamblichus wrote such a treatise must remain open.

Ambiguity and paradox defined the very essence of the soul. Again, Priscianus:

According to Iamblichus, the particular soul embraces both characteristics equally, both permanency and change, so that in this way its intermediate position is again preserved; for higher beings are stable, mortal ones are completely changeable. The particular soul, however, which as middle, is undivided and multiplied together with the mundane beings, does not only remain permanent but also changes because it lives through so many divisible lives. And not only in its habits, but it changes also in its substance.

These oppositions were triggered by the soul’s animation of its body. Since the human soul was “inclined toward the body that it governs” (DM 21, 5-7, 16), when it projected its “lower lives” (i.e., the irrational powers of the soul) its ousia was broken apart and intertwined with mortal lives. Paraphrasing Iamblichus, Priscianus says: “It is therefore more reasonable and necessary to say that not only the actuality but also the highest essence of our soul is in some way relaxed, broken up, and has its existence constituted, so to speak, in its descent toward lower lives.” While Plotinus and Porphyry also maintained that the soul projected its lower powers (dunameis) to animate the body and believed that these powers acted as a means between the ousia and the embodied energia of the soul, the essence of the soul was never affected by this projection. Changes may seem to affect the soul, but its rational essence remained untouched. For Plotinus, the diverse activities attributed to the soul were merely accidental and somatic accretions which do not implicate the soul’s unaffected ousia. For Iamblichus, they do. In embodiment the ousia, in fact, becomes ousiai, for in accord with the energia-reveals-ousia formula, the multiplicity of the energeiai and dunameis reflect a multiplicity of ousiai. Consequently, Iamblichus speaks of the essences (ousiai) of the soul, and Priscianus, following him, says: “The definition of these matters is difficult because in truth the soul is one and many in essence” (DA 14, 7-8).

The soul endured such paradox because of its cosmogonic function as the mean between extremes. Remaining and proceeding were essential modes of the soul’s existence, and if it were truly to function as a mean its essence could not remain stable and unchanging. The loss of the soul’s unity and stability caused it to suffer, but this was the soul’s way to participate in the activity of the Demiurge. To deny diversity to the soul would deny its role in cosmogenesis where it bestowed coherence and unity to the chaos and diversity of generated life. However, because it was a human soul with weakened measures of coherence, it experienced this demiurgy as a kind of self-alienation and disembodiment. The soul’s demiurgic unity, ironically, was available to it only through the act of self-division.

Among the hierarchy of immortal entities, the human soul possessed the greatest degree of “otherness” (heteroterês). This caused it to identify with what was other to itself, and the corporeal body became the context of its self-alienation. Priscianus says: “Our soul remains one and is
multiplied at the same time in its inclination to the body; it neither remains purely nor is changed entirely, but somehow it both remains and proceeds from itself, and when it is made other to itself the sameness with itself is made faint.”13 The soul was self-alienated in embodiment,14 even to the point of having its existence constituted by its descent to the generated world,15 yet, as Priscianus explains, “it can never become entirely self-alienated or it would cease to be soul.”16 As Steel puts it: “the soul only remains itself because it ceaselessly proceeds from itself and, at the same time, returns to itself.”17

Iamblichus’s definition of the soul was received by his successors in significantly different ways. Proclus, despite following Iamblichus in his teaching that the soul descends entirely in embodiment,18 could not accept that the highest part of the soul, its ousia, is changed when the soul animated a body. Proclus employed Iamblichus’s own principle of mediating terms to argue that the eternal ousia of the soul cannot undergo temporal change. Using a triadic division, Proclus placed the human soul between the extremes of (a) that which is eternal in substance and activity; and (b) that which is temporal in substance and activity. The soul, therefore, was (a) and (b), that which is eternal in substance but temporal in activity.19 Proclus says: “every participated soul has an eternal substance but a temporal activity,”20 which seems to resolve the tension and contradiction in Iamblichus’s view by preserving the ousia of the soul from the changes endured in its energia. Yet, in doing this, Proclus splits the soul and returns to the position of Plotinus, for what else is the soul’s eternal and unchanging ousia if not an undescended soul?

Damascius, on the other hand, accepted Iamblichus’s definition of the soul and explained the paradox of change in the soul’s ousia with a Pythagorean reading of Aristotle’s distinction of specific and individual identity. According to Aristotle, perishable entities such as plants and animals possess immortality and identity in their species but not as individuals (De Anima 415b, 2–9), for any entity whose essence changes does not remain the same individual. Thus, if the human soul were changed in its essence it would lose its immortal identity. Damascius solved this dilemma by asserting that “the essence of the human soul is the mean between that which endures specifically (kat’ eidos) and that which endures individually (kat’ arithmon; Dub. et Sol. II, 263, 12), which is another way of saying that the soul is both mortal and immortal.

According to Damascius, the Platonic definition of the soul as “self-moved” (auto-kinesis) led directly to the contradictions seen in Iamblichus’s position. The soul was kinesis in that its essence was “moved” and endured “change,” yet it was autos in that the soul “endured” the change, for change itself could have no meaning without a fixed point of reference. Self-change, however, does not mean that there are two parts of the soul, a stable element and a moveable element. In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus argued that the auto-kinesis of the soul was “a simple essential movement that subsists from itself and not in relation to another” (DM 12, 8–9). Damascius developed this point at length in order to prove that “self-moved” (auto-kinesis) indicates that “both moved and mover are the same being” (Dub. et Sol. II, 263, 12). The soul, he says, “both changes itself and is always being changed, thus, it possesses its being precisely by always changing its own essence” (Dub. et Sol. II, 263, 12–14).

The preservation of the soul’s identity in Damascius’s definition is indicated by the word “always” (autos). Iamblichus used this term in a technical sense in his Parmenides commentary to indicate how Motion (kinésis) and Rest (stasis) were combined into one idea (hen eidos) at the level of the second hypothesis (Parm. 146a).21 In the human soul Damascius called this combination of auto-kinesis, the eidos tis huparxeos of the soul, and he again credited Iamblichus for distinguishing between huparxis—which is the principle of the soul’s determination—and ousia, which is its determined essence (Dub. et Sol. I, 132, 12–23; cf. I, 312, 4–28). The eidos tis huparxeos of Damascius and Iamblichus was not conceived as a deeper substrate (ousia) of the soul but as its pre-essence, the presence of the One that revealed itself as autokinesis, self-change. If this eidos were simply a higher essence then the changes of the soul would be accidental, not essential. The peculiar characteristic of the human soul,

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20. ET, prop. 191; p. 166, 26–27 (Dodds).

21. Damascius: “So then Motion is permanent (stationary) in the process of being in motion (for it will always be in motion), while Rest will be extended in its being at rest (for it in turn will always be at rest) inasmuch as Motion will not allow Rest to, as it were, drop off to sleep, while Rest will not permit Motion to ‘jump out of its skin.’ In this way the notion of ‘always’ is essentially bound up with both being at rest and being in motion” (for in Perm., frag. 8, 13–16, in Dillon, trans., Iambilicita Chalcedensis, 218–19).
however, was that it preserved its identity “by always changing its own essence.”

Damascius attempted to explain this change by comparing the soul’s aetheric body to a sponge. For Damascius, as for Iamblichus, the soul’s sphericity was the sign of its illumination. Damascius says:

Like a sponge, the soul loses nothing of its being but simply becomes rarified or densified. Just so does the immortal body of the soul remain individually the same, but sometimes it is made more spherical and sometimes less, sometimes it is filled with divine light and sometimes with the stains of generative acts, and as its life undergoes some essential change so also the soul itself, while remaining what it is, is changed in itself and by itself. (Dub. et Sol. II, 255, 7–12)

“Sometimes,” Damascius says, “the soul is tied essentially to the Gods, sometimes to mortal creatures” (Dub. et Sol. II, 255, 25–26), yet following Iamblichus, Damascius said it never loses its identity as soul. Like the sponge the soul could be filled with divine light and “established in the essence of the sun” (Dub. et Sol. II, 255, 7), or it could lose the light as well as its spherical shape in the darkness of generative impulses.

Damascius concluded that the soul cannot be split into higher and lower parts. Its autokinésis is, as Iamblichus said, haplous, “a simple essential movement” (DM 12, 6–9), yet when the soul extends its secondary powers (deuterai duanemeis) into a corporeal body its essence divides and the soul identifies with its animated parts. Although immortal and divine, the soul becomes a mortal creature.

This last point is of crucial importance and is arguably Iamblichus’s raison d’être for theurgy. According to Iamblichus, it was the entire soul that changed in embodiment, both its rational and irrational powers, and, just as significantly, it was the entire soul that remained immortal, both its rational and irrational powers. In his Phaedo commentary Damascius lists the Platonists who share this position: “Some consider immortality to extend from the rational soul as far as to the irrational soul, among the older are Xenocrates and Speusippus, of the more recent are Iamblichus and Plutarch.”

Proclus, on the other hand, restricted immortality to the rational soul (logismos), which was consistent with his view that only the energestai of souls undergo change (hence mortality), not their ousai (In Phaed. 177, 5; trans. Westerink). This was also consistent with Proclus’s view that each soul has three vehicles (ochêmatata): (1) the fleshy vehicle, (2) the pneumatic vehicle, drawn from the planetary elements, and (3) the universal and divine vehicle. For Proclus, as well as for Porphyry, only the divine body was immortal whereas the pneumatic body had a limited immortality relative to its degree of purity; when entirely purified it ceased to exist. Since Porphyry followed Plotinus in his belief that part of the soul was undescended, he held that theurgic rituals were necessary only for cleansing the lower soul and its pneumatic vehicle, for the undescended soul would need no purification (De regressu animae 27, 21–28, 15). Although Proclus says that the soul’s ousia was unchanged (hence, somehow undescended), he nevertheless followed Iamblichus’s view that theurgy was necessary even at the highest levels. This may indicate that he had a different conception of theurgy than Iamblichus, or that his understanding of theurgy was inconsistent with his teachings on the extent of the soul’s fall and the three ochêmatata. For Iamblichus, the pneuma of the soul could be filled with divine light, where it truly became augoeides (DM 132, 11–13) or darkened by generative affections and lose its sphericity, yet—like Damascius’s sponge—it remained the same vehicle.


25. For a discussion of Proclus’s views on the ochêmatata and the “parts” of the soul, see Westerink, Greek Commentaries 2:108 n. 5; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), 108; Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chalcidensis, 373.

26. Ilsetraut Hadot has attempted to make Iamblichus’s position agree with that of Proclus by reading an implicit doctrine of “three ochêmatata in the De Mysteriis and the De Anima fragments: (1) the vehicle of the flesh, (2) the pneumatic vehicle “relatively” immortal and subject to fate, and (3) the vehicle of the noetic soul.” I. Hadot, Le problème, 98–106. Dillon notes, however, that the soul subject to fate (DM 269, 1–12) is never described as “mortal, merely that it is subject to Fate” (Iambliche Chalcidensis 375). Blumenthal is correct, therefore, when he says that Proclus had “two” subtle vehicles and Iamblichus only “one” because Iamblichus held that both the rational and irrational parts of the soul were immor-
Iamblichus was reluctant to separate the rational from the irrational parts of the soul: the logismos from the thumos and epithumia. Again, following Aristotle, who rejected Plato’s tripartite division of the soul (Rep. 435–41), which identified each “part” with a “place” in the body (Tim. 69; cf. Aristotle, De Anima 414a, 29; 411b, 5), Iamblichus says the soul is a simple essence (ousia) with several powers (dunameis), and when it incarnates it does so as an integral whole. According to Iamblichus, Plato spoke of the soul ambivalently, sometimes defining it as “essentially tripartite” and sometimes as an “undivided essence of life having many powers and properties in one identity” (see Stob. I, 368, 23–369, 2; 369, 1). Although Plato’s language varied, Iamblichus believed that Plato understood the soul to be a simple unity with three powers, and the discrepancy with Aristotle on this issue was merely semantic. Iamblichus says: “In short, part differs from power in that part (meros) presents to our mind an otherness of essence (ousias heterotês) while power (dunamis) suggests a creative or productive distinction in the same subject.”

For Iamblichus, the soul’s thumos, epithumia and logismos belonged to one immortal subject, but in embodiment they all verged to the mortal body and were rejoined with the gods only by theurgy.

In her classic study, Le Dualisme chez Platon, le Gnostiques et les Manichéens, Simone Petrement characterizes dualism as follows: “In religions and philosophies where it appears, dualism seems tied to the belief in a transcendent, to an unknown which is not simply not yet known, to an invisible which is not simply not yet seen, but to that which essentially goes beyond anything seen and known” (3). Although Iamblichus was not a dualist, this definition is perfectly applicable to his theurgical Platonism. Petrement’s thesis is that genuine experiences of transcendence occur beyond one’s understanding and that these ruptures in the continuity of consciousness lead naturally to the postulation of a “two-world” cosmology. “To speak of two worlds,” she says, “is to speak of total change” (8). Petrement argues convincingly that cosmological dualism is rooted in experiential dualism and that soteriology necessarily precedes cosmology. In this I believe she is correct, but for Iamblichus the dualism that derives from a transcendent rupture: “[when] the soul exchanges one life for another [and] entirely abandons its former existence” (DM 270, 17–19), did not produce a cosmological dualism but a psychological
one. Iamblichus differed from his Platonic predecessors because he believed the dualism experienced by the soul was caused by its mediating function, linking the oppositions of same and other, unified and divided, immortal and mortal. Iamblichus spoke of the soul’s “two lives” (Stob. I, 371, 6–8), “two powers” (Stob. I, 368, 1–6), and “two activities” (Stob. I, 371, 5–8), and in the De Mysteriis he cited Hermetic teachings stating that man has “two souls,” one subject to fate and the other above fate resting in the noetic world. (DM 269, 1–270, 12). Yet Iamblichus qualified this description of a noetic and seemingly undescended soul by saying that it was the vehicle of theurgic apotheosis (DM 270, 11–12) and thus beyond reach of the embodied soul. The Iamblichean soul had two lives, but because of its embodied condition it could only know one. The higher life received in theurgy was an epistemological impossibility for the embodied soul. Its divine life came from the gods as other to the soul even if it expressed the soul’s truest identity. Can Iamblichus’s paradoxical psychology still be considered a genuine form of Platonism? Porphyry’s letter to Anebo challenged Iamblichus to answer this question, and the De Mysteriis was a philosophical apologia for a discipline that claimed to transcend philosophy. Yet it was Iamblichus’s skill as philosopher that makes his defense of theurgic convincing, for in his reply to Porphyry, Iamblichus used standard Platonic arguments to support the practice of theurgy. 2

According to Iamblichus, every human soul contained the ineffable presence of the One. By definition this presence was unknowable and would thus satisfy Petrémen’s demand for the ineffability of an other. This ineffable presence was the functional equivalent of Plotinus’s undescended soul, a point Zintzen makes when he says that Iamblichus translated Plotinus’s noetics into theurgical terminology. 3 Yet I would argue that the reason for this translation and the difference in their psychologies was due, not only to the greater influence of Aristotle on Iamblichus but more important, to Iamblichus’s different understanding of salvation. The psychologies of Plotinus and Iamblichus were coherent with their soteriologies, and these, I believe, derived from their attempts to make sense of transcendent experiences. Armstrong distinguishes Plotinus’s doctrine of the undescended soul from the Iamblichean view of the soul based on this experiential criterion:


Iamblichus shifted Platonic soteriology from an intellectual to a ritual askēsis. What the embodied soul could never know, it could, nevertheless, perform in conjunction with the gods. As discursive, however, the mind remained enantios, barred from union with the gods.

The goal of theurgy was to awaken the soul to the presence of the One that it bore unknowingly. And, by means of the very images that bound the soul to its generative life, theurgy released the soul from their grip. Theurgic ritual transformed the soul's somatic, emotional, and intellectual identity through "symbols" (sumbōla) and "tokens" (sunthēmata) that united the soul with the Demiurge (DM 97, 4–8; 97, 16–17; 209, 14–19; 65, 6–9; 136, 2–8). However, what the Demiurge contained simultaneously (DM 141, 10–13), each soul had to integrate over the course of its life and lives, and because the soul had distributed its powers into generated life, its salvation had to include all the mortal activities with which it was identified. The soul's return to the divine, therefore, demanded that it ritually reenact cosmogenesis.

Since theurgic symbols transmitted the power of the demiurgic Nous they functioned much like the Platonic Forms by enforming matter (DM 65, 6–9). Yet because Iamblichus and his successors saw the cosmos as the "most sacred temple of the Demiurge" (In Tim. I, 124, 16–22), these Forms also possessed an anagogic power in theurgic ritual. Only then did they function properly as symbols and sunthēmata. Describing the relation of theurgic cult to cosmology Iamblichus says:

This cult, has it not been intellectually ordained from the beginning according to the sacred laws of the Gods? It imitates the order of the Gods, both the intelligible order and that in heaven. It possesses the eternal measures of beings and wondrous signatures which have been sent down here from the Demiurge and Father of Wholes, through which the inexpressible is revealed through ineffable symbols. (DM 65, 3–9)

When the soul activated the power of these symbols their presence in the soul was awakened. Iamblichus tells Porphyry that this occurred, for example, when meaningless (ασήμα; DM 254, 15) names of the gods were chanted. As theurgic symbols these names transcended discursive understanding: "Even if they are unknowable to us, this very unknowability is its most venerable aspect, for it is too excellent to be divided into knowledge" (DM 255, 17–256, 3). The ineffable names were already present in the soul in the form of an undivided image. Iamblichus says: "We preserve completely in the soul the mystical and ineffable image of the Gods, and through these [names] we lead the soul up to the Gods and, when elevated, we are connected with them as much as possible" (DM 255, 17–256, 3).

Chanting the ineffable names awakened corresponding sunthēmata in the soul, and Iamblichus says, "these sunthēmata themselves do their own work, from themselves, and without our thinking" (DM 97, 4–5). The embodied soul, as intermediary, was simply the conduit through which the divine will in nature joined the divine will in the soul, a conjunction that transcended discursive consciousness. In practical terms, theurgy matched the images in the soul to their counterparts in nature, and though this demanded effort on the part of the soul, the transformative work was done by the images. Iamblichus says: "It is the divine sunthēmata themselves, these the things which properly awaken the divine will; and thus these sunthēmata of the Gods are awakened by the Gods themselves" (DM 97, 4–5).

A divine name was the audible energēia of the god and when invoked the theurgist entered its power, joining the divine image in his soul to the divine itself: "For the divine, intellectual, and one in us—or if you prefer to call it intelligible—is clearly awakened in prayer, and being awakened, it vehemently yearns for its match and is joined to perfection itself" (DM 46, 13–16). Strictly speaking, theurgists did not call down the gods with their prayers; the gods were present already in the invocations (DM 47, 6). Iamblichus says: "At the moment of prayer, the divine itself is literally joined with itself, and it is united with the spiritual conceptions in prayers but not as one thing is joined to another" (DM 47, 9–11).

Nevertheless, it is man who prays, and the impulse to prayer was a crucial element in Iamblichus's soteriology. Responding to Porphyry's criticism that man's prayers were impure and unfit to be offered to the divine Nous, Iamblichus retorts:

Not at all! For it is due to this very fact, because we are far inferior to the Gods in power, purity, and everything else, that it is of all things most critical that we do pray to them to the utmost! For the awareness of our own nothingness, when we compare ourselves to the Gods, makes us turn spontaneously to prayer. And from our supplication, in a short time we are led up to that One to whom we pray, and from our continual intercourse with it we obtain a likeness to it, and from imperfection we are gradually embraced by divine perfection. (DM 47, 13–48, 4)

When the soul fully recognized its nothingness it was stirred to pray, and any presumption that it had the capacity to reach the gods would prevent its occurrence. Before its conjunction with the divine the human
soul had to recognize the unbridgeable gulf that separated it from the gods, and the recognition of this limitation was the only genuinely theurgical act that Iamblichus allowed to the soul. Instead of trying to reach the gods by giving them anthropomorphic characteristics (the Gnostics) or by giving divine characteristics to man (Plotinus) (DM 65, 16–66, 2), Iamblichus maintained that only when the human soul fully accepted the unflattering reality of its rank, would it spontaneously (autothnma) be drawn to the gods.

Clearly, spontaneous prayer could not derive from discursive deliberation. It was, in fact, the energeia of the divine image in the soul yearning for its original. Yet to awaken this divine power the soul had to establish a limit (to peras) on its unlimited pretense to know (to apeiron). The soul’s turn to prayer, in short, was the awakening of its divine sunthema. Iamblichus says: “If one considers that sacred prayers are sent down to man from the Gods themselves and that they are the sunthematata of these very Gods and are known only to the Gods and possess, in a manner, the same power as the Gods, how could anyone justly conceive this sort of prayer to be physical and not divine and intellectual?” (DM 48, 5–11). In its unity, the One of the soul was always in a state of prayer, joining itself to itself, yet the soul participated in this union only in moments of theurgy and through the medium of prayer.

Like Plotinus, Iamblichus maintained that the soul’s final goal was an ineffable henosis (DM 238, 4), yet he was somewhat vague about the divinity with whom the soul unites. Iamblichus said the soul is united with “the Gods” (hoi theoi; DM 238, 5), with the “universal Demiurge” (holos demiuorgos; DM 292, 7), or even with the “God who transcends thought” (ho proennoumenos theos; DM 293, 2–3). It should be remembered, however, that the De Mysteriis was an apology for ritual theurgy, not a theological treatise, and each ritual was directed to the specific needs of a particular soul. A theurgist, therefore, would not attempt first to ascertain the “highest god” in an abstract sense and then worship it. The highest god for any soul in practical and theurgical terms was the god that ruled the elements that bound it. Therefore, Iamblichus’s vagueness concerning divine henosis may simply reflect his theurgical pragmatism. Henosis was always relative to the deity with whom one needed to unite.

Nevertheless, book VIII of the De Mysteriis and Iamblichus’s commentary on the Timaeus suggest that the highest unification for a soul was with the pre-essential (proousios) Demiurge, who contained the entire intelligible world. Iamblichus distinguished this primary Demiurge from the secondary Demiurge who managed the generated cosmos. The first Demiurge was an “antier father,” “cause of all the intelligibles” (DM 262, 7–8), and “God of gods” (DM 262, 4). Iamblichus calls him the “first God and king” (DM 161, 10–11) and identified him with the Egyptian god Ikont, the indivisible one who holds in himself the secondary demiurgic gods Amon and Ptah. In mathematical terms he was simply the “monad from the One” (DM 262, 4–5).

Was the One itself beyond the reach of the soul? Strictly speaking, yes. But according to the Parmenides the One transcended even itself; strictly speaking, even the One could not be one (Parmenides 141d–142). The complexity of this problem was much appreciated by the Neoplatonists. For them “unity” was simply a heuristic term that marked the point of transcendence, and its conceptual meaning was defined only by the particular context from which it was approached. For Iamblichus, beyond the noetic Demiurge was utter ineffability, and it was called “one” only by virtue of its unifying effects, all of which the Demiurge contained. So there was no unification higher than with the pre-essential Father.

7. DM 262, 5; 291, 7. Iamblichus introduced the term proousios into Neoplatonism. The use of pro instead of huper, Trouillard argues, shows that the Iamblichean school was concerned more with the ineffable foundation of consciousness (en deq) than in extending consciousness into the beyond (au dela); see J. Trouillard, “Note sur PROOUSIOS et PRONOIA chez Proclus,” Revue des Etudes Grecques 73 (1960): 80–87.


9. DM 267, 2–4. In radcal: Les mystères d’Egypte, des Places translates: “Ils (les Egyptiens 266, 10) préposant le démiurge au devenir comme un père du démiurge antérieur à celui-ci et distinguent la puissance vivante antérieure au ciel et celle qui est dans le ciel.” Scott comments: “According to the reading of the text, the propator is tòn en genei demiuorgos. But the meaning must have been that the Egyptians recognize a propator distinct from and prior to the demiuorgos tòn en genei” (Parmenides 141d–142). Scott’s remark is corroborated by Iamblichus’s commentary on the Sophist (frag 1, in Dillon, trans. Iamblich Chalcdionis, where he distinguishes three Demiurge: “the sublunar Demiurge” (1, 1–2), “the heavenly Demiurge” (1, 15–16), and the “Father of Demiurges” (1, 18). Dillon explains the fragment: “What we have in this passage is, first, a transcendent Demiurge who sends forth the original creative thoughts; then a heavenly Demiurge, whom one may equate with the en theoi of the Timaeus; and finally our third Demiurge, who presides over generation in the realm of the Moon” (246). The propator of the DM 267, 3 is the “transcendent Demiurge.”

10. For an illuminating discussion of the understanding of the “one” in later Neoplatonism, see Trouillard, La Mystagogie de Proclus (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985), 94–108. Cf. the discussion following Beierwaltes’s essay “Das Problem der Erkenntnis bei Proklos,” in Entretiens, 186–90. There the notion of henosis and to en hmen hen is discussed in connection with the degree of unity afforded the soul in its unio mystica. Beierwaltes, like Trouillard, denies that henosis implies that the soul achieves an “absolute Identitat” with the One.
Iamblichus maintained that regardless of the degree of the soul’s ascent it must always remain soul. Therefore, the soul’s conjunction with the divine was never an absolute identity of soul and god but a unification of the will and activity of the soul with the will and activity of the Demiurge. Describing this conjunction Iamblichus says:

When the theurgic art has united the soul successively to the orders of the universe and to all the divine powers that pervade them, it leads it up to the Creator in his entirety and deposits it there with him, outside of all matter, uniting the soul with the one eternal Logos. Specifically, what I mean is this: theurgy joins the soul with the Self-Begotten, Self-Moving, and All-Sustaining Powers, then with the Intellectual Power which arranges the cosmos, with the Anagogic Power leading to Intelligible Truth, with the Self-Perfect and Creative Powers, and with all other demiurgic powers of this God in order that the theurgic soul may be perfectly established in the activities, thoughts and creations of these powers. Then, indeed, it establishes the soul in the Creator God in his entirety. And this is the goal of the hieratic ascent according to the Egyptians.11

The soul was established in the gods by taking part in their activities, that is to say, in their theurgies, for only by entering the activity of the Demiurges could the soul remain within the eternal logos that held the divine worlds together. Souls who entered this company became “companions of the gods” at which time Iamblichus says, “the aetheric and luminous pneuma, which surrounds the soul, is divested of all generative impulses” (DM 239, 9–11).

Iamblichus explicitly rejected the idea that the soul achieves an absolute union with the divine. In the De Anima he contrasted the view of the Ancients (i.e., theurgists),12 who denied absolute unification, with the view of Numenius (and by implication Plotinus), who affirmed it. Iamblichus says:

Numenius appears to maintain that there is unification and identity without distinction of the soul with its principles, but the Ancients maintain that the soul is united while remaining distinct as an essence.

12. Pseudo-Pod. (Stob. I, 438, 6); palaioi, (458, 18).

Numenius compares it to a “resolution” (analusis) but the Ancients to an “association” (suntaxis) and while the former used the terms “unification with no distinction of parts,” the latter say it is a “unification with distinction of parts.” (Stob. I, 458, 3–8)

This forms part of Iamblichus’s explanation of the rewards given to the purified soul after death. It is germane because theurgy, like death, separated the soul from its embodied identity and caused it to experience post-mortem purifications and rewards.13 Therefore, Iamblichus’s description of liberated souls in the De Anima concurs with his description of theurgic souls in the De Mysteriis. Like theurgists, divinized souls after death share in the creation and preservation of the cosmos. Contrasting the more theurgic view of the Ancients with the Platonists, Iamblichus says:

According to the Ancients, the souls freed from generation co-administer the cosmos with the Gods, but according to the Platonists they contemplate their divine hierarchy. And in the same way, according to the Ancients, liberated souls create the cosmos together with the angels, but according to the Platonists they accompany them in the circular journey. (Stob. I, 458, 17–21)

Theurgic hēnōsis was not a beatific repose but an active embodiment and beneficent sharing of beatitude in cosmogenesis. After all, unification in the will of the Demiurge was a unification in the divine generosity (aphthonos; Tim. 29e) that creates the cosmos. To remain above with the Demiurge, souls had to descend demiurgically in the act of creation.

When the soul was liberated it joined the circulation of angels and archangels “united in mind”14 with the Demiurge. The soul performed

13. That theurgy may be seen to culminate in a kind of “voluntary death” is implied in Proclus’s remark that “in the most mystic of all consecrations (en tē musikōthē tōn telētōn) the theurgists order the whole body to be buried except for the head” (Th. Pl. IV, 30, 19, trans. and ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981)). See Saffrey’s discussion of this passage, 135–36; and Hans Lewy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy, ed. M. Tardieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), 204–7. Damascius, in his catalogue of “deaths,” refers to a “supernatural (huperphufos) death by dissolution of the elements, in other words, the deaths which many theurgists have died” (In Phaed. II, 149, 7–8). This form of “voluntary death” (hekousia kai thanatos) Damascius calls “setting the soul free in the most divine way” (149, 12–13); See In Phaed. II, trans. L. G. Westerink, in The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, vol. 2: Damascius (New York: North-Holland, 1977), 368–69.
14. For Iamblichus the term homonomos describes the noetic concord that is the culmination of all theurgy (DM 294, 5). Cosmologically, it is also the term that describes the perfect concord of demiurgic powers in the orders of creation (DM 25, 3), as well as
its cosmogonic round in the luminous and spheric body gained after a life of theurgic purification. Yet this final body of the soul was identical to its first body created in the beginning by the Demiurge. To become a "companion" (sunopados) of the gods (Phaedrus 248c), the soul had to reenter its first ochêma at the moment of creation. According to Iamblichus, this vehicle was a microcosm, "produced from the entire aether . . . which possesses a generative power." Yet its recovery demanded a laborious reharmonizing of the "numerous pegs" (puknoi gomphoi; Tim. 43a, 4) that bound the soul to its body. It is significant that Iamblichus equates these bonds with the "reason-principles of Nature" (hoi phusisai logos); "binding" is an accurate description of the soul's unknowing bestowal of divine logoi to the world. In theurgy these logoi were ritually realigned with their divine principles and the soul was translated to its luminous ochêma as if to its "first birth" (prôth genesis). The soul's ascent to the rank of an angel was therefore experienced as a descent into its first vehicle at the moment of creation. This was consistent with the Neoplatonic paradoxe that the return (epistrophê) to the One manifests the procession (prohodos) of Ideas from the One. Only temporal experience and discursive thought separated the procession from the return. Theurgy overcame this and allowed the soul to return to the gods by embodying the eternal measures (metra aidia) which continually proceed from them (DM 65, 6).

The noetic simultaneity of prohodos and epistrophê was also reflected in the salvation of the soul although it was extended over time:

From their first descent God sent souls here in order that they might return again to him. Therefore there isn't any change [in the divine will] on account of this sort of [theurgic] ascent, nor do the descents and ascents of souls oppose each other. For just as in the entire cosmos generation and this world below are conjoined with the Intellectual Essence, so in the order of souls, their concern for generated lives is in accord with their liberation from generation. (DM 272, 10–15)

The embodiment of the soul and its concern for generated lives was a fall only so long as the soul failed to limit (to peras) its ceaseless attraction to external phenomena (to aperion). As the soul was initiated into the eternal measures of the cosmos, its fall was transformed into theoaphany, revealing a demiurgic concern for genesis.

Iamblichus and the later Platonists rejected the notion of static perfection as an idol of the discursive mind. Their negative theology demanded that even the terms "one" and "good," should not be taken descriptively but symbolically; that is to say, by virtue of their beneficial and unifying effects. As Trouillard puts it: "La bonté caractérise la cause, non parce qu'elle possède le bien, mais parce qu'elle la crée." In the same way, the highest condition for souls was not only their enjoyment of divine status, but their bestowal of divine measurements in cosmogenesis. This made theurgia superior to the highest forms of thébria, and from this perspective even the descent of souls into bodies was an expression of the same informing activity though it came at the cost of the soul's beatitude. For although embodiment broke the soul's connection with the gods, theurgy recovered it through a mimesis of divine action.

19. For Iamblichus each soul is stamped with the ineffable principles of peras and aperion. Metaphysically the latter is responsible for procession from the One and the former for return to the One. The uneducated soul described by Plato (Tim. 44) and the initiated soul described by Iamblichus are dominated by the principle of aperion, for they have not yet learned to limit their powers in accord with the divine economy of the cosmos. In the Philebus, where peras and aperion are investigated as cosmogonic powers, Plato puns on the homonym aperion, which also means an "inexperienced one." (Phil. 17e). The embodied soul, therefore, may properly participate in the demiurgic mixing of the principles peras-aperion (Phil. 26cd) only when, through the experience of its embodiment, it discovers its limits. For Iamblichus, the education/initiation of the soul was necessarily its homologization to the demiurgic mixing of these principles, which Plato called the genesis eis ouion (Phil. 26d).


Eros and the One of the Soul

There is another principle of the soul . . .

Lamblichus's doctrine of the "one of the soul" provided important theoretical support for the practice of theurgy. Because the soul carried the presence of the One it had the capacity to rise above itself, be homologized to the cosmos and united with its divine cause. The fact that the soul possessed correspondences to the entire cosmos meant that, like the cosmos, it possessed a principle that preceded its multiplicity. Lamblichus called this principle "the one of the soul" (to hen tēs psuchēs), and he identified it with the "helmsman" (kubernētēs) of the Phaedrus who unites the soul with the Intelligibles in its celestial circuit.¹

In his Phaedrus commentary Lamblichus described this helmsman as "an entity more perfect than the charioteer,"² yet in his Timaeus commentary he says that the "charioteer [not the helmsman] is the highest element in us."³ The discrepancy in the two statements may reflect the difference for Lamblichus between the henological and ontological or-

ders. As a being in the hierarchy of souls, man's highest element was certainly logismos, the rational faculty, but Lamblichus distinguished between an entity's being (ousia) and its huparxis. Damascius explains this distinction etymologically:

[Huparxis], as the word (hupō + archein) itself indicates, signifies the first principle of every hypostasis. It is, as it were, a sort of foundation or substructure previously established for the structure as a whole and for each part. . . . Huparxis is the simplicity anterior to all things. . . . It is the One itself, which pre-exists beyond all things and is the cause of every ousia but is not yet itself ousia.⁴

Considered essentially, the charioteer/logismos was indeed the soul's highest faculty, but pre-essentially the helmsman/huparxis or "one of the soul" was its highest element. Strictly speaking, the "one of the soul" was not part of the soul but was present to it in a pre-essential way, just as the One was present to all hypostases as their pre-essential cause.⁵

Lamblichus explains that the helmsman is called a "spectator" (theatēs) of the supercelestial realm, "not to signify that it directs its gaze on this object of intellection as being other than it (kath' heterotēta), but that it is united with it (henoutai autō) and appreciates it on that level . . . for it is the essential nature of the "one of the soul" to be united with the Gods."⁶ Theurgy was the embodied realization of this union, for in theurgy the "one of the soul" united with the hypercosmic gods just as the "helmsman" joined the disembodied soul to the supercelestial realm. Lamblichus said the soul was capable of this unification "[because] there subsists in its very essence an innate knowledge (emphutos gnōsis) of the Gods" (DM 7, 13–14). Lamblichus admits that he uses the term gnōsis inexact, for the highest aspect of the soul could not possibly "know" the gods any more then the helmsman could "see" them. Defining this innate knowledge Lamblichus says:

[It] subsists in our very essence, is superior to all judgment and choice, and exists prior to reason and demonstration. From the beginning it is united to its proper cause and is established with the soul's essential desire (ephepsis) for the Good. But if one must

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1. Dillon notes that in the phrase psuchēs kubernēte monē theatē nō (Phaedrus 247c, 7–8) the nō was not in the Platonic text used by Lamblichus and, if it were, he would have had to explain it away: Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chalcidensis, 253; cf. frag. 6, pp. 96–97.
2. In Phaedrum, frag. 6, 5–6; Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chalcidensis, 96–97.
3. In Tim. IV, frag. 87, 23–24; Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chalcidensis, 200–201.
5. Cf. the proousios patēr of DM 262, 6.
It is a contact, Iamblichus says, established by the gods, and the soul's very existence depended on it, "for we are enveloped in it, even more, we are filled by it, and our existence itself we possess by "knowing" (eidenai) the Gods" (DM 8, 11-13). This essence-making knowledge, like the gaze of the helmsman, is not of one to another; it is a unifying contact. And since the "principles (archai) of reason and life" (DM 9, 6) can never be grasped by the orders they establish, it is through the soul's preconceptual contact with the gods that it sees and knows them. 

Des Places has noted the influence of Plato's *Phaedrus* on the De Mysteriis and points to Iamblichus's direct borrowing of words and phrases. In his explanation of the soul's innate knowledge of the gods Iamblichus says: "Indeed, it seems (eiketô dè) that with the eternal companions of the Gods is fitted an inborn (sumphutos) perception of their Lords" (DM 9, 10-11). The terms eiketô and sumphutos were also used by Plato in his description of souls who are joined to the gods in their celestial round (*Phaedrus* 246a, 5), and though (unlike Iamblichus) Plato used sumphutos to describe the unity of the vehicle and rider and not their contact with the supercelestial realm, Iamblichus's use of the terms sumphutos (9, 11) and emphutos (7, 14) in this context suggests that he imagined theurgic unification against the background of the *Phaedrus*. 

Iamblichus's use of terms, however, must be understood in context. For example, although Iamblichus denies that noësis is sufficient to reach the divine he also says that souls join the gods by noësis: "It is by pure and blameless intuitions (noësis) that are received out of eternity from the Gods that the soul is joined to them" (DM 9, 16-18). Iamblichus's speak the truth, contact with the divine is not knowledge. For knowledge is separated [from its object] by otherness. But, prior to the act of knowing another as being, itself, "other," there exists a spontaneous [...] uniform conjunction suspended from the Gods. 

Since the noësis of the gods had no "otherness" in the separated manner of human knowledge, their "pure intuitions" (katharai noësis) necessarily transcended the soul. Theurgic noësis was, in fact, the act of a god knowing itself through the activity and the medium of the soul, not vice versa. Noësis, in fact, was not conceptual, and Iamblichus maintained that noetic contacts with the gods were more erotic than intellectual. In his Parmenides commentary he says: "The Intelligible is held before the mind, not as knowable (hós gnōston), but as desirable (hós epheton), and the mind is filled by this, not with knowledge, but with the being and every intelligible perfection." 

The "one of the soul" was anterior to the soul's hypostasis. As archê of the soul's being and consciousness, it was pre-essential and pre-noetic, completely inaccessible to understanding. Although the soul could not knowingly know the gods or even its own divinity, it was nevertheless drawn to them by its innate gnōsis and desire (ephesis). Theurgic successfully embodied this desire in proportion to the soul's capacity to homologize itself to the cosmos. Graphically put, the soul's vertical ascent was determined by its horizontal extension and its coordination of the many attractions of embodied life. According to Damascius, Iamblichus believed that "the ascent to the One is not possible unless the soul coordinates itself to the All and, with the All, moves itself toward the universal principle of all things" (Dub. et Sol. I, 79, 12-14). According to Pythagorean teachings, the One manifested itself as a coordinated multiplicity: a Whole, and similarly, the "one in the soul" manifested itself when the soul ritually coordinated its multiplicity into a whole, imitating "the anterior and commanding principle which contains in and around itself otherness and multiplicity" (DM 59, 13-15). In its coordination of parts the soul was lifted out of the contraries of embodied life11 and entered the reference to noësis, gnōsis, or eidēsis to describe contact with the gods should not be confused with human modes of understanding. These terms were used as metaphors to describe the soul's pre-essential contact with the gods, and Iamblichus always qualified them as innate (emphutos), natural (sumphutos), uniform (monoœids), or pure (katharo) to distinguish them from human understanding. 

7. DM 7, 14-8, 6. I find A. Smith's explanation of emphutos gnōsis (7, 14) as "still divided" (see Porphyry's *Place in the Neoplatonic World: A Study in Post-Platonic Neoplatonism* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], 85-86) and therefore subordinate to the sumphutos, which is uniform (monoœids, 8, 5) to be unconvincing. Iamblichus begins his explanation of human contact with the gods with the term gnōsis probably because it was the term Porphyry used in his question (10, 2), and in any case, Iamblichus clearly distinguishes it from human gnōsis and explicitly denies its dividedness since he equates the emphutos gnōsis tôn theon with the sumphutos. Iamblichus, therefore, defines two kinds of gnōsis: divine and human (10, 1-6) and explicitly states that the gnōsis/eidēs is of divine things is monoœids (10, 8).

8. *Oracles Chaldaïques*, 42 n. 2

unity that preceded its embodied existence.

Iamblichus referred to the “one of the soul” differently depending on the context, and his inconsistency suggests that he was not concerned about the term he used so long as it conveyed the idea of an anteriority pre-established with the gods. Responding to Porphyry’s question on prayer, Iamblichus used the terms hen, theios, noerōs, and noētos to describe the divine element in the soul (DM 46, 13–15). In a discussion of divination, Iamblichus explained that prophecy was caused by this “one principle” and he made a rigorous distinction between theurgic divination (to theion mantiκēs eidos; DM 64, 16–17) and the varieties of human divination. The latter, Iamblichus says, are “false and deceptive” (DM 165, 2–3), in contrast to theurgic divination which is “one, divine, and unmixed” (DM 164, 18–19). He says: “The divine kind [of divination] must be uniformly comprehended according to one measure and order (hē logos kai mia taxis) and according to one intelligible and immutable truth” (DM 165, 4–6). True divination was not a natural gift, “but a certain divine good which is pre-established as more ancient than our nature” (DM 165, 18–19; cf. Stob. II, 174, 15–16). This “certain divine good” stood in precisely the same relation to man as the “one of the soul” and Iamblichus maintained that it came to the soul from outside: “It is necessary to contend vigorously against anyone who says that divination originates from us” (DM 166, 14–15). Divine mantiκē came to the soul “from without” (exother; DM 167, 2), just as the Aristotelian nous came to the soul “from without” (GA 736b, 28). Even the soul’s “innate knowledge” of the gods had to come to it from without for due to its anteriority it was “more ancient” (presbutēra) and therefore inaccessible to the soul.

That this more ancient principle remained outside the soul was a point on which Iamblichus was unwilling to compromise. One might suppose that since the soul enjoyed a degree of union with the gods between incarnations it could sustain this connection subliminally and, as Plotinus seems to suggest, “unconsciously,” but Iamblichus’s view of the de-scent of the soul and his distinction of incorporeal hypostases did not allow for this. The embodied soul was incapable of returning to the gods of its own power and needed their aid to reach them. This “otherness” of the divine principle was consistent with Iamblichus’s psychology. Because of the inversion of the soul its autōs was recovered only by ritually embracing the heterōs, and although the objects employed in theurgy appeared as “other,” it was through them that the soul’s external inclinations were united with their celestial archetypes. By ritually uniting its own multiplicity the soul entered the activity of the One and penetrated to its own pre-essential archē. Of this principle Iamblichus says:

But there is another principle (archē) of the soul, superior to all nature and knowledge, by which we are able to be unified with the Gods, transcend the mundane order, and participate in the eternal life and activity of the supercelestial Gods. . . . The soul is then entirely separated from those things which bind it to the generated world and it flies from the inferior and exchanges one life for another. It gives itself to another order, having entirely abandoned its former existence. (DM 270, 8–19)

Iamblichus believed that the unifying principle that transformed the soul in theurgy was the same principle that held the cosmos together as its universal phīlē or erōs (DM 211, 3–6): “There is a single friendship (phīlē) which contains all things and produces this unifying bond (sundesmos) by means of an ineffable communion” (DM 211, 16–18). The unifying power of phīlē defined the steps of theurgic ascent at the same time as it revealed the cosmicogonic procession. In short, phīlē sustained both the cosmos and every act of theurgy. Consequently, Iamblichus argued that the effective agent in theurgy was phīlē or, speaking Platonically, that erōs drew the soul back to the gods (cf. DM 239, 6–13). Although the heavenly cycles described in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus were the goal to which a Platonist aspired, it was erotic madness that brought him there. According to the Chaldean Oracles, Eros was the first god born of the Paternal Father; Eros coordinated the Ideas in the
ei Victorinus, 442. The Iamblichean fragment preserved by Simplicius (In Categ. 116, 25–118, 15) reveals Iamblichus’s application of the Aristotelian categories kata analogian (116, 26) to the entire neoic realm as well as to celestial deities such as stars and planets. B. D. Larsen comments on the above-mentioned fragment and shows its relation to the “Pythagorean” Aristotel of Iamblichus; see Larsen, Iamblique de Chalcis: Exégèse et philosophie (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 243, 260–62.


13. Dillon notes that it is only “through the Circuit of the Same within it” that the embodied soul, with the aid of theurgy, is allowed to rise above the material world; Dillon, trans., Iambliche Chaldeismen, 342.

According to the Oracles the Demiurge filled each soul with a "deep eros" (erós bathús) to draw it back to the gods.¹⁸

The deep eros of the Oracles, like the innate gnōsis or essential desire (epheσis) of the De Mysteriis (DM 7, 14; 8, 2), was present in the soul but anterior to consciousness. It was the desire that drew the soul down into a mortal body and led it back to its immortal ochēma. The theurgist received this eros from the gods, and returned it to them in the form of a ritualized cosmos (cf. DM 210, 3-4; 211, 3-10). Embodiment was simply the pivot through which the eros of the Demiurge returned to itself.

In this light, the embodiment of the soul and the tension caused by its separation from divinity was not a fall or an error but the sine qua non of its ascent. And that the things woven by the intellectual light of the Father could never yearn for itself, Eros would never arise as the "first-eros" (anatropē), the divine could never experience separation from divinity was not a fall or an error but the sine qua non of its ascent. Both were sensible objects drawn from the elements to which the soul was bound, and both defined the soul through an act of creation.²¹ Theurgy, therefore, may be seen as the ritual elaboration of both the Platonic doctrines of erōs and anamnēsis.

It is perhaps appropriate to conclude Iamblichus’s vision of the embodied soul with a hagiographical image of Iamblichus himself. In the Lives of the Philosophers, Eunapius reports that when Iamblichus journeyed to the baths of Gadara with his disciples he acceded to their demands to demonstrate his power. Eunapius says:

There were two hot springs smaller than the others but prettier, and he [Iamblichus] bade his disciples ask the natives of the place by what names they used to be called in ancient times. When they had done his bidding they said: "There is no question about it, this spring is called Erōs, and the name of the one next to it is Anterōs."²² He at once touched the water with his hand—he happened to be sitting on the ledge of the spring where the overflow experience in a corporeal form was the linchpin of the cosmos: embodiment was a creative and sacramental act.

That the soul’s embodiment was the ultimate sunthēma of its ascent remains an insoluble logical paradox, but appropriately, for the lover it is a commonplace experience. In the erotic dialectic discussed by Plato in the Symposium (200-202), the separation of the lover from the beloved was the sine qua non of their attraction and unification,²⁰ and in Iamblichean theurgy the sunthēma had the same function as the beloved (erōmenon) in Plato’s erotic ascent. Both were sensible objects drawn from the elements to which the soul was bound, and both defined the soul through an act of creation.²¹ Theurgy, therefore, may be seen as the ritual elaboration of both the Platonic doctrines of erōs and anamnēsis.

19. For a discussion of the cosmogonic role of Eros in later Neoplatonism, see Stephen Gersh, KINÉSIS AKINÉTOS: A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), app. 1: "ERÖS as a Cosmic Process," 123-27. F. Cremer explains Eros as a theurgic virtue according to the Oracles; Cremer, Die Chaldäischen Orakel, 139-43.
20. J. Trouillard explains the unifying activity of Eros in the soul as "the active presence of the One in us," and as much dependent on our "procession" as on our "return"; see Trouillard, "Sur un pluriel de Platon et de Proclus," Association Guillaume Budé 4 (1958): 90.
21. In the Symposium Diotima defines the praxis and ergon of love: "To love," she says, "is to bring forth upon the beautiful both in body and in soul" (206b, 7-8). "The act of creation (he genēsis)," she adds, "is the one deathless (athanaton) and eternal (aiōgenes) element in our mortality" (206e, 7-8). In the Phaedrus, Plato says the erōtēs "would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to a holy image of deity" (251a, 6-7); and at 253a he says the divine habits that the soul receives from the deity who possesses him are attributed to the beloved upon whom he pours out his love. See J. Trouillard’s discussion of this passage in L’un et l’âme, 180-84.
22. Wright suggests the two Erotes of Themistius’s fable (304d) as a possible source for the names of these springs. Considering the profound similarity in the function of Platonic erōmenoi and theurgic sunthēmata, it is more likely that Eunapius borrowed his terms from the Phaedrus (255d) where Plato describes the yearning of the beloved for his lover: "And when the other is beside him, he shares his repitite from anguish, and when he is absent, he likewise shares his longing and being longed for, since he possesses a counter-love (anterōs) which is the image of love (erōs)." See Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists, trans. W. C. Wright (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921; reprint, 1968).
runs off—and uttering a brief summons, he called forth a boy from the depth of the spring. He was white-skinned and of medium height, his locks were golden and his back and breast shone; and he exactly resembled one who was bathing or had just bathed. His disciples were overwhelmed with amazement, but Iamblichus said, “Let us go to the next spring,” and he rose and led the way, with a thoughtful air. Then he went through the same performance there also and summoned another Eros like the first in all respects, except that his hair was darker and fell loose in the sun. Both the boys embraced Iamblichus and clung to him as though he were genuinely their father. He restored them to their proper places and went away after his bath, reverenced by his pupils.  

We need not concern ourselves about the veracity of this fabulous tale to appreciate its iconic truth. Perhaps no better image for the theurgist could be portrayed than this: Iamblichus himself, seated by an overflowing stream, invokes its ἔρως and having called it out, joins it—through his own body—to its responsive Αντερός. All theurgy did the same: situated in the stream of generation, the theurgist invoked the ἔρως of this stream to awaken the anterόs hidden in his soul; in the hieratic moment of joining the divine to the divine the theurgist himself became a creator. Yet it was only by virtue of his embodiment and alienation from the gods that he was able to fulfill this task. In the theurgic act of an embodied soul, Eros was allowed to join itself and regenerate the bonds that unite the cosmos.

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24. Iamblichus discusses the “double role” of the theurgist in two passages, DM 184, 1–8; 246, 16–247, 2.
Cult and Cosmos

Iamblichus believed that theurgy was entirely compatible with Plato's teachings on the soul and that it provided a practical solution to the problem of embodiment. Yet Iamblichus's apology for theurgy did more than address the philosophical problem of the soul’s embodiment; more generally, it provided a defense of religious ritual against well-known arguments brought forward by Porphyry in his letter to Anebo and his treatise On the Abstinence of Animal Food. Far from being a mere *propaideia* to philosophy, Iamblichus argued that the concrete performance of ritual was the culmination of one’s philosophical development. Theurgy tied soteriology to cosmogony and allowed the soul to share in both.

Up to this point Iamblichus's Platonism has been considered with respect to his metaphysical positions. In Part I, matter and embodiment were examined and absolved of the pejorative connotations given to them by Iamblichus's predecessors. In Part II, the embodied soul was examined, the most problematic aspect of Iamblichus's metaphysics. Yet Iamblichus's paradoxical definition of the soul as "self-change" is crucial for a proper understanding of Platonic theurgy. The anatropic condition of the embodied soul was tied to the mysteries of creation and salvation. Far from being denied, the inversion of the soul was seen by Iamblichus...
to be necessary to complete the cosmogonic cycle, and embodied experience, progressively incorporated by theurgic activity, put the soul in place despite the prima facie fact of its being out of place, i.e., anatropē. Iamblichus’s metaphysical solutions to the problems of matter and the embodiment of the soul form an essential background to his theory of theurgy. Yet without ritual performance they would remain, by his own definition, discursive fantasies cut off from the divine. Therefore, we must examine the rituals themselves: although theurgy may be described theoretically as a soteriological and cosmogonic practice, it must be seen specifically how this was understood and accomplished. Since this is the question Iamblichus himself was challenged to answer, we can do no better than (1) follow Iamblichus’s explanation of the correspondence that exists between the cosmos and the cult; (2) consider the significance of this correspondence for man in finding and performing an appropriate ritual; and (3) examine in detail how the rites exemplify this correspondence and fulfill a theurgic function. In sum, the question to be answered is how Iamblichus understood ritual to be simultaneously soteric and cosmogonic, and consequently, how the stages of cosmogony were reflected in the theurgic cult.

In his letter to Ancbo, Porphyry accused theurgists of believing that the gods “were especially enticed by the vapors of animal sacrifice” (DM 212, 2-3), and Iamblichus responds by laying out the principle of all theurgic sacrifice: “The best of all beginnings is the one which demonstrates that the law of sacrifices (thesmos tôn thusan) is connected with the order of the gods (taxis tôn theon)” (DM 217, 3-5). In On the Abstinence of Animal Food Porphyry had argued that the “gods” worshiped in blood sacrifices were not gods at all, but daemons counterfeiting as gods. That daemons were the immediate objects of worship was a point with which Iamblichus agreed, for it followed the hierarchical law that man must approach the gods through the mediation of daemons. However, Iamblichus disagreed with Porphyry’s description of these entities. While both acknowledged that daemons were invisible beings with pneumatic bodies, Porphyry contended that their bodies were perishable and nourished by the vapors of blood sacrifice. Iamblichus categorically denied it: “For although Daimones possess a kind of body which some believe is nourished by sacrifices, this body is unchangeable, impassive, luminous, and without needs, so that nothing flows from it and, in addition, it does not need anything outside to flow into it” (DM 212, 3-7). As a class daemons were ontologically superior to man and revealed the invisible powers of the gods. Iamblichus says: “they bring into manifest activity the invisible good of the Gods, reveal what is ineffable in them, shape what is formless into forms, and render what is beyond all measure into visible ratios” (DM 16, 17-17, 4). In short, daemons were agents of the Demiurge in his cosmogonic activity. Understandably, for Porphyry, the agents of a desacralized cosmos could not be considered superior to man. Therefore, his estimation of daemons as perishable and perverse demons was a correlate to his view of the cosmos as a topsy-turvy realm from which souls must escape, a point not missed by Iamblichus who accused Porphyry of holding unreasonable views, saying: “It is not possible that the Creator has generously provided ready nourishment for animals in the sea and on earth, but has made the beings superior to us [i.e. daemons] in want of it” (DM 212, 15-18). To believe, as Porphyry did, that daemons depended on man for their sustenance contradicted the rational order of the cosmos. Thus, Iamblichus argues:

Why don’t those who say this simply turn the entire hierarchy of things upside down, making us more powerful and in a better class? For if they make us responsible for nourishing and fulfilling Daimones we would be above them in the order of causes. For every order receives its perfection and nourishment from the order that generates it. One can see this even in the generation of visible things, and it is also seen among cosmic entities; in fact, earthly things are nourished by the celestial. And this becomes especially clear among the invisible causes. For Soul is perfected by Intellect, and Nature by Soul, and other things similarly are nourished by their causes. And since it is impossible for us to be the ruling causes of Daimones, for the same reason we could not be the causes of their nourishment. (DM 213, 8-214, 3)

Iamblichus’s position on the question of sacrifice and daemons was based on his understanding of the “order of the gods” (taxis tôn theon). Although his criticism of Porphyry on the question of daemons exemplifies only one instance where he found himself at odds with his former teacher, the issue typifies Iamblichus’s more general critique of Porphyry’s soteriology. Iamblichus continually referred to the hierarchical order of the cosmos to correct Porphyry’s misunderstandings of theurgy, so to understand theurgical ritual we must understand the order of the Iamblichus gods, the archai of his cosmos.

Iamblichus divided superior beings (hoi krettones) into four distinct classes: gods, daemons, heroes, and pure souls. As discussed previously, the extreme classes, gods and souls, were unified and divided respectively; whereas daemons and heroes served as media connecting the extremes. Iamblichus imagined the gods at the top and souls at the bottom of an ontological scale, with daemons in the second rank “sus-
Heroes, situated below the gods (DM 16, 8-10). Due to Porphyry’s questions about daimons, Iamblichus devoted more attention to explaining their function.

Significantly, their task was cosmogonic. Daimons were the agents of prohodos. They obeyed the “beneficent will of the gods” (DM 16, 15-17) and revealed the divine and invisible good. Insofar as daimons served the procession impulse of the gods they were responsible, as well, for binding souls to bodies (DM 67, 15-68, 1). In their extrovertive function, daimons produced growth in plants and preserved animal species (including human) through the sex drive and other instincts. In this sense daimons might seem opposed to the soul’s desire to free itself from material attachments. Yet Iamblichus never forgets that it is the gods and the Demiurge who send the daimons forth. Therefore, man had to understand how to work with these demiurgic functions, not to reject or oppose them. As Iamblichus asserts: “I say, therefore, that Daimones are produced by the generative and demiurgic powers of the Gods in the most extreme culmination of the [cosmogonic] procession and the last distribution of parts” (DM 67, 3-6). The daimons of Iamblichus may be likened to “laws of nature.” As guardians of the generated realm, daimons blindly performed their tasks, and souls prospered or not depending on their judicious use of these powers. Heroes, on the other hand, performed a soteriological function and guided souls in their spiritual integration. Iamblichus says: “But Heroes are produced according to the logoi of life in divine beings, and the first and perfect measures of souls are completed and defined by Heroes” (DM 67, 6-9). Typical to Iamblichus’s method, he distinguished daimons and heroes in the same manner that he distinguished gods and souls: by their essence (ousia), power (dunamis), and activity (energeia). “For,” Iamblichus says, “being generated from different causes, the essence of one is different from the essence of the other” (DM 67, 10-11). His distinctions are as follows:

ousia: The essence of Daimones is fit for bringing about final effects; it is perfective of mundane natures and gives completion to the providential care that oversees each generated being. But the essence of Heroes is vital and rational and is the leader of souls. (DM 67, 11-15)

dunamis: With respect to their powers, those of Daimones must be defined as fecundating, for they oversee nature and the binding of souls into bodies; but to Heroes one must assign powers that are vivifying, that lead men, and are liberated from generation. (DM 67, 15-68, 2)

energeia: It follows that the activities of these classes should be defined. The actions of Daimones should be defined as more mundane and more widely extended in the deeds they bring to completion; but the actions of Heroes are less pervasive and are concerned with the orderly arrangement of souls. (DM 68, 3-7)

According to these definitions the function of daimons was cosmogonic. Acting centrifugally, they carried the generative will of the Demiurge into its most minute and particular expressions. The function of heroes, by contrast, was convettive. As agents of epistrophé they guided the soul’s daimonic drives into divine measures.

Viewed statically, daimons and heroes were in conflict, the former binding souls to bodies and the latter aiding in their release. In this light it is understandable how the daimons of the Platonic tradition became the demons of the Gnostic and Christian worlds. For Iamblichus, however, both daimons and heroes acted in conjunction and obedience to the divine will (DM 70, 5). They completed the circuit of divine life that descends continually into sensible expression while remaining rooted in the Forms. Thus, Iamblichus says:

these mediating classes complete the universal bond between Gods and souls, they effect an indissoluble connection between them, and they bind together one continuum extending from the highest to the lowest. They make the communion of universal beings indivisible and provide an excellent blend and proportionate mixing for all. They allow the procession (prohodos) to pass from more excellent to inferior natures, and they equally facilitate the ascent (anagogé) from inferior to superior natures. They insert order and measures of the communication descending from more excellent natures, [they allow for] its reception into imperfect beings, and they make all things mutually agreeable and in harmony with each other, receiving from on high, from the Gods, the causes of all these things. (DM 17, 8-20)

The continuity (sunecheia) and kinship (sungeneia) of the cosmos were essential to Iamblichus’s theory of theurgy. Based on the principle that there was an unbroken continuity throughout the cosmos (DM 20, 5),
Iamblichus could defend rites that used material objects. Theoretically, any object could connect the human soul with the gods because the entire world was their *energeia* and therefore manifested their presence. As Iamblichus put it, the gods were “present immaterially within material things” (DM 232, 15–16), and therefore theurgists invoked the gods in accord with their different expressions (DM 30, 13).

Porphyry challenged this view and asked how theurgists can invoke subterranean and terrestrial deities if the gods dwell only in the heavens (DM 29, 17–19). Repeating Thales’ well-known dictum, Iamblichus replied: “To begin with, it is not true that the Gods dwell only in heaven, yet the gods themselves were not affected by these earthly things” (DM 30, 1–3; cf. DM 27, 8–10). Each god’s authority was allotted to a different region of the cosmos: heaven, earth, sacred cities, sacred places, or certain sacred groves or statues (DM 30, 14–16), yet the gods themselves were not affected by these allotments for the divine illuminates all these externally (*exōthen*) just as the sun externally (*exōthen*) illuminates all things with its rays. Therefore, just as light envelopes things illuminated by it, so does the power of the Gods externally embrace those natures that partake of it. And just as natural light is undividedly present in the air . . . so also the light of the Gods shines separately (*chóristós*), and though it remains firmly established in itself it proceeds through all existing beings. (DM 30, 16–31, 6)

Although the light of the gods was indivisible (DM 31, 6–10), the world was divided and therefore their light was received in different ways.

Yet the light itself is everywhere and entirely one and it is indivisible in all things that are able to participate in it. By its perfect power it fulfills everything, and by virtue of its unlimited and causal transcendence it brings all things to completion in itself. Everywhere it is united to itself and joins last things to their principles. (DM 31, 13–18)

The gods were revealed by their participants aetherially (*aitheriós*), aeri ally (*aeríos*), aquatic ally (*enhudríos*), etc. (DM 33, 8–9), and theurgists invoked the gods accordingly (DM 33, 9–11).

Attempting to find contradictions in Iamblichus’s Platonism, Porphyry asked how theurgists could worship the gods as sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies if the gods were incorporeal (DM 50, 14–17). To which Iamblichus replies: “Indeed, we maintain that the celestial Gods are not contained by bodies but that they contain bodies in their divine lives and activities (*energeiai*)” (DM 50, 17–51, 2). The celestial gods contained their bodies, and since all gods were defined by unity their activities were also unified. As we have seen, the only body that exemplifies unified action is the sphere, so the bodies of the gods were spheres, the geometric complement to their unity. Yet heavenly spheres were not bodies in the ordinary sense for they were perfect *energeiai* of gods. Quite literally they were the divine acts (*theia erga*) or theurgies of the gods. Like the theurgic actions performed by human souls, the celestial bodies “imitate the sameness of the Gods with an eternal motion, in accord with the same principles and similarly toward the same end, according to one ratio (*heis logos*) and one order (*mia taxis*)” (DM 51, 16–52, 2). According to Iamblichus, the bodies of the celestial gods were “entirely similar,” “united,” and “uniform” (DM 52, 6–8) so that, despite their embodiment, “the visible Gods in the heavens are all, in a certain sense, incorporeal” (DM 52, 17–18).

Because the body of a visible god was totally under the control of its soul and guiding *Nous*, its noetic character was ironically revealed as a sphere and, like other *sunthēmata*, it served as a mean between the corporeal and the incorporeal.

According to Iamblichus, incorporeal gods existed above their celestial counterparts. In a lost treatise entitled *On the Gods* Iamblichus distinguished these two classes of deities as “cosmic” (*perikosmioi*) and “hyper-cosmic” (*huperkosmioi*) (DM 271, 11), and in his discussion of sacrifices and gods in the *De Myste rioi* he referred to these gods respectively as “material” and “immaterial”:

In the first place, we maintain that among the Gods some are material and others immaterial. The material Gods are those that contain matter within themselves and give it order, but the entirely immaterial Gods are removed from matter and transcend it. (DM 217, 4–8)

The material gods were the celestial deities, and though Iamblichus distinguished them from the “incorporeal” (*asomatoi*) and “intelligible” (*noétai*) gods (DM 57, 7–8), all the gods were united. The different allotments—whether material or immaterial—simply reflected the contexts in which they communicated the will of the Paternal Demiurge. In response to Porphyry’s question about the relation of corporeal to incorporeal gods, Iamblichus says:
Since the Gods ride upon celestial spheres while remaining incorporeal, intelligible, and united, they continue to possess their principles in the intelligible realm, and while contemplating their own divine forms they govern the entire heaven according to one infinite activity. And if, while being in the heavens separately (chôristôs), they lead the eternal revolutions through their will alone, they remain themselves, unmixed with the sensible order and co-existing with the intelligible Gods. (DM 57, 7-14)

Like light that remains "firmly established in itself" (DM 31, 5), the celestial gods remained in the intelligible realm yet served as principles for their "visible statues," the celestial spheres (DM 57, 18). In turn, the celestial gods generated sublunary existences which also remained in "continuity" (sunecheia) with the intelligible gods "according to one union" (kata mian henôsin) (DM 58, 3-4). The dominant characteristic of the gods was unity, their activity was unifying, and thus, although the One was present everywhere (DM 58, 7), it was most evident among the gods. The material gods were therefore united with the immaterial gods through their common characteristic of "unity." Iamblichus says:

In the case of the Gods, their order exists in the union of them all: their primary and secondary genres and all natures generated from them co-exist together in unity. The beginning, the middle, and the end co-exist according to the One itself, so as regards the Gods one ought not to seek from whence the One comes to them. For whatever the Being itself is in them, this Being of theirs is the One. And according to this principle, the secondary Gods remain in the One of the primary Gods while the primary Gods give to the secondary the unity proceeding from themselves. All of them together possess the communion of an indissoluble connection. (DM 59, 15-60, 8)

Despite this unity at the level of the gods, the soul could reach the immaterial level only first by passing through the material gods. In fact, the characteristics of these two orders may have been determined by their effects on souls. For example, Iamblichus said that the soul's liberation from fate was effected by the hypercosmic gods (DM 271, 11-12). Unfortunately, his explanation of these gods has been lost, but Damascius says that his description of the liberated gods (apolutoi theoi) was based on Iamblichean teachings so we will follow his explanation.

Damascius says that according to "Orpheus" and "the theurgists" (Dub. et Sub. II, 214, 8) each order of the gods was determined and guided by the order immediately prior to it. Thus, the summit of any order was rooted in the order above it and guided it from there. Concerning the liberated gods, Damascius says:

Thus, the liberated (apolutoi) Gods should be conceived as the last of the hypercosmic (hyperkosmioi) Gods and as exercising providential attention over the world. Therefore, [we ask], do these liberated Gods occupy the highest point among the enкосmic (enkosmioi) Gods, and are they to be counted among them with respect to their characteristics, or are the liberated Gods not only enкосmic but also reveal a hypercosmic nature? Accordingly, and with respect to their proper species, one ought to classify them as the mean (mesotelês) of these [i.e., the hyper- and encosmic gods]. We maintain that the liberated Gods are those that exercise a providential attention over the cosmos but are neither held in its nature nor completed within its order. (Dub. et Sol. II, 214, 8-15)

Under the reign of Kronos, the "liberated Demiurge" (apolutos demiourgos; Dub. et Sol. II, 214, 22), the gods ruled in Plato's Golden Age (Dub. et Sol. II, 214, 17-19), guiding the world from above with noetic and providential care. As the mesotelês between enкосmic and hypercosmic gods, the liberated gods were in contact with both worlds. Damascius continues:

Indeed, their position according to their half-related status reveals more clearly how they occupy the middle rank among the Gods. For at the same time that their status of being "related" (to kata schêsin) is proper to the enкосmic Gods, their status of being "unrelated" (to ascheton) is proper to the hypercosmic Gods. For [their] nature is one but [also] double since they project a single life which is both enкосmic and hypercosmic. (Dub. et Sol. II, 215, 4-6)

Damascius applied the law of mean terms to create an intermediary class of gods, and since he attributed these teachings to Iamblichus it is safe to assume that Iamblichus's material and immaterial gods would have been joined in the same way. Iamblichus said that the liberation of souls was effected by the hypercosmic gods, but to fulfill a liberating function Damascius reminds us that these gods must somehow have been in the cosmos: how else could they lead souls out of it? The difference between the material and immaterial gods therefore, like the difference between fate and providence, cannot be separated from the soul's
experience of them.² The mediating class (or function) of “liberated” gods reflected the soul’s experience of the liberating presence of immaterial gods in the material order and further, since the soul’s experience was triadic,³ the order of the gods was also assumed to be triadic.⁴ Just as the spherical bodies of celestial gods mediated between the corporeal and incorporeal realms, the liberated gods mediated between the encosmic and hypercosmic realms, their identity and position being relative to the context in which they were experienced (see Diagram 1).

The division of the gods into hypercosmic (A), encosmic (B), and liberated (AB) is an extension of Iamblichus’s “law of mean terms” to the divine classes.⁵ Since Iamblichus assumed the law of the mean distin-

² In the same way that Iamblichus says that “fate is providence” so the material gods, in one sense, are the immaterial gods; cf. Stob. II, 174, 5–7.
³ That is, the soul experienced the hypostasis of the liberated gods and thus identified with the mean term embracing two divine orders: immaterial and material.
⁴ Personal experience must always be taken into account to understand the abstract schemas of the Neoplatonists. As A. C. Lloyd puts it: “The hypostases are experiences; they are types of consciousness. . . . It follows that the element of personal experience is needed to complement the non-empirical philosophical system. The two together constitute Neoplatonism”; The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 126.
⁵ See Dodds’s discussion of the influence of this Iamblichean principle on Platonic tradition in ET, xxi–xxii.

The Liturgy of the Cosmos

Cult and Cosmos

guished the classes of the gods, the archai of his universe, it necessarily distinguished lower levels of manifestation. With the law of the mean Iamblichus connected the extremes of any opposition, including that between gods and men.

In his letter to Anebo, Porphyry understandably had asked why theurgists subordinated invisible daimons to visible gods (DM 61, 12–15). Iamblichus replied that the visible gods were “united” (sunhēmēnoi; DM 61, 17) with the intelligible gods because their very Form (unity) was held in common (DM 61, 18) but daimons were far removed from unity and had a different essence (DM 62, 1). With respect to the invisibility of the noetic gods and daimons, Iamblichus said that although both daimons and the noetic gods were invisible (aphanēs), significant differences separated them. Daimons were merely invisible to the senses, but the gods were invisible to “rational knowledge” and “material intelligence” (DM 62, 5–7). For Iamblichus, whatever was invisible to the intellect because of its transcendence was certainly higher than what was merely invisible to sight. In the case of the celestial gods, although they were empirically visible, they remained invisible to the grasp of the mind. Iamblichus says:

What then? Are the invisible Gods, by virtue of being invisible, any greater than the visible Gods? Not at all! For the divine wherever it is and whatever allotment it has, possesses the same power and dominion over its subordinates. Accordingly, even if it is visible it rules in the same way over invisible Daimones, and if it exists in the earth, it still rules over the Daimones of the air. For neither the place of reception nor a part of the world can produce any change in the authority of the Gods. (DM 62, 10–63, 1)

 Gods and daimons were also distinguished by their dominions. The dominion of the gods was universal while that of daimons was divided into parts (DM 63, 5–10), and the gods were “entirely independent” (παντῆς kecharismenoi; DM 63, 14–15) of the bodies they commanded while daimons were not separated (achôristoi) from the things they ruled (DM 63, 12–13). As Iamblichus put it:

Generally, the divine is leader and stands over the order of beings, but the daimonic nature is attendant and willingly receives whatever the Gods instruct them to do, and they work out manually the things which the Gods conceive, wish, and command intellectually. Surely this is why the Gods are free from the powers that verge into generation, but Daimones are not completely free of them. (DM 64, 2–9)
Consequently, every god manifested itself through its attendant daimons, who were in *sumpatheia* with animate life while the god remained entirely independent (*chōristōs*).

Since the order of the gods and of each god was triadic, the structure of the universe and of every ontological order necessarily reflected this triune principle. The Pythagorean influence on Iamblichus is particularly evident in the role of the triad, which was central to Pythagorean worship. In *De Caelo* Aristotle reports:

> It is just as the Pythagoreans say, the whole world and all things in it are summed up in the *triad*; for end, middle, and beginning give the number of the whole and their number is the triad. Hence it is that we have taken this number from nature, as if it were one of her laws, and make use of it even in the worship of the gods.6

More specifically, the triadic rule was reflected in each ontological class. For example, Iamblichus distinguished three kinds of daimons: (1) those who help the gods reward theurgists for their sacred labors (*DM* 181, 8–13); (2) those who preside over judgments as the agents of justice, aiding good men and punishing the evil (*DM* 181, 13–19); and (3) those who are without reason (*alogistos*) or judgment (*akritos*), are allotted one power, and preside over a single natural function (*DM* 182, 1–4). Of this third group Iamblichus says:

> Just as the function of a knife is “to cut” and to do nothing else it is the same in the case of the spirits distributed into the cosmos. . . . Indeed, in the case of certain invisible spirits each receives but one power, and by nature it performs only this one task that has been ordained for it. (*DM* 182, 4–13)

This last class of daimons was irrational, blindly preserving the order of nature and corporeal life. They manifested in the rhythms of somatic life: the diastole and systole of the heart, the rhythm of breath, the digestion of food, and the consistency of the nervous system. In the psychic life they were instincts of preservation, sustaining the hungers and drives that preserve individuals and society. The task of each soul, therefore, was to engage these daimons in a way that “imitates the Demiurge,” to act “justly” and in obedience to the laws of the creator gods (*Tim.* 41c). If the soul succeeded in this it was lifted to the level of the gods. Since these laws were as much biological as ethical, the labors of the embodied soul included eating justly, exercising justly, sleeping and waking justly, as well as behaving justly toward other human beings and the ruling gods: in short, labors that made up the Pythagorean *bios* as conceived by Iamblichus in *De Vita Pythagorica*.

The Chaldean Oracles reflect the same Pythagorean influence and one fragment reads: "For in every world shines a *triad*, ruled by a monad."7 While the One ruled transcendentally over all triads, its immanent activity took the form of *philia*, a term Iamblichus borrowed from the Pythagoreans.8 Cosmologically, *philia*, like the Chaldean *erōs*, was the power that bound all things to all. Theologically, *philia* unified the triads of the gods, and since the gods ruled all theurgies, each theurgic rite was an expression of the *philia* that governed the cosmos and “[binds] the Gods to men . . . through learned worship” (*VP* 123, 7–9). This *philia* was conveyed to humanity in rituals that both embodied and reflected the divine order. Iamblichus says:

> Is not every sacred ritual legislated intellectually from first principles according to the laws of the Gods? For *each rite imitates the order of the Gods*, both the intelligible and the celestial, and each possesses the eternal measures of beings and the wondrous symbols which have been sent here by the Demiurge, the Father of all things.” (*DM* 65, 3–7)

Every rite had its beginning and end in the gods; man was the performer, not the initiator, for “it is not possible for any of the divine actions to be performed in a sacred manner without one of the Superior Beings present to oversee and complete the sacred acts” (*DM* 144, 1–3). Since the human soul was the lowest divinity and, in its embodied and anatropic state, was incapable of reaching the gods, it could neither invent nor initiate a theurgic rite. On this point Iamblichus was clear:

> If these things were only human customs and received their authority from our legal institutions one might say that the worship of the Gods was the invention of our ideas. But in fact God

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8. See Iamblichus’s discussion in *VP* 123, 7–21.
is the leader of these things, the one who is invoked in the 
sacrifices and a great number of Gods and angels surround him. 
And each nation on earth is allotted a certain common guardian 
by him, and every temple is similarly allotted its particular over-
seer. (DM 236, 1–8)

Ritual and the 
Human 
Hierarchy

Even the perfect soul is imperfect
when compared with divine 
action.

Theurgic rites reflected the order of the gods and therefore played a role 
in cosmogenesis, but since human souls performed the rites their differ-
ences influenced the form and intensity of their theurgies. Given the 
variety of human beings it would be impossible to see how theurgic
ritual mirrors cosmogony unless one first understands how Iamblichus
conceived these differences. Not surprisingly, he divides human souls
into three classes distinguished by their purposes for descending into
bodies.

According to Iamblichus, the purpose for the descent of the soul was
revealed in its embodiment and this determined the kind of theurgy
appropriate for it. Following the principles of continuity, filiation, and
the rule that “like can only be joined to like” each soul was fit to perform
a specific kind of ritual. For Iamblichus’s description of the descents of
souls we must return to the De Anima.

It is significant that Iamblichus begins his review with the teachings of
the Platonist Calvenus Taurus, who maintained that the Demiurge sent
souls to earth to complete the cosmos (Stob. I, 378, 25–28) and, more
specifically, to reveal the life of the gods in the pure and faultless life of
souls (Stob. I, 379, 2–6). This view is consistent with Iamblichus’s own explanation for the descent of souls. Since souls were the lowest of the superior kinds they were the last mediators of immortality to the mortal world. The common purpose of each soul’s descent was cosmogonic and revelatory, but since souls were seeded into the ranks of different gods, the nature of their manifestations differed. In addition, because embodiment itself was anatropic, it caused each soul to experience alienation and lose the continuity it possessed with the gods. Therefore, to the degree that each soul lost its original filiation with its god and divine community, it had to undergo corresponding degrees of correction. In accord with this, Iamblichus described the descent of souls first as being voluntary or involuntary: “According to another division, some modes of descent are conceived to be voluntary, either when the soul chooses to govern terrestrial things, or when it is persuaded to do so by the Superior Kinds. But other descents are involuntary, when the soul is forcibly dragged to what is inferior” (Stob. I, 379, 6–10). The causes for these different modes of descent were the different purposes of embodiment.

Iamblichus continues:

I think that inasmuch as there are different purposes for the soul’s descent this creates differences in the manner of descent. For if the soul descends for the salvation, purification, and perfection of the things in this world then it descends purely. But if the soul is turned toward the body for the sake of exercising and correcting its habits, the descent is not entirely without passion nor is the soul, in itself, released and liberated. And if the soul descends as if being dragged down here for punishment and judgment, the descent is forced. (Stob. I, 380, 6–14)

Contrary to the view of Porphyry, Iamblichus did not believe that apotheosis resulted in the soul’s escape from the cosmos. The perfectly purified soul continued to “descend,” not for the sake of punishment or correcting psychic imbalances, but for the benefit of others, revealing through its own perfection the perfection of the gods. The descent of a purified soul may not have severed its connection with divine beings (ta ́ketai), yet it had to descend. As Olympiodorus says, following Iamblichus:


4. One such family was that of Julian the Chaldean who prayed to the Paternal Demiurge that his son be given the soul of an archangel. According to Psellus, this son, “Julian the Theurgist,” received the soul of Plato himself; see Hans Lewy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy, ed. M. Tardieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), 223–24 n. 195.

5. That is to say, when heteros permanently assumes the role of autos.
The purpose for the embodiment and descent of souls was reflected in the body's dual life: the manifesting energeia of their nature of its function in a manner corresponding to the purpose (telos) for its embodiment. Consequently, the purpose (telos) for its embodiment. The gods, Iamblichus says, were everywhere (DM 30, 1–3; 27, 8–10), but they could be received only by a vehicle that had been properly prepared. Thus, speaking for all theurgists, Iamblichus says: “Let us not disdain to say this also, that we often have occasion to perform rituals for the sake of genuine bodily needs, to the Gods who oversee the body, and to their good Daimones” (DM 221, 1–4). The reverence paid by theurgists to the gods that ruled over physical nature was an expression of their confidence in philia. This comprehensive force extended from the unity of the gods to the divisions of the sensible world, but to experience philia the soul had to know the grade of the cosmos to which it was attached so that it could honor its tutelary gods and daimons. To prescribe the appropriate ritual for a soul the theurgist needed to be able to “read” the nature of its energeia, for this revealed the mode of its descent and, consequently, the purpose (telos) for its embodiment. The purpose for the embodiment and descent of souls was reflected in their bodies and lives: the manifesting energeia of their souls. Iamblichus distinguished three types of souls: (1) the great herd of humanity subject to nature, is governed by natural powers, and looks downward towards the works of nature; it fulfills the administration of fate, and accepts for itself the order of things which are brought to completion by fate. It makes use of practical reasoning all the time and only concerning things in nature. But there are a small number who, using a certain power of the mind that surpasses nature, are released from nature and are led to the separate and unmixed Nous, and at once they become superior to the powers of nature. And there are others who are between these, placed about the media between nature and the pure Nous. Some of them follow both [i.e., the separate Nous and nature], others pursue a life mixed from these, and others are liberated from inferior natures and pass on to better things. (DM 223, 10–224, 6)

According to another division, the great herd of humanity is subject to nature, is governed by natural powers, and looks downward towards the works of nature; it fulfills the administration of fate, and accepts for itself the order of things which are brought to completion by fate. It makes use of practical reasoning all the time and only concerning things in nature. But there are a small number who, using a certain power of the mind that surpasses nature, are released from nature and are led to the separate and unmixed Nous, and at once they become superior to the powers of nature. And there are others who are between these, placed about the media between nature and the pure Nous. Some of them follow both [i.e., the separate Nous and nature], others pursue a life mixed from these, and others are liberated from inferior natures and pass on to better things. (DM 223, 10–224, 6)

Iamblichus distinguished three types of souls: (1) the great herd who follow nature and fate; (2) those who have risen to the divine Nous above nature and fate; and (3) those who are between the two extremes. To each type of soul there was a corresponding mode of worship. Iamblichus continues:

Therefore, since these distinctions have been made, what follows should be most obvious. Souls governed by the nature of the universe, leading lives according to their own personal nature and using the powers of nature, should perform their worship in a manner adapted to nature and to the corporeal things moved by nature. In their worship they should employ places, climates, matter and the powers of matter, bodies and their characteristics and qualities, movements and what follows movements, and changes of the things in generation, along with other things associated with these in their acts of reverence to the gods, and especially in the part that pertains to performing sacrifice.

Other souls, living according to the Nous alone and the life of humanity...
the Nous, and liberated from the bonds of nature, should concern themselves in all parts of theurgy with the intellectual and incorporeal law of the hieratic art.

Other souls, the media between these, should labor along different paths of holiness according to the differences of their intermediate position, either by participating in both modes of ritual worship, or by separating themselves from one mode, or by accepting both of these as a foundation for more honorable things—for without them the transcendent goods would never be reached. (DM 224, 7–225, 10)

The objects sacrificed to the gods had a direct affinity with them. Iamblichus says: “Whenever we worship the Gods who rule over the soul and nature it is not out of place to offer natural powers to them, nor is it deplorable to consecrate to them bodies under the rule of nature, for all the works of nature serve the Gods and contribute to their government” (DM 226, 3–9). To the gods who presided over particular places, the things produced in those places were the appropriate sacrifices (DM 234, 1–2). Iamblichus says: “For always, to creators their own works are especially pleasing, and to those beings who are primarily the causes for producing certain things, those very things are primarily dear to them” (DM 235, 3–5). Such creations, Iamblichus says, may be “animals” (zōa tina), “plants” (phuta) (DM 235, 6) or other earthly products that contribute to the administration of the gods. These creations united embodied souls with the universal philia. As Iamblichus put it, “they preserve the power of the communion between Gods and men” (DM 235, 11–12).

Material creations were the proper elements to sacrifice in the theurgies of souls bound to material concerns. Through the consecration of these elements souls brought themselves into accord with the gods who ruled them; that is, with the material and enocosmic deities. All souls began theurgic disciplines with sacrifices to these gods to establish a foundation for more comprehensive forms of worship, and the material gods themselves presided over these offerings. Iamblichus explains:

According to the art of the priests it is necessary to begin sacred rites from the material Gods. For the ascent to the immaterial Gods will not otherwise take place. The material Gods, therefore, are in communion with matter in as much as they preside over it. Hence they rule over material phenomena: (i.e., division, collision, impact, reaction, change, generation, and corruption of all material bodies).

If anyone wishes to worship these Gods theurgically, [that is to say,] in the manner in which they naturally exist and have been allotted their rule, one ought to render to them a material form of worship. For in this way we may be led into complete familiarity with all these Gods, and in worship we offer what is appropriately related to them. In the sacrifices, therefore, dead bodies and things deprived of life, the blood of animals, the consumption of victims, their diverse changes and destruction, and in short, the breakdown of the matter offered to the Gods is fitting—not for the Gods themselves—but with respect to the matter over which they preside. For although the Gods are pre-eminently separate (chōristai) from matter they are nevertheless present to it. And though they contain matter by virtue of an immaterial power, they co-exist with it. (DM 217, 8–218, 12)

Elsewhere, Iamblichus described the benefits of animal and blood sacrifices. In the case of expiatory sacrifices to appease the “anger of the gods” (DM 43, 2), he explained that the “anger” did not come from the gods but from the soul’s “turning away from their beneficent care” (DM 43, 4–5). The purpose of the sacrificial rite was to turn the soul’s attention back to the gods and the higher order. The expiation did not affect the gods but souls, converting them to the divine order. Iamblichus says: “If anyone believes that deserting the guardian care [of the gods] leads to a sort of automatic injury, the appeal to Superior Beings by means of sacrifice serves to remind us again of their beneficent care, removes the privation [of their presence], and is entirely pure and inflexible” (DM 44, 5–10). Animal sacrifice and the burning of victims portrayed how the soul’s impurities were consumed in its apotheosis. Iamblichus chided Porphyry for ignoring this symbolic (and theurgic) dimension of fire (DM 214, 5–6, 216, 9–10):

Your question betrays an ignorance concerning the offering of sacrifices by means of fire, for it is the greater power of fire to consume, destroy, and assimilate matter to itself but not to be assimilated to matter, and fire lifts up the offering to the divine, heavenly, and immaterial Fire instead of drawing it down to matter and generation. (DM 214, 5–10)

The power of fire to destroy and assimilate matter was a ritual anticipation of the soul’s assimilation to the gods. Iamblichus says:

For Superior Beings, those for whom the breakdown of matter through fire is dear, are impassive, and they render us impassive.
The Liturgy of the Cosmos

Whatever exists within us is made similar to the Gods just as fire assimilates all solid and resistant substances to luminous and attenuated bodies. And by means of sacrifices and the fire of the sacrificial offering, we are led up to the Fire of the Gods just as [we see] in the ascent of fire to the Fire invoked and in the drawing up of gravitating and resistant things to divine and heavenly natures. (DM 214, 17–215, 7)

In effect, the drama of blood sacrifice was a mnemonic rite to remind the soul of its fiery origin. One can imagine how the sounds, smells, and colors of an animal sacrifice would hold the attention of the worshiper; for Iamblichus, one’s absorption in the rite was the sine qua non to awaken the divine sunthēma in the soul. As he says, “the fire of our sacrifice imitates the divine Fire” (DM 215, 19), which “liberates” (DM 216, 5) the soul from the bonds of matter, “assimilates” (DM 216, 5) it to the gods, and makes it fit to participate in their phūta (DM 216, 6).

The offering and consumption of a victim was vicariously the sacrifice of the soul, yet to achieve the desired familiarity (oikefisis) with the gods of the sacrificed elements, the worshiper had to be similar to the elements offered. His communion with the gods depended on his connaturality (sungeneia) with the elements. Material theurgy often called for the consumption of life and blood, which may signify that for the “great herd” of humanity, embodied for punishment (krisis) (Stob. I, 380, 12–13) the ritual suffering of matter effected the gods, and makes it fit to participate in their phūta (DM 216, 6).

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Such practices established the proper “foundation” (hupotēsis; DM 225, 8–11) for the immaterial worship of hypercosmic gods.

Finally, to the intermediate gods, who were both encosmic and hypercosmic, a twofold kind of worship was appropriate. Iamblichus says: “And in truth, to the intermediary Gods, who are leaders of intermediate blessings, sometimes two-fold offerings are adapted, sometimes a common gift to both, or such gifts that are detached from what is inferior and connected with more elevated natures, or generally, in one of the modes of worship that fills the mean position between extremes” (DM 226, 14–20).

To sum up, Iamblichus affirmed a tripartite anthropology determined by the three purposes (tela) for the descent of souls into bodies: (1) to save, purify and protect the cosmos; (2) to correct and exercise their character, or (3) to undergo punishment and judgment. These divisions correspond to Iamblichus’s tripartite theology where gods are distinguished as: (1) hypercosmic; (2) hypercosmic and encosmic; and (3) encosmic. To each class of gods a corresponding mode of worship was assigned, drawn from the elements over which it ruled. Since encosmic gods were responsible for the material order they received material offerings, hypercosmic gods received noetic gifts, and the intermediate gods received both, or a mixture, or one in favor of the other. The divisions of the gods in their cosmogonic procession, therefore, had corresponding expressions in worship. Since there were three classes of human souls, each performed the worship appropriate to its type and to the occasion for the worship. The “great herd” of humanity worshiped the material gods with material offerings, the extremely rare noetic souls worshiped the soul” (DM 226, 9–14). The men who performed this kind of theurgy were “entirely purified” and very rare (DM 219, 14–15). Indeed, Iamblichus says to participate in the gods in this manner was “the rarest of all things” (to panton spaniotaton; DM 228, 2–3), and the De Mysteriis provides little information on the theurgy practiced by these souls. Undoubtedly, these were the bodhisattvas to whom Dillon refers, the perfect souls who descended into bodies for the salvation of others (Stob. I, 380, 8). Since they were already in perfect harmony with the gods who ruled the material cosmos they had no need to perform material worship. Nevertheless, because of the weakness of the human soul, their noetic perfection could not manifest immediately, and material forms of worship would have been necessary during their years of maturation. Such practices established the proper “foundation” (hupotēsis; DM 225, 8–11) for the immaterial worship of hypercosmic gods.

12. Iamblichus says that it would not be appropriate to discuss this kind of theurgy with those who are beginning sacred operations or even with those who have reached the intermediate stage (DM 228, 6–12).
the immaterial gods with noetic gifts, and the intermediate souls worshiped the intermediate gods with twofold gifts. The correspondence between Iamblichus's theology, psychology, and ritual worship may be portrayed in Table 1.

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Souls</th>
<th>Purposes for Embodiment</th>
<th>Rituals</th>
<th>Gods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. noetic</td>
<td>to save, perfect, and purify generated life</td>
<td>completely material and noetic</td>
<td>hypercosmic/immaterial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. intermediate</td>
<td>to exercise and correct moral habits</td>
<td>immaterial and material</td>
<td>intermediate: joining encosmic to hypercosmic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. material</td>
<td>for judgment and punishment</td>
<td>material</td>
<td>encosmic/material</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The omission, even of few things, subverts the entire effect of worship.

To divide theurgists into three groups corresponding to three levels of the cosmos suggests a static structure, with each soul assigned a specific rank to worship a specific class of gods fixed in its rank. Although this schema is not inaccurate it overlooks the vitality of the structure, the dynamic character of theurgy as the unifying energeia of the gods. Cosmogenically theurgic action was philia, the demiurgic weaving of opposites (cf. In Nic. 73, 1–5), and it should be remembered that theurgic rites were performances that initiated human souls into the activity of the gods.

In the previous chapter I argued that every sacrifice had to meet two criteria of fitness (prosekton): the sacrifice had to be connatural (sungenes) both with the soul who offered it and with the god who received it. The sacrifice, therefore, served as a mean to awaken the philia between the god and the soul. The affinity of the theurgist with his offering and its connection to the god allowed him to enter the god's energeia when the sacrifice was properly performed. Through sacrifice the soul tapped the power of the ruling god whether the offering was an animal, a plant, a song, or a virtue, and these sacrifices were not extraneous to the will of
The gods but direct expressions of their own activity. For Iamblichus, theurgy was fundamentally dynamic, for the *philia* that sustained both cosmos and sacrifice was seen, ultimately, as the *eros* of the One, proceeding from, and returning to, itself.

Theurgic sacrifice was also dynamic from the perspective of an individual soul; in its worship each soul gradually moved from material to immaterial gods. Following the Aristotelian principle that the first in ontology was last in generation, the human soul proceeded to the intelligible gods by first accommodating itself to the material gods; only when the soul had integrated itself with material powers could its immaterial principles become active.1 The soul's ascent to the noetic Father followed an unbroken continuum and any attempt to worship the Father directly and without intermediaries was bound to fail. Iamblichus explains that "for people not yet liberated from the fate of the material world and the communion tied up with bodies, unless a corresponding sort of worship is offered, they will utterly fail to attain immaterial or material blessings" (DM 219, 18–220, 5). Although the immaterial gods contained (perichein) the material gods and were the ultimate source of material blessings, their goods had to be mediated by the material gods and their daimons. Iamblichus says: "it must not be allowed for anyone to say that the immaterial Gods provide their gifts with their attention immediately bound up in the affairs of human life" (DM 222, 9–13).

The worship of the material gods fulfilled the order of fate (DM 223, 13–15), which allowed the soul to experience its laws as providential and liberating.2 Since the material gods were revealed by daimons, material rites necessarily worked with daimonic orders, and since these same daimons ruled over bodily instincts and passions, the rituals that established the proper measures for associating with them also stabilized the passions of the soul. Somatic life was ritually sewn into the cosmogonic *philia*, but to attain this affiliation the theurgist had to awaken all the powers in his soul through their correspondences in the cosmos. Iamblichus says: "The theurgists know that the omission, even of insignificant things, subverts the entire effect of worship; just as in a musical scale, if one string is broken the whole scale becomes inharmonious and out of tune."3 To deny any power its honor would deny to one's soul the divinization of its corresponding element. Thus Iamblichus says:

He who has not distributed to all [these powers] what is fitting and in accord with the appropriate honor that each is worthy to receive, will depart imperfect and deprived of participation in the Gods. But he who celebrates all these powers and offers to each gifts that are pleasing and honors that are as similar to them as possible, will always remain secure and infallible since he has properly completed, perfect and whole, the receptacle of the divine choir. (DM 228, 19–229, 7)

The "receptacle of the divine choir" was the soul itself whose task it was to receive all the gifts of the gods (DM 55–56). In Aristotelian terms, this reception transformed the soul from a cosmos in potentiality (en *dunamei*) to a cosmos in actuality (en *energeia*). Since the cosmos was collectively the *energeiai* of the gods, the human soul, in effect, assimilated itself to the gods by ritually enacting their *energeiai*; first, however, the soul had to coordinate its passions with material daimons. The affections that enslaved the soul to daimons had to be purified and aligned with *sunthēmata* in nature before the soul could reach the simpler and more unified levels of the gods. Without this collaboration with daimons the soul lacked the foundation necessary to homologize itself to the material gods.4 Noetic worship was useless without this foundation. Yet, in the view of Iamblichus, such premature noetic worship was being encouraged in Platonic schools, and Porphyry, his chief rival, was a prime example of one who attempted to short-circuit the material gods and daimons. Although Porphyry had spoken of his *henōsis* with the One, he was subject to severe bouts of depression, even to the point of suicide. Such emotions would suggest that Porphyry neglected to honor the god and daimons

1. This progress through the orders of the gods is reflected in the psychological progress within the orders of the soul itself; just as the immaterial gods were present, but hidden, in the material gods, so the soul’s circle of the “same” was present in the circle(s) of the “other” but remained inactive until the soul balanced them (Tim. 37ab). Cf. the soul’s relation to the two horses of the *Phaedrus* (247ab). For Iamblichus, this rectification was possible only by theurgy. See Dillon’s comments, *Iamblichus Chalcidianus*, 341–42.


3. DM 230, 2–6. Repeating the same principle, Simplicius says: “Just as in the case of a word, if letters are left off or added on the form of the word is lost, so with divine works and words, if anything is left off, or added on, or mixed up, the divine illumination will not take place”; Simplicius, *Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti*, ed. L. Deubner (Paris, 1842), 94, 42–46.

4. Philo of Alexandria, faced with a similar challenge (i.e., to justify the traditional Jewish cult in the face of philosophic critique) argued that without the fulfillment of the material cult the soul would lack a foundation for spiritual initiations; see *De Mig. Abr.* 89; 92–93; 96.
associated with his depression and thus failed to homologize himself to the material gods, gatekeepers of the immaterial gods and true union with the One. From a theurgical perspective, Porphyry lacked a foundation, the security (asphalé) and infallibility (aptaios; DM 229, 5–6), that came from properly completing the “receptacle” of the divine choir. From Iamblichus’s perspective Porphyry’s henōsis had to have been false: if someone were still dominated by worldly passions (e.g., suicidal depression), he could not presume to pass beyond the material gods.  

Iamblichus says:

For if we ourselves are in the world, are contained as individual parts in the whole of the universe, are brought into existence primarily through it, are perfected by all the powers in it, are constituted by its elements, and receive from it our share of life and nature, if this is the case, it is not allowed for us to pass beyond the cosmos and the encosmic orders. (DM 227, 6–13)

The soul could not rise to the paternal Demiurge alone.  

To reach the One, the soul had to be assimilated to the Whole, and this was accomplished only by honoring “all the gods.” Though Iamblichus admits that noetic theurgy worshiped the “One, at the summit of the whole multitude of gods” (DM 230, 15–16), the direct worship of the One came only “at the very end of life and to very few” (DM 230, 18–231, 1). In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus did not reveal the details of this elevated form of theurgy (DM 231, 2–5) except to say that its method of worship corresponded to the simplicity of its object, the One. Although noetic theurgy made no use of material objects, it would not have been opposed to material theurgies; the One was as present to sublunary natures as it was to the hypercosmic gods. The theurgist who performed noetic worship consequently honored the multitude of encosmic orders contained in the One. In fact, the One was never reached directly—by seeking unity—but by unified activity that imitated the energéia of the One: the manifesting cosmos. Iamblichus explains:

[J]ust as a cosmos is gathered into one congregation out of many, so also the completion of sacrifices—to be faultless and whole—must be connected to the entire order of Superior Beings.

5. Apart from the fact that it is self-contradictory to know one has experienced an ineffable union.


And if, indeed, this order is numerous, all-perfect, and united in several ranks, it is necessary that the sacred rite also should imitate its variety by attaching itself to all the powers. Therefore, in accord with this, and with respect to the great variety of beings around us, it is not allowed to be joined with the divine causes that preside over these powers from a certain part (meros) that they contain, nor to ascend imperfectly to their first causes. (DM 231, 6–17)

In contrast to Porphyry, Iamblichus felt that souls must participate directly, and theurgically, in the material cosmos. For Iamblichus, cosmogenesis was the divine activity and the material cosmos, including its daimons, was a theophany. To participate in this activity required simply that the ritual and the gods invoked in the rite be appropriate (prosēkón) to the soul that performed the sacrifice. As Iamblichus says: “Each man attends to his sacrifice according to what he is, not according to what he is not; therefore the sacrifice should not surpass the proper measure of the one who performs the worship.”

There is no simpler or more comprehensive expression of theurgy’s pragmatism. The theurgic cure for any disturbance in the soul had to be adapted to the nature of the illness. When this concerned exaggerated affections or disturbances the god and daimons who had jurisdiction over that condition had to be placated. Theurgy simply attempted to balance the disturbed element of the soul by restoring it to the lord of that element, and to effect this the soul focused on a ritual object connatural (sungenēs) to itself and to the ruling god. Explaining this method, Iamblichus says:

The law of religious worship distributes similars to things obviously similar (to homoia . . . tois homoiois) and extends through all things from the highest to the lowest, assigning incorporeals to incorporeals, but bodies to bodies, and to each of these classes (it distributes) things that are proportionate to their natures [DM 227, 16–228, 2]. . . . Indeed, when the divine causes and the human preparations resembling them are united in one and the same act, the accomplishment of the sacrifice achieves all things and bestows great blessings. (DM 232, 6–9)

7. DM 220, 6–9. I follow the emendation by Gale and Sicherl of thusias for hosis. The osias preserved in book V was probably a copyist’s error due to the similarity of omicron and theta in the uncial script. The hosis preserved in M, therefore, represents a subsequent attempt to emend the error of osias. See Iamblique: Les Mystères d’Egypte, trans. and ed. E. des Places (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1966), 170.
The objects of the rite varied depending on the soul and the god invoked, but if the objects were offered properly they worked in the same way—through the sungeneia that existed between the soul and its sacrifice and the sungeneia between the sacrifice and the god. Because the soul employed animals, plants, and other objects to enter the energeia of the gods, one might assume that theurgists believed the objects themselves effected the soul's unification. Porphyry suggested that this was what theurgists believed, making them no better than sorcerers. Iamblichus disagreed with the assumption: "It is better to assign as the cause [of the power in sacrifices] the intimacy (philia), familiarity (oikeiosis), and united relationship (schesis sundetike) of creators toward their creations and of generators toward things generated" (DM 209, 11–14). Iamblichus maintained that the sacrifice of a material object released the will of the Demiurge by means of the intermediate orders and the preparation of the soul:

Therefore, with this common principle [i.e., the universal philia] leading us, whenever we take a certain animal or any of the plants of the earth that preserve intact and pure the will of its maker, by means of this intermediary then, we appropriately move the demiurgic cause which presides over this undeformed. But since these causes are numerous, some, like the Daimones, are immediately engaged, others, like the divine causes [Gods], are situated above these, and even further above these is the one most venerable and leading cause, and in conjunction with the perfect sacrifice, all these causes are moved. (DM 209, 14–210, 4)

The ritual objects awakened corresponding sunthêmata in the soul, and for each soul its unification was proportionate to its level of existence. Thus, a noetically received union communicated a more intense awareness of the One than a union received through material objects. Yet the philia was the same, and the noetic theurgist would not have disdained material sacrifices for he already comprehended them through a vital identification with their energeia (cf. DM 8, 3–6). Again, in theurgy the soul did not escape from generation but assimilated itself to the demiurgy of the world. As the "inspired" Socrates explains in the Cratylus (396c), noesis comes from neo + hesis, the soul longing for the new and generating world. "Ugliness," (aiskron) by contrast, was "the obstacle to the flow" (416a), from which it may be inferred that the soul's resistance to generation is what alienated it from beauty and divinity, not the flow of generation itself (see Tim. 43d).

The initial anatropé that the soul suffered in birth was caused, not by the flow of generation—for the flow was theophany—but by the soul’s incapacity to receive the flow. Theurgy enhanced the soul’s receptivity and drew it into deeper resonance with the demiurgic will. Ultimately the soul's individual identity was restructured so that the anatropic self became a pivot for the gods to experience mortality. The theurgist became a living sunthêma, a vehicle of the gods. The theurgic progress of the soul from the sublunar realm to the cosmic and hypercosmic gods may be exemplified in Diagrams 2 and 3.

The apotheosis of the soul has been divided into three stages: A and A.1 represent the soul at the beginning of theurgic disciplines using material sunthêmata as a foundation (A) for intermediate rites and intermediate sunthêmata (B), and these, in turn, supported the complete alignment of the soul into the order of the World Soul. Beginning with material rites the soul used material sunthêmata as a foundation (A) for intermediate rites and intermediate sunthêmata (B), and these, in turn, supported the complete alignment of the soul into the order of the World Soul in the final state (C). A.1, B.1, and C.1 (side view), show how this movement to the principle of the soul also effected its ascent up the axis of cosmogenesis. At birth the cosmogonic procession from unity was experienced by the anatropic soul as brute necessity and the laws of fate (broken lines). In A.1 as the soul assimilated itself to the encosmic gods (indicated by the solid ascending lines) the continuity of the encosmic order was realized and fate began to appear as providence (solid descending lines). In B.1 the same transformation occurred, as errant necessity and fate were seen as the will of the paternal Nous. Finally in C.1 the circulation of the procession and return became continuous and unbroken, but this was not realized until the soul completely integrated itself to the divine will. The reward of the soul's anagôgê to the paternal Nous was realized in its active participation in the procession from the Nous to the hypercosmic, cosmic, and sublunar worlds, ensuring that the "parts" the soul had purified remained properly situated within their "causes." In the soul's coadministrating—with the encosmic gods—the extension of daimons into the last things, it helped to ensure that these extensions remained in their causes. This was the cosmogonic weaving of apeiron into peras, and it was accomplished by each soul in its material, intermediate, and noetic theurgies.

In each mode of worship the gods were mediated to the soul by means of sunthêmata, and though Iamblichus did not provide a ritual taxonomy he referred to objects that may be distinguished heuristically as material,
noetic, and intermediate sunthēmata. Since theurgy was more a practical therapy than a philosophic system, this division of sunthēmata is based on therapeutic appropriations, not on metaphysical essences. A sunthēma may be defined as material when it divinizes the material powers of the soul, intermediate when it divinizes the soul’s intermediate powers, and noetic when it divinizes its noetic powers. All sunthēmata were essentially divine but, like the gods, they received different allotments cosmologically and were therefore distinguished by their recipients. In terms of the previous diagram, all sunthēmata oriented souls to the vertical axis of the cone. In view of their common divinity but contextual differences they may be defined as “proportionately equivalent.” Therefore, if the ratio 1:2 represents a sunthēma appropriate to divinize a noetic soul, for a more divided and materialistic soul the same divinizing power/ratio would be employed in a range of multiplicity proportionate to that soul, say 16:32. In other words, for the sunthēma to draw a soul into the demiurgic will it had to affect that soul on its level of existence. This is what Iamblichus means when he says “the sacrifice should not surpass the proper measure of the soul who performs the worship” (DM 221, 8-9). The sunthēma affected the soul in its world of experience, whether this was entirely material or noetic. Therefore, noetic sunthēmata would not be effective in moving a material soul to the vertical axis. On the contrary, if the soul’s intellect served anatropic desires, its movement would not be axial but peripheral to appropriate the noetic sunthēma as an idea to inflate its self-importance. Iamblichus believed that this kind of conceptual spirituality threatened the integrity of the Platonic school. Theurgy guaranteed that the soul’s anagēgē could not be “rationalized”; the sunthēmata that released the will of the Demiurge and effected the soul’s ascent functioned at a level that preceded all conceptualization.

8. Such “prizes” would be the equivalent of the false rewards sought by the keen-eyed prisoners of the “cave” in the Republic (516cd).
Material Sunthêmata

Iamblichus used the terms sunthêma, sunbolon, and sêmeia, to describe respectively the theurgic “token,” “symbol,” or “sign” that divinized the soul. Iamblichus’s use of the term sunthêma probably derived from the Chaldean Oracles where it was synonymous with sunbolon. In fragment 108 of the Oracles, the sunbôla are said to be “sown . . . throughout the cosmos” by the Paternal Demiurge, and both were considered the “thoughts of the Father.” From Oracle fragments 2 and 109 it is clear that the sunthêmata were also anagogic, for when the soul “remembers the pure, paternal token (sunthêma),” it returned to the paternal Nous. In the Chaldean system and the De Mysteriis the sunthêmata were distributed simultaneously into the cosmos and into every soul by the Demiurge.

Iamblichus discussed sunthêmata in a cosmogonic context three times in the De Mysteriis. In DM 65–66 Iamblichus says that each theurgic rite engaged the “eternal measures” (metra . . . aidia) and “wondrous deposits” (enthêma thaumastà) sent by the Demiurge to our world (DM 65, 6–8), and through them “the inexpressible is expressed through ineffable symbols” (DM 65, 8–9). This describes a cosmogonic and hieratic function of sunthêmata. In an explanation of augury Iamblichus makes the hieratic and cosmogonic connection even more explicit. He says that the gods use the cosmogonic power of daimons to reveal their will through natural signs (DM 135, 8–10). He explains:

The Gods produce signs (sêmeia) by means of nature which serves them in the work of generation, nature as a whole and individual natures specifically, or by means of the generative Daimones who, presiding over the elements of the cosmos, particular bodies, animals, and everything in the world, easily produce the phenomena in whatever way seems good to the Gods. They reveal the intentions of the God symbolically (sunbolikâs) (DM 135, 14–136, 3).

Iamblichus quotes Heraclitus, Iamblichus says this is the oracular mode: “neither speaking, nor concealing, but signifying” (DM 136, 4–5) and suggests that this was also the cosmogonic mode. He continues: “Therefore, just as the Gods create all things by means of images and signify all things in the same way through sunthêmata, in the same way the Gods stir up our understanding to a greater sharpness by the same means” (DM 136, 6–10).

Finally, Iamblichus says the Egyptians imitated the nature of the universe and the creation of the gods through their use of noetic images (eikones) (DM 249, 14–250, 7). For Iamblichus, the Egyptian cult served as a model for theurgy because of its imitation of cosmogenesis. The hieroglyphic symbols were images of creative powers, the same powers that effected the soul’s return to the gods. The eikones of the Egyptian cult, like the sunthêmata of theurgy, performed a cosmogonic function. Iamblichus uses the verb “to impress” (apotupei) to describe Egyptian cosmogenesis, following Plato, who says the Demiurge perfected the world by “impressing (apotupeumi) living creatures according to the nature of

2. For the Middle Platonic interpretation of the Forms as the “thoughts” of the Demiurge see Philo, De opif. 4, 17–20; 44, 129–130; cf. Albinus, Didasc. 9, 1–2. Also, see the discussion by John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London: Duckworth, 1977), 55.
3. CO, Frag. 109, 91. Frag. 2 states to reach the Intelligible “you must cast into your imagination the entire token (sunthêma) of the triad” (49). See Majercik’s commentary, 141.
4. At DM 65, 10, to reveal the Forms in images; at 135, 5, to stamp out the character of the Demiurge; and again at 250, 5, to reveal the Forms in images.
the paradigm” (Tim. 39e, 6–7). For Iamblichus the living eikones impressed by the Demiurge were simultaneously cosmogonic and anagogic.

The sunthëmata and sumbëla of theurgy functioned in a manner similar to Plato’s Forms in that both revealed the divine order. According to Plato, however, only the Form of Beauty is sensibly revealed, and therefore it is Beauty that instigates man’s anamnësis of the gods (Phaedrus 250, b–d). Significantly, in Proclus’s theory of prayer, where he purports to explain the view of Iamblichus (In Tim. 1, 209, 11), sunthëmata are described as

the material causes (hulikai aitiae; In Tim. 1, 213, 16) [of prayer], implanted in the essences of souls by the Demiurge for their recollection (anamnësis) of the Gods who made them and of other [divine] things. (In Tim. 1, 213, 16–18)

Common to Beauty and to theurgic sunthëmata was the erōs that initiated the soul’s divinization. In Chapter 13, I suggested that the erōmenoi of the Symposium and the sunthëmata of theurgy were functionally equivalent. Both revealed divinity to the soul at its level of attraction, and both initiated its ascent to the gods. If sunthëmata may be equated with the Forms of Plato, they should especially be associated with the Form of Beauty for, like Beauty, sunthëmata were revealed to the senses and through the sanctification of the senses the sunthëmata—like expressions of Beauty—gradually led the soul back to the highest level as the soul elevated its erōs for the Good.

Posing the question of what relation theurgic sunthëmata have to the Platonic Forms, Andrew Smith acknowledges their similarity but distinguishes the sunthëmata and sumbëla by noting that they “perfect the cosmos rather than simply enform it.” Smith explains that for Proclus the sunthëmata tend to express more the anagogic than emanative power of the Forms, and he says this distinction is also present in the De Mysteriis where Iamblichus asserts the “analogy” but not identity between the sunthëmata and the Forms (Porphyry’s Place, 107 n. 11).

Smith’s distinction is correct, yet it may be developed further. Since Iamblichus asserts that questions may be discussed in a philosophical, theological, or theurgical manner, it is possible to see the cosmological description of the Forms as proper to a philosophic discourse while an anagogic description would stress the theurgic function of the Forms as sunthëmata. In other words, although every soul was created by the Demiurge with “harmonic ratios” (logoi harmonikoi) (In Tim. 1, 4, 32), and “divine symbols” (sumbëla theia; In Tim. 1, 4, 32–33), the former were active in all souls by virtue of cosmogenesis while the latter remained inactive until awakened in theurgy. Thus, when the logoi that constitute the soul’s essence were ritually appropriated and awakened in the life of the soul, these logoi could then be called sumbëla or sunthëmata.

Friedrich Cremer argues that theurgic sunthëmata were charged with demiurgic will, and he contends that Iamblichus’s source for this understanding was the Chaldean Oracles. Cremer’s first point is indisputable, but I believe he exaggerates Iamblichus’s dependence on the Oracles for this teaching. The notion of the “beneficent (aphthonos) will” of the Demiurge was already described by Plato in the Timaeus (29e) as the primary cause for creation. This was a Platonic topos and had been developed by Middle Platonists in their description of the Forms as the “thoughts” of the Father. In the hieratic discourse of the Oracles these “thoughts” were translated into sunthëmata and sumbëla, charged with divine will. Iamblichus says that despite the variety of these symbols the Demiurge contains them all indivisibly: “he contains the signs within himself, has comprehended them in unity, and creates them from himself according to one will” (DM 141, 11–13).

If the generosity of the Platonic Demiurge was the cause for creation, it follows that this will was immanent throughout his creation. As Proclus put it, the world was contained within his will (cf. In Tim. 1, 209, 13–210, 4). When the Platonic Forms were transformed by Middle Platonists into the “thoughts” of the Creator and these, in turn, were understood to be “powers” extending into the cosmos, it was perhaps inevitable that these demiurgic powers would be “discovered” in their manifest expressions and adapted in some manner to benefit embodied souls. Theurgy and the doctrine of divine sunthëmata was the practical culmination of this development, and it is one that Iamblichus believed to be entirely Platonic.

The hieratic function of sunthëmata in the noetic, material, and intermediate realms reinforced the connection between the highest and lowest levels and communicated the demiurgic will to every part of the world where the soul was bound. Iamblichus says: “The abundance of power of the highest beings has the nature always to transcend everything in this world, and yet this power is immanent in everything equally without impediment. According to this principle, therefore, first beings illu-

5. Smith cites Proclus In Tim. 1, 161, 10; see Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 107 n. 11.

minimize the last, and immaterial beings are present in material natures, immaterially” (DM 232, 11–16). In his explanation of prayer Proclus repeats this principle almost verbatim. He says that although the procession from the gods is carefully graded, the gods contain everything “directly” (autothen; In Tim. I, 209, 17–18): “for the divine is separate from nothing, but is present equally (ex isou) to all” (In Tim. I, 209, 19–20). Hieratic Neoplatonists believed that suntthēmata had a twofold function. They remained “equally” (ex isou) in the gods because they were all “vertically” rooted in their causal power, yet each also had a “horizontal” identity in its respective order in the cosmos (In Tim. I, 210, 12–20). Since each god had a specific cosmic function, its suntthēmata bore its identifying marks in their respective (horizontal) realms of expression and possessed a special intimacy with others marked by the same god.

In On the Hieratic Art Proclus explains that the relationship between the suntthēmata tied to the same deity was not based on natural power but on the degree of participation in their ruling god. For example, in the case of lions and cocks, which are both solar animals, Proclus says:

Indeed, it is amazing how things that are lesser in natural power and size are fearful to those greater than them in both attributes. For they say the lion draws back from the cock. The cause for this may not be grasped from the physical senses but from intuitive observation and from the differences among the causes. For the symbol of solar qualities is certainly more actively present in the cock [than in the lion].

The “things below,” Iamblichus says, are connected to “divine causes,” yet, as Proclus explains, the relationship between sensible symbols was determined by the degree of “verticallity” that each actualized. This would explain Iamblichus’s hierarchy of human souls: the more active the god in a soul, the higher the soul’s spiritual rank. In addition, human souls under a hermetic, solar, or lunar order had a special affinity for the plants, animals, and stones associated respectively with Hermes, Helios, or Selene (In Tim. I, 210). As cause of a specific order, the god contained all its symbols and the theurgist had to re-create the entire collection in his ritual. Therefore, theurgists observed the natural properties of things in order to identify their gods and to gather the appropriate objects when invoking a specific deity. Proclus says: “Hence, in the mixture of many things the theurgists united the aforementioned [divine] emanations and made the unity derived from many things resemble that unity which is whole prior to the many” (CMAG VI, 150, 28–30). Without this collection of things, each of which “bears a certain characteristic of the god” (CMAG, VI, 150, 27), Proclus says the theurgist could not invoke him. This follows Iamblichus’s teaching that one must honor all the powers or the gods will not be reached (DM 228, 19–229, 7). One could not ascend to the undivided deity through only one of its parts or divisions.

The fragmentation of material souls required a corresponding multiplicity in their worship. Material souls had to gather a multitude of objects to represent and contain their own dividedness. To consecrate a statue, worshipers collected various objects through which they could invoke the deity. The statue was a mean that functioned both as a projection of the soul’s powers and as an image of the powers of the god revealed in single coherent form. To ensure the effectiveness of the rite the objects had to be fitting (prosēkoi) to the god invoked and to the material attachment of the soul. These collections formed “receptacles” (hupolochai) for the gods and Iamblichus says that theurgists created them with “stones” (lithoi), “herbs” (botanai), “animals” (zōa), “aromatics” (aromata), and other sanctified objects (DM 233, 9–12) that possessed intimate affiliations with the gods invoked. These material objects were necessary for worship and therefore Iamblichus warns Porphyry that one ought not to despise all matter, only matter that is estranged from the Gods, for matter that is related to them should be chosen since it is able to be in harmony with the shrines built to the Gods, the erecting of statues, and also with the holy acts of sacrifices. For there is no other way that places on earth or men who dwell in them might receive participation in the Superior Beings unless a foundation of this kind is first established.

The objects and shapes used to erect a temple or consecrate a statue had to possess suntthēmata of the god invoked or theurgic contact would not be effected. In addition to the objects listed above Iamblichus refers


to the use of “batons” (ραβδoi), “pebbles” (psephidia; DM 141, 14), and “incense” (aroma; DM 233, 13–16) to awaken corresponding sunthêmata in the soul, and a form of theurgic divination called “light-gathering” (φωταγίγεια) employed “water” (hudor; DM 134, 2–3) and “walls” (toichoi; DM 134, 2–7) as media for light. Iamblichus’s most extensive discussion of a material sunthêma concerned the vernal rites of erecting phalli whose worship introduced man to cosmogonic action. He says: “Speaking of particular things, we say that the erection of phalli is a sunthêma of generative power, and we believe this act calls out for the fecundation of the cosmos. Hence, most are offered in the spring, precisely when the entire cosmos receives from the Gods the germination of the whole natural world” (DM 38, 14–39, 3). The obscenities uttered during this rite also had a psychagogic function. Iamblichus continues:

In my view the obscene words spoken indicate the privation of beauty in matter and of the antecedent state of deformity in things about to be brought into cosmic order. The entities in need of being ordered yearn [for it] proportionately more as they despise more the ugliness in themselves. Again, therefore, they pursue the causes of the forms and of beauty after they have learned about ugliness from the uttering of obscenities. The execution of base actions is averted, yet by means of verbal expressions the knowledge of it is revealed, and they turn their desire to the opposite [of what is base]. (DM 39, 3–13)

Iamblichus employed Aristotle’s theory of catharsis to explain the psychological effects of phallus rituals (DM 39, 14–40, 8), for he believed that the experience of the embodied soul was vicariously portrayed in the rite. Estranged from its own divinity, the soul—like chaotic matter—was deprived of beauty, and the obscenities shouted in the ritual allowed the soul to recognize its ugliness apart from the divine. This recognition awakened the soul’s desire (ephesis) for the divine, and the erect phallus—as sunthêma—was an image of that desire.10

The participant in the rite did not literally worship a phallus but the divine power of fecundation. In other words, the erect phallus functioned as an intermediary to the divine, a sunthêma of the god. As Julian explains in his Letter to a Priest: “Our fathers established images and altars, and the maintenance of undying fire, and all such things, in a word, as symbols of the abundant presence of the Gods, not that we may regard these things as Gods, but that we may worship the Gods through them (di’ autôn).”11 The horizontal sympathy that the soul shared with a symbol became the foundation through which its vertical power was received, and any ritual that stopped at the horizontal level of sumpatheia and did not “preserve the analogy with divine creation” (DM 168, 13–16) was not theurgy at all, but sorcery (goeiteia). Theurgic activity was always—in analogy—cosmogonic activity, and Iamblichus condemned sorcery specifically because it did not share in the creative generosity of the gods: “If some of those [sorcerers] who perform invocations make use of natural or corporeal powers of the universe, the influence (dosis)12 of the energy, in itself, is involuntary and without evil, but he who uses it perverts the influence to a contrary purpose and to base things” (DM 193, 15–18). Although the influence of the material gods was universal and worked on the principle of like to like (di’ homoiotêta; DM 193, 18–19), the sorcerer “directs this gift toward base things according to his will and contrary to justice” (DM 194, 1–2).

Iamblichus continues:

The influence [from the Gods] causes things that are furthest apart to move together according to the one harmony of the cosmos, but if someone who understands this tries to draw certain parts of the universe to other parts in a perversive way the parts are in no way the cause of the perversion but the audacity of men and their transgression of the order in the cosmos, perverting things which are beautiful and lawful. (DM 194, 2–7)

The perversity of the sorcerer returned to himself:

If anyone takes the things that contribute properly to the perfection of the universe and diverts them to another purpose and illegitimately achieves something, the damage from what he has evilly used will fall on him personally. (DM 182, 13–16)

10. The recognition of one’s “ugliness,” like the recognition of one’s “nothingness” (sudeneia) in prayer (DM 47, 17), caused the soul to yearn more intensely for the divine.

11. Julian, Letter to a Priest 292ab, in The Works of the Emperor Julian, 3 vols., ed. W. C. Wright (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); cf. 294c: “When we look at the images of the god, let us not indeed think they are stones or wood, but neither let us think they are the gods themselves.”

12. dosis, “influence” or “gift,” refers to the beneficent emanations that come to man from the gods; cf. DM 29, 13–15.
Intermediate

Sunthēmata—

Seeing and Hearing the Gods

Because intermediate souls performed a combination of noetic and material rites, they necessarily employed material sunthēmata. Indeed, material sunthēmata would not have been inappropriate for purely noetic souls either since material rites were guided by the same gods and, by analogía, in the same way as noetic rites. Nevertheless, there are forms of worship discussed in the De Mysteriis that exhibit less material characteristics than those discussed previously, and for heuristic purposes the objects used in these rites will be designated as “intermediate sunthēmata.” These were the visible and audible sunthēmata that Iamblichus described in the De Mysteriis as hieratic characters, symbols, names, and musical compositions. Although the designation “intermediate” is my own, I believe the distinction is consistent with Iamblichus’s thought. Following Iamblichus’s principle that the law of worship derived from the order of the gods, the visible and audible symbols mediated between immaterial and material realms just as liberated gods mediated between the hypercosmic and encosmic realms. Incantations and hieroglyphics did not draw directly from the material order like plants, animals, or stones, yet neither were they wholly immaterial. They were intermediate and remained material to the degree that they had a sensible expression.

It is important not to misunderstand this distinction. It does not mean that the unity of the gods was less present in a stone because it was materially more dense. Iamblichus’s division of sunthēmata was based on the needs of souls, not on the degree of divinity in the ritual objects. A soul already justified with material daemons and encosmic gods, for example, still had to sanctify its dianoetic capacities. For such a soul, following the homeopathic principle described in Chapter 4, the cure for its disorder was found in the disordered elements themselves, and this called for sunthēmata more akin to dianoetic activity. In short, the symbolic vehicle for a soul’s purification had to be suited to the specific needs of that soul, and if the soul was ready for contact with the intermediate gods, it called for rites and sunthēmata of an intermediate order.

Iamblichus speaks of diviners who invoke the gods with “characters” (charaktēres) sketched on the ground and says that they should follow a carefully prescribed order of worship (DM 129, 14–131). Further, in his explanation of divinization effected through the medium of light (phōsagōgia), Iamblichus says that theurgic contact may be awakened when light is cast on a wall prepared “with sacred inscriptions of characters” (DM 134, 4–6). Although he does not describe these characters in any detail, Proclus, in his commentary on the Timaeus, says the chi (X) (Tim. 36b) was the “character” (charactēr) or “shape” (schēma) most evocative for recollecting the divinization of the world and our souls (In Tim. II, 247, 14–29). The charactēres mentioned by Iamblichus probably included this X and other symbols that corresponded to the planetary gods. Subsequent Arabic Hermeticists describe such planetary “characters” and claimed that their science derived from theurgists.

Iamblichus provides an explicit account of visible sunthēmata in his exposition of Egyptian symbols. He explains that since Egyptian symbols originate with the gods, they cannot be understood discursively or in terms of human imagination. Here Iamblichus follows Plotinus who praised the Egyptians for having developed a mode of communication superior to discursive thought. For Plotinus the “images” (agalmata) engraved on the walls of Egyptian temples “manifest the non-discursive...
The Liturgy of the Cosmos

The first Egyptian symbol Iamblichus describes is a god seated on a lotus (see Fig. 1).3 Iamblichus begins with the “mud” (illos) in which the lotus was rooted. For Iamblichus “mud” represented matter and all that is corporeal, nutritive, generated, and subject to change (DM 250, 17–251, 3). Mud was the “primordial cause” (archéon aition; DM 251, 5) of the elements and was therefore pre-established as their “foundation” (pufhmen) (DM 251, 5). The god of generation, however, wholly transcended his material powers. He was “immaterial” (ahulos), “incorporeal” (asomatos), “supernatural” (huperphus), and “ungenerated” (agenontos; 251, 8–9). This god “contains all things” (DM 251, 11–12) though he remains “separate” (chóristhos; DM 251, 14) and elevated above the mundane elements. This condition, Iamblichus says, is represented by his being seated on a lotus that separates him from the “mud.” The lotus, therefore, functioned as the intermediary between the transcendent god and the material world, and Iamblichus says its circularity represented the god’s intellectual empire for the circle was the image of the Nous (DM 252, 2–6).

Iamblichus’s exegesis of this symbol outlines the itinerary of the embodied soul. Material and corporeal concerns were first balanced to establish a proper foundation (mud); the soul’s intellectual capacities were then rectified (made circular) to create a receptacle sufficient to seat (i.e., activate) the anterior presence of the god. The hieroglyph symbolically portrayed the entire cycle of embodiment.

The second Egyptian symbol discussed by Iamblichus portrays a god sailing in a barge (see Fig. 2),4 which represented the god that guides the material world while remaining chóristhos (DM 252, 13). He identifies this god with the sun, Helios: “Thus, Helios, being separate, governs the tiller of the entire cosmos” (DM 252, 15–16). The sun played a central role in the theurgic cult. For Iamblichus, its light-giving power was far more than a conceptual analogue of the noetic Demiurge, it was a sunthema of the One itself. The importance of Helios in the Neoplatonism of Emperor Julian testifies to its importance in the Iamblichean school, and the solar motif also reappears in Iamblichus’s remarks on audible symbols.

The visible “characters” of the planetary gods invoked in theurgic ritual had their audible counterparts. Consider, for example, the following rules for composing theurgic hymns:

1. Find out what powers and effects any particular star has in itself, what positions and aspects, and what these remove and produce. And insert these into the meanings of our lyrics, detesting what the stars remove and approving what they produce.


2. Consider which star chiefly rules which place and man. Then observe what modes these regions and persons generally use, so that you may apply similar ones, together with the meaning first mentioned, to the word which you wish to offer to these same stars.

3. The daily positions and aspects of the stars are to be noticed; then investigate to what speech, songs, movements, dances, moral behavior and actions most men are usually incited under those aspects, so that you may make every effort to imitate these in your songs, which will agree with the similar disposition of the heavens and enable you to receive a similar influx from them.

These principles for invoking the gods were written by Marsilio Ficino, the fifteenth-century leader of the Platonic Academy in Florence. Following Iamblichus, he says that his invocations were not attempts to compel the gods but to allow men to "imitate them" and share in their divine activity.

Ficino reports that his celestial music derived from "the Ancients," among whom he includes Iamblichus, and though Ficino's explanation of the effects of these rites differs somewhat from that of Iamblichus, their principles were nearly identical. Consider, for example, Iamblichus's description of the divinizing effects of theurgic music. Refuting Porphyry's suggestion that theurgic hymns worked on the passions, he says:

Rather, we say that sounds and melodies are consecrated to each of the Gods in a proper way and that a natural alliance (surgencia) has been suitably allotted to these [planetary] Gods according to the particular orders and powers of each, the motions of the universe itself, and the harmonious whirring sounds emitted by their motions. Then, by means of such melodies adapted to the Gods, their divinity becomes present (for there is nothing at all to stop it). So, whatever happens to possess a likeness to the Gods directly participates in them; a perfect possession immediately takes place and the [experience of] being filled with the essence and power of a Higher Being. (DM 118, 6–119, 9)

Iamblichus emphasizes that although this possession manifested through bodily organs and emotions, it was not caused by somatic conditions. He says:

It is not that the body and soul are in sympathy with each other and are together affected by the melodies. Rather, because the inspiration of the Gods is not separate from the divine harmony, and since it has been adapted to it from the beginning, it is participated by it in the appropriate measures. And the awakening of this inspiration as well as its ceasing occurs in accordance with each order of the Gods. (DM 119, 9–15)

The divine inspiration (epinoia) or possession (katachē) could not occur unless the soul already possessed measures that corresponded "horizontally" to the audible melodies and "vertically" to their inaudible principles. Musical theurgy was a form of anamnēsis that awakened the soul to its celestial identity with the gods. It was not, Iamblichus argues, a way to purge the soul of psychological or somatic disorders, for it affected the soul at a level that preceded its embodiment. Musical theurgy came from the gods and gave the soul direct contact with them. Iamblichus says:

Indeed, before the soul gave itself to the body, it heard the divine harmony plainly. Therefore, after it departs into a body and hears the sort of melodies that especially preserve the trace of the divine harmony, it welcomes these and recollects (anamnēsthai) the divine harmony from them. It is drawn to this, makes itself at home with it, and partakes of it as much as possible. (DM 120, 7–14)

According to Iamblichus, Pythagoras was the first composer of this anagogic music. Pythagoras's special gifts allowed him to "thread his intellect into the divine harmony of the stars" (VP 36, 18) where he was "assimilated to the heavens" (VP 37, 10–11), heard its ineffable harmony, and re-created its audible "traces" for the disciples of his school.

The sacred names and incantations used in theurgic invocations also


9. Ficino, unlike Iamblichus, says these rites have an effect only on the human soul. Faced with the charge of attempting to compel angels or, worse yet for Ficino, "demons," he argues that the rites change not the soul by accomodating it to the divine powers. Iamblichus says nearly the same, but because for him theology is not merely philosophical he says that what is awakened in the rites is not the soul, but the "one in the soul," which, collectively, are the various sunthēmata.


11. VP 36, 17–18. Iamblichus refers to a "certain ineffable divinity" (arrhētōs tis theōtēs).
originated from the gods, and Iamblichus says the Egyptian prophet Bitys revealed the name of the god that pervades the entire cosmos (DM 268, 2–3). This recalls Chaldean fragment 37 where the Paternal Nous "sounded forth (rhoizein)" the multiform Ideas. The term rhoizos, "whirling" or "rushing," was used by Iamblichus to describe the sound of the divine harmony (DM 119, 3), and Chaldean fragment 146 uses the same term. It speaks of "formless fire, from which a voice (phone) is sent forth..." a sumptuous light (phōs) rushing (rhoiazion) like a spiral round the earth.12 For the soul to make its ascent to the gods the Oracles say that it had to recover the audible sumbōla sent from the Father by giving them expression, through "speaking a word."13

For Iamblichus the god whose "name" pervaded the cosmos was Helios, yet because the recipients of the undivided gift of the god (DM 253, 14) were themselves divided, they received and expressed it in different ways. Iamblichus says:

These multiform powers are received from Helios according to the unique movements of the recipients, and because of this, the symbolic teaching means to show that God remains one through the multitude of his gifts and through the diversity of powers he proves his one power. Hence, this doctrine says God remains one and the same and it assumes that his changes of form and shifting aspects occur in the recipients. (DM 253, 15–254, 3)

Iamblichus refers here to the movement of the sun through the signs of the zodiac. They exist, he says, through receiving the "powers descending from Helios."14 Man’s prayers must therefore be presented to Helios through the many zodiacal schēmata that the god assumes. Iamblichus says: ‘The Egyptians employ these sorts of prayers to Helios not only in their visions but also in their more ordinary prayers that have this same term, invocations do not, in fact, "invoke" the gods or call them down. On the contrary, they "evoke" the divine sunthēmata lying in the human soul:

It does not, as the name [prosklēsis; DM 42, 6] seems to indicate, incline the intellect of the Gods to men, but according to the truth itself—as it means to teach—the invocation makes the intelligence of men fit to participate in the Gods, elevates it to the Gods, and harmonizes it with them through orderly persuasion. Whence, indeed, the names of the Gods are adapted to sacred concerns, and with the other divine sunthēmata they are anagogic and have the power to unite these invocations to the Gods. (DM 42, 9–17)

Iamblichus says the names of the gods were impressed on souls before birth and that theurgic chants awakened them. As Trouillard puts it, "le nom prononce devient, pour ainsi dire, le symbole efficace d’un vertu divine."15 The "names" of the gods, in effect, defined transforming experiences in the soul. Paraphrasing Proclus, Trouillard writes:

Les dieux, comme Zeus, Poseidon ou Hermès, personnifient des théophanies qui sort des révélations diverses de la même divinité. Celle-ci, étant au-delà de la lumière elle-même, se dévoilerà sous des aspects divers par autant de systèmes expressifs dont chacun sera présidé par un dieu. Les noms des dieux ne sort pas des attributs divines proprement dits, mais les modes selon lesquels l’efficacité divine retentit en nous.16

In his Timaeus commentary Iamblichus said the paternal Demiurge (the hidden sun) contained the intelligible (i.e., hypercosmic) realm, just as Helios contained the encosmic powers of the zodiac. Their power was transmitted in theurgic invocations by awakening the corresponding Helios/Demiurge in the soul. Since "naming," "thinking," and "creating..."
ing" were one and the same activity for the gods, theurgic naming allowed souls to experience the thinking/creating of the gods. Theurgic naming was equivalent to primordial demiurgy, articulating the powers of the paternal Father through his audible sunthēmata. By reciting the agalmata of the gods the theurgist was assimilated to their order and the silence that contained them (cf. Proclus, In Crat. 32, 18–25; 59, 1–8).

Intermediate
Sunthēmata—
Naming the Gods

We Egyptians do not use words, but sounds . . .

One might assume, with Porphyry, that since “names” fall within the order of discourse they would have discursive meanings, so he asked why theurgists recited “names without meaning” (τὰ οὐσιαστὰ ὄνοματα; DM 254, 15). Iamblichus replied contentiously that such names “are not meaningless” (τὰ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι οὐσιαστὰ; DM 254, 16) even if they are “unknowable” (ἀγνώστα) to us: “to the Gods, however, they are all meaningful, but not in a way that can be described, or in a manner that is significant or indicative to men through their imaginations” (DM 254, 18–255, 3). These names, he continues, were revealed through the intellect of the gods or remained completely ineffable (ἀπθηνήγτοι) and intelligibly united with them (DM 255, 4–6). Therefore, Iamblichus says:

It is necessary to remove all conceptions and logical deductions from divine names, and to remove as well the physical imitations of the voice naturally akin to the things in nature. Rather, it is the symbolic character of divine resemblance, intellectual and divine, that must be accepted in the case of divine names. [DM 255, 6–11]. . . . even if it is unknowable to us, this very thing is its most venerable aspect. (DM 255, 11–13)
If divine names, like other names, were conceptually knowable they would possess the same properties as human thoughts; Porphyry's interest in their "meaning," therefore, was characteristically anthropocentric and misguided. It was equivalent to seeing herbal sunthēmata as food, or mineral sunthēmata as building material. In short, Porphyry was caught up in the horizontal expression of the nominal sunthēmata, and since he saw no meaning in the names, he questioned their value. For Iamblichus, however, their ineffability was their "most venerable" (to semnotaton) aspect because it awakened the ineffable presence of the divine in the soul. Thinking, by itself, could not achieve this. As Iamblichus says:

Whence indeed, the divine causes are not called into activity prompted by our thoughts. Rather our thoughts and all the noble dispositions of the soul, as well as our purity, should be considered as auxiliary causes, but the things that truly excite the divine will are the divine sunthēmata themselves. And so the causes from the Gods are activated by the Gods themselves, who accept nothing for themselves from their inferiors as cause of their own proper activity. (DM 97, 11–19)

Sunthēmata were the "wild cards" in Iamblichus’s cosmological deck. They revealed the presence of the gods at any grade of reality since each grade was sustained directly (autothen) by them. Yet the ascent of each soul was gradual, and at its particular level of attachment only an encounter with a sunthēma from that level allowed the soul to proceed.

With respect to the names used in theurgy Porphyry also asked why the priests prefer barbarian names over "our own." For this Iamblichus says there is a "mystical reason" (mustikos logos) (DM 256, 5–6): "Because the Gods have taught us that concerning the sacred races such as the Egyptians and Assyrians their entire language is adapted to sacred concerns, and on account of this we believe that it is necessary for us to address the Gods in a language which is connatural (sungeneia) to them." (DM 256, 6–9). Iamblichus maintained that the Egyptians and Assyrians received the names of the gods through divine revelation, kept them intact and thus connected with the gods who sent them. Iamblichus opposed Porphyry's suggestion that sacred names could be translated, as if their conceptual meanings were independent of their phonetic expressions. This view overlooked the theurgic and "vertical" dimension of the sunthēmata. Iamblichus says:

The situation is not as you have supposed. For if it were according to convention (kata sunthēkēn) that names were established, it would make no difference whether some names were used instead of others. But if they are tied to the nature of reality those names which are more adapted to it would no doubt be more pleasing to the Gods. Indeed, from this, as is reasonable, the language of sacred races are preferred over those of other men. (DM 257, 3–10)

The translation of "sacred names" would be ineffectual, "for even if it were possible to translate them, they would no longer hold the same power" (DM 257, 13–15).

The translation of divine names was a much-debated topic in antiquity, and while the question cannot be treated here in detail it is worth noting that Iamblichus's mustikos logos was shared by Origen, for whom Hebrew was the sacred language, "not concerned with ordinary, created things, but with a certain mysterious divine science that is related to the Creator of the universe."1 And in the Corpus Hermeticum "Asclepius" warns King Ammon not to translate Egyptian mysteries into Greek:

For the Greeks, O King, who make logical demonstrations, use words emptied of power, and this very activity is what constitutes their philosophy, a mere noise of words. But we [Egyptians] do not [so much] use "words" (logos), but "sounds" (phōnai) which are full of effects.2

Fragment 150 of the Chaldean Oracles puts it very simply: "Do not change the nomina barbara."3

In a critical essay on the question of translation Claire Préaux explains the underlying issue of the debate. "The attitude of religious communities with regard to translation," she says, "is conditioned by the degree of rationality that they admit in the relations between man and the divine."4 Because of the limits of embodiment, Iamblichus allowed human rationality only a small role in these relations. By contrast, Porphyry— with his doctrine of the undescended soul—believed that the exercise of rationality allowed the soul direct access to the divine. Préaux concludes by suggesting that the nontranslators’ view of human existence was pessimistic.

3. CO, 107.

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mistic, but in this she fails to see the cosmological affirmation that underlies it, at least in Iamblichus’s case. She also overlooks the cosmological pessimism in the translators’ view, implied in their devaluation of the sensible expression of the word. For if one adopts the translators’ view that the sound of a sacred name is not significant or powerful apart from its conceptual meaning, then the sound as such would be superfluous, and the sensible aspect of the word could be disregarded in favor of its inaudible logos. For Iamblichus, however, to deny the value of the god’s audible expression would dismiss the energēia of the god, and in principle it would deny the value of the entire sensible cosmos as the energēia of the Demiurge. The names of the gods were individual theophanies in the same way that the cosmos was the universal theophany, and since both preceded man’s conceptual understanding Iamblichus says they should not be changed according to conceptual criteria (DM 259, 1–5). Out of the same respect that Iamblichus held for the cosmos as the sensible expression of the Demiurge, he honored the audible manifestations of the gods. The sacred names were “bodies” of the gods that should not be violated by translation.

In contrast to Iamblichus, Proclus believed that several nations possessed divine names, among whom he includes Egyptians, Chaldeans, Indians, and Greeks. Proclus maintains: “Even though God may be called by the Greeks Briareus under the influence of the Gods, and is called in another way by the Chaldeans, it must be understood that each of these names is the offspring of the Gods and signifies the same essence.”

The difference between Proclus and Iamblichus on this issue depends on how much emphasis is given to Proclus’s phrase: “under the influence of the gods” (para tôn theóν). If taken in a strong sense, it puts Proclus in the same camp as Iamblichus with respect to theurgical principles, for it implies that the name Briareus was divinely received by the Greeks, that is to say, in the same manner that the Assyrians and Egyptians received their divine names “having mixed them with their own language” (DM 256, 11–13). Iamblichus never argued that there was only one sacred language—after all, this would contradict his own principles by giving universal power to a particular qua particular. He argued, rather, that the names of the gods were determined by the gods them-

5. As Trouillard explains in his discussion of the Neoplatonic understanding of the revelatory power of the “spoken word”: “Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu’un être supérieur ne contient pas en acte les déterminations qui procèdent de lui. En s’exprimant et en se manifestant, il fait de nouveau. Il ne se redouble pas.” “L’Activite onomatique selon Proclus,” in Entretiens, 254.

6. Proclus, In Cratylinum 32.5.

7. Ibid., 32, 9–12.

8. Trouillard also points out that for Proclus the onoma is distinguished from phônetai because the latter functions as hulē and the former as eidos. “L’activité onomatique,” 252–54.

9. Laoz 656d–657b. B. D. Larsen rightly explains that in antiquity it was the common conviction that Greek philosophy derived from Egyptian wisdom. Larsen says that in the role of Abammon, Iamblichus represents Egyptian wisdom answering the questions posed by Greek philosophy, represented by Porphyry. Larsen, Iamblique de Chalcis: Étude et philosophie (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), 150–54.
The report is tantalizing but only suggestive. More theoretical evidence for the liturgical chanting of the vowels by theurgists is given by Nicomachus of Gerasa who explains that each of the seven spheres is associated with a tone and a vowel. Nicomachus says:

Indeed, the tones of the seven spheres, each of which by nature produces a particular sound, are the sources of the nomenclature of the vowels. These are described as unspeakable (arrešta) in themselves and in all their combinations by wise men, since the tone in this context performs a role analogous to that of the monad in number, the point in geometry, and the letter in grammar. However, when they are combined with the materiality of the consonants, just as soul is combined with body, and harmony with strings, (the one producing a creature (zōon), the other notes and melodies), they have potencies which are efficacious and perfective of divine things. [Thus whenever the theourgoi are conducting such acts as worship they make invocations symbolically with hissing, clucking, and inarticulate and discordant sounds].

Hans Lewy suggests that Proclus substituted theourgoi for another term or simply added the last sentence, since theurgists were unknown in the first half of the second century C.E. Nevertheless, Nicomachus’s association of vowel sounds, the seven spheres, and their power to effect divine things when uttered anticipated the principles of theurgy if not its first half of the second century. Hans Lewy suggests that Proclus substituted theourgoi for another term associated with a tone and a vowel. Nicomachus says:

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Seven is also called “voice” because the seven elementary sounds [vowels] exist not only in the human voice but also in the instrumental, the cosmic, and, in short, the consonant voice, and not only because of the single and primary sounds emitted from

Iamblichus cites the authority of Ostanes and Zoroaster to explain the connection of the heptad with planetary angels. The Babylonians, Iamblichus says, call the stars “herds” (agelai) because they move together in circles and act as “bonds” (sundesmoi) and “collections” (sunagogai) of physical ratios. (TA 57, 2–3). Since the administration of these ratios was an “angelic” function, Iamblichus notes that with the addition of a g these “herds” (agelai) were called “angels,” (aggeloi/angeloi) by the Babylonian priests (TA 57, 5). He continues:

Hence, in a similar way, they call the stars and Daimones that rule over each of these herds “Angels” and “Archangels,” and these are seven in number. So, according to the truest etymology the hebdomad is called angelia.

Iamblichus says the heptad is also called the “Guardian” (phulakitis) because the seven starry spheres guard the universe and rule over it with “continuous and everlasting permanence” (TA 57, 12).

Iamblichus believed that the seven vowels were connatural (sungenia) with the seven planetary gods, and certain Gnostic writings suggest that one-to-one correlations were ritually developed. For example, Valentine’s disciple Marcus associated the vowels with heavenly spheres as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Heaven</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>first heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>second heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ι</td>
<td>third heaven</td>
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<td>i</td>
<td>fourth heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>fifth heaven</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. I follow Meurs’s addition in the apparatus of phone de after dierai of line 13.
14. TA 71, 13–18. Text: ὅτι ὁ μόνον τῆς ἀνθρωποτρίτης φυσικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀργανικῆς καὶ κοσμικῆς καὶ ἄλλας εὐαρμονιῶν φυσικῆς ζῆσαι τοις στοιχείοις φήματα, οὐ μόνον παρὰ τό ὕπο τῶν ζ ἄστερων φρέσκους μόνα καὶ πρώτου, ὡς ἑγάμονες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τό πρῶτον ἀναγράφαμα παρὰ τοῖς μονοισίᾳ ἐπάγωνται ἐπέκειται. [Iamblichus], Theologumena cmr00000001, ed. V. de Falco, 1922; ed. with additions and correction, V. Klein (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1975). Note here Iamblichus’s distinction of three kinds of voice: (1) of the spheres: musica mundana; (2) of man’s body and soul: musica humana; and (3) of instruments: musica instrumentalis, a distinction that has been attributed to Boethius. Cf. D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demoniac Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1958; reprint, Lichtheim: Klaus Reprint 1976), 14.
Ruelle provides examples from the magical papyrus of Leiden that demonstrate how these vowels were used in invocations. The papyrus reads:

I invoke you Lord, with a chanted hymn, I sing your holy prayer: \( A E E I O Y O O O \). Your name made up of seven letters in harmony with the seven sounds which have voices (\( \phi \text{h} \text{onai} \)) corresponding to the 28 lights of the moon ("Le chant," 40).

There are numerous other examples of vocalic invocations in the Greek Magical Papyri. The so-called Mithras Lithurgy as well as certain Hermetic tractates provide examples of theurgic-like invocations that were certainly known to Iamblichus. This prevalence of \( \phi \text{voces mysticae} \) in the rites of late antique sorcerers probably played a significant role in Iamblichus’s defense of theurgy in the De Mysteriis. For, as Dodds pointed out, the techniques of the sorcerer and the theurgist would have been indistinguishable to the uninitiated, so Iamblichus had to explain theurgy in a way that was entirely consonant with Platonic philosophy. The \( \text{hieratike technē} \) of the later Platonists had to be distinguished from sorcery (DM 161, 10–16). After all, Iamblichus employed the craft and material of sorcerers, the \( \text{asēma onomata} \) for example, and he probably shared their cosmological assumptions, but in theurgy the purpose of the rite was never to manipulate the gods or call them down. On the contrary, theurgic invocations called souls up to experience the gods.

In a discussion of theurgy’s relation to Gnosticism, Birger Pearson suggests that Iamblichus’s theories of theurgy might profitably be applied to certain Gnostic texts. Pearson has already shown the decidedly Platonic flavor in some later forms of Gnosticism, so, he argues, there is reason to suspect that certain Gnostics shared the theoretical presuppositions of the Neoplatonists. Since the Gnostics did not provide a theoretical framework to explain their rites and Iamblichus did not provide concrete ritual data, Pearson’s study is useful for both scholars of Gnosticism and later Neoplatonism.

Pearson suggests that some Gnostic rites effected the soul’s salvation through a simultaneous ascent and descent achieved by chanting the \( \text{nomina barbara} \) and unintelligible vowels. He explains the Gnostic chants with a passage from the De Mysteriis where Iamblichus maintains that anagogic rites fulfilled divine law since the purpose of the soul’s descent was to reascend.

Since the ascent of the soul was integrally tied to the descent of the gods in cosmogenesis, when the soul chanted the names and vowels associated with the gods it entered their \( \text{energeia} \). Because the names were divinizing the soul ascended, yet insofar as the soul chanted the names, it descended with them into the sensible world. Since these sounds were the \( \text{agalmata} \) of the gods, when the soul chanted them, it imitated the activity and the will of the Demiurge in creation. In this sense the theurgist did bring the gods down into the world, but he did so at their command and to fulfill their will. This clearly would distinguish theurgy from sorcery, for a theurgic incantation preserved the transcendence and ineffability of the gods while making the soul an embodiment or actualization of their will. Since the soul itself could never grasp or initiate theurgy, the incantation, strictly speaking, was accomplished by the god, yet it freed the soul by allowing it to actively experience what it could never conceptually understand.

Again, theurgical Platonism may be seen as Iamblichus’s practical application of Pythagorean theory. Following the rule that first principles contained and yet remained hidden in their pluralities, the theurgist reached the primordial silence of the One only by embracing the plurality of sounds. Just as the monad was present in multiplicity monadically, preexisting silence was present in the seven sounds silently, and the theurgist entered this silence by chanting/containing the sounds that proceed from it.

In an incantation the theurgist became a citizen of two worlds. On the
one hand, he joined the gods through his assimilation to the Demiurge; on the other, he remained mortal due, in part, to the expression of the demiurgic will. Insofar as the theurgist became divine, he commanded the daimons who served the gods, yet he did not command them as a man but as one of the gods. Discussing this double nature of the theurgist Iamblichus says: “According to this distinction, therefore, as is proper, [the theurgist] invokes as his superiors the powers from the universe since the one making the invocation is a man and, on the other hand, he commands them since, somehow, by means of the ineffable symbols, he is invested with the hieratic shape of the Gods” (DM 184, 8–13).

Noetic Sunthêmata—Mathematics and the Soul

The soul contains in itself the sum-total of mathematical reality.

In the De Mysteriis, Iamblichus says he will not discuss noetic forms of worship, but to pursue the division of sunthêmata into material, intermediate, and noetic categories, I would argue that the soul’s noetic powers would have to be transformed by noetic objects, and that these would have been best exemplified in numbers. An implicit arithmetic influence is evident already in the intermediate sunthêmata, for a numerical framework determines the composition of theurgic incantations and melodies. Since Iamblichus was a Pythagorean, it seems likely that he would have given mathematics a central role in the highest form of worship.

That mathematical objects made up the sunthêmata of noetic worship is a supposition that may easily be misunderstood. Iamblichus never states this explicitly, which might be enough to dismiss the conjecture. I believe, however, that the context of Iamblichus’s thought as demonstrated in relevant citations will bear the supposition out. Far more problematic is our tendency to presume that in noetic or mathematic theurgy Iamblichus’s genuinely Platonic (i.e., “rational”) teachings may be discerned. In this light, recent studies of theurgy have argued that the material and intermediate forms of worship represent Iamblichus’s “concession” to the intellectual inadequacies of the common man, his effort
to save Platonism by creating a salvific cult to rival the increasing popularity of Christianity. In two recent studies, Andrew Smith and Anne Sheppard argue that there was, in fact, a "higher" form of theurgy free from the sinister elements of animal sacrifice, the chanting of *nominata barbara*, and other superstitions. With a more sympathetic approach to Neoplatonic theurgy, they have attempted to save it from the accusations of irrationality by E. R. Dodds and others by dividing theurgy into high and low forms, the former being appropriate for genuinely spiritual and Platonic souls, the latter for the uneducated. Such efforts to render theurgy more intelligible and acceptable to our norms of rationality, however, succeed only in obfuscating the problem.

Our norms of rationality are not the norms of the Neoplatonists. On this issue Jean Trouillard says:

Dans notre Occident le rationalisme et le primat de la technologie ont tellement imprégné notre mentalité qu'ils sont le plus souvent inconscients. D' où la difficulté d' entrer dans des pensées comme celle de Proclus, aussi longtemps que nous tentons de lui appliquer nos modèles d' intelligibilité.

Trouillard argues here that our belief in the univocity of reason prevents us from grasping the mystagogie of the later Neoplatonists (223). Although they valued clarity and coherence of thought, it was never an end in itself. Yet it is difficult for us to realize that "rational thought" did not have the same value for "Platonists" as it does in our age where reason and mathematics form the bases of our worldview. One must grant to Trouillard the credit for recognizing this. He says: "il faut revenir à la thése capitale du néoplatonisme selon laquelle la pensee n'est pas la valeur suprême. Elle est une médiation entre la dispersion du sensible et la pure coincoïdence mystique" (83; my emphasis). The function of reason for the Neoplatonists was simply to reveal "l'Ineffable qui l'habite" (La mystagogie, 233), and rational thought was simply one mode of activity through which a superior intelligence guided and sustained the soul throughout its embodiment.

If mathematical elements functioned for Iamblichus as *sunthēmata* it was not because of their "horizontal" expression as rational formulas. Their intelligibility alone did not make them theurgic but their capacity to create noetic rhythms capable of receiving the gods. Their horizontal expression as intellectual formulas was no more theurgic than the horizontal expression of stones, animals, or songs. Taken as ends in themselves, mathematical formulas were as much obstacles to the soul as the crudest form of fetish worship or passionate obsession. If, as I shall argue, mathematical elements made up the *sunthēmata* of noetic theurgy, they must be understood as ritual objects and according to the same principles as the other *sunthēmata*, "not that we may regard those things as Gods, but that we may worship the Gods through them." Despite the cognitive content of mathematics their theurgic function was to transform the soul, not "teach" it.

The importance of mathematics in the Platonic dialogues is unquestioned today. What is unclear, however, as it was even to Plato's students, is the role that mathematics played in their spiritual discipline and how it related to the soul. Mathematic elements are fully evident in the *Timaeus* where the Demiurge creates the World Soul out of geometric, harmonic, and arithmetic proportions. The entire passage from 35a to 35b is based on the *tetraktys*, the Pythagorean symbol for cosmogenesis. Mathematics was central to the educational program of Platonists and each teacher developed his own interpretation of the numerical proportions of the World Soul described by Plato.

In Iamblichus's commentary on the *Timaeus* 35B, for example, he posits that the seven numbers that divide the World Soul—1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27—had metaphysical functions. Sameness and unity were under the monad, procession under the dyad, and return under the triad. The tetrad functioned as a mean, communicating the primary order to its secondary manifestation, the ennead functioned as a "new monad," the...
ogdoad as dyadic procession, and the *eikosiheptad* (27) exemplified the power of return. According to Iamblichus the tetrad held the pivotal position of the *mean*. He says: “The Tetrad, being in the middle, through being a square, has the quality of remaining stable; on account of its being even times even, (it has) the quality of proceeding; and through being filled with all the ratios from the monad, (it has) the property of returning. And these are symbols of divine and ineffable being even times even, (it has) the quality of proceeding; and through returning. And these are symbols of divine and ineffable things.” There were, however, a variety of opinions in the later Academy as to how the soul was defined with regard to the mathematicals.

In the *De Anima* Iamblichus reviews the opinions of those who identified the soul as a “mathematical essence.” He lists three positions:

1. **Soul as geometric figure:**

   Now, one kind of mathematical essence is the figure (*to schêma*), being the limit of extension and the extension itself. The Platonist Severus defined the soul in these very terms, while Speusippus defined it as the form of that which is extended in all directions. (*Stob.* I, 364, 2–5)

2. **Soul as number:**

   Number, therefore, is still another kind of mathematical essence. Indeed, some Pythagoreans find that number without any qualification is a fitting description of the soul: Xenocrates, as “self-moved” [number]; Moderatus the Pythagorean, as containing [numerical] ratios. (*Stob.* I, 364, 8–11)

3. **Soul as harmony:**

   Let us now consider harmony, not that seated in the body, but the mathematical harmony. This latter harmony, in a word, somehow brings things which are disjointed into proportion and connection, and Moderatus equates the soul with this. (*Stob.* I, 364, 19–23)

It is clear that Platonist and Pythagorean philosophers identified the soul with different branches of the mathematicals, and in the *De Anima* Iamblichus leaves the issue unresolved. In his treatise *On General Mathematical Science*, however, he takes up the problem again and attempts to solve it.

It would not be reasonable to posit the soul as being just one class of the mathematicals. ... Therefore, the soul, should not be defined either as [1] idea of the all-extended [Speusippus], or as [2] self-moved number [Xenocrates], or as [3] harmony of (numerical) ratios [Moderatus], or as anything else of this kind specifically, but rather, all these should be intertwined together. For if the soul is a numerable idea and subsists according to the numbers containing harmony, all the symmetries of the mathematical order ought to be subsumed together under the soul along with all the mathematical proportions. On account of this, then, the soul coexists together with the geometric, arithmetic and harmonic proportions, so that by analogy the soul is identical with [all] mathematical ratios; it has a certain connaturality (*sugenêia*) with the archai of existing things; it lays hold of all reality and has the capacity to resemble all things. ... To sum up the whole doctrine, we think the soul exists in ratios common with all mathematicals, possessing, on the one hand, the power of generating and producing the incorporeal measures themselves, and with these measures the soul has the capacity to fit together the generation and completion of forms in matter by means of images, proceeding from the invisible to the visible, and joining together the things outside with those inside. In view of all this, in brief, the definition of the soul contains in itself the sum-total of mathematical reality.9

For Iamblichus, the soul was identified with all branches of the mathematicals together, a position that Philip Merlan summed up aptly: “he who says ‘soul’ expresses mathematics in its fullness”;10 this is particu-

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Iamblichus compares mathematical exercises to a kind of Platonic anamnésis. He says:

The soul is raised up to the objects of knowledge from without (exōthen), and while it receives from things other [than itself] the beginning of its recollection (anamnésis), it projects (proballein) this beginning from itself. This activity is not stable according to one energy—as is the case with the Nous—but in movement the soul proceeds out of itself and into itself. Nor, in this, is the soul complete, as is the Nous, but in continually seeking and finding the soul proceeds from a lack of knowledge to a fulness thereof. It is divided equally between the limit (persus) and the unlimited (apotron). Wherefore, the soul continually advances from the unlimited to being defined and transforms itself for the reception of mathematical figures.12

11. While I agree with Merlan's characterization of the soul and numbers, B. D. Larsen argues that Merlan mistakenly interprets Iamblichus in chapters 9 and 10 of the DCMS as identifying the soul with mathematics as such. Larsen contends that this led Merlan to posit two contrasting views in the DCMS with respect to the soul and mathematics. In chapters 3 and 4 and Iamblichus clearly does not classify soul and mathematicals under the same genus, while in chapters 9 and 10 he does (see Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 11-33). The contradiction, according to Merlan, was due to Iamblichus's practice of compiling diverse sources without attempting to make them cohere (151). Larsen, on the other hand, argues that there is no contradiction and that Merlan failed to see that in chapters 3 and 4 Iamblichus spoke "des principes et du domaine ontologique de la mathématique," but in chapters 9 and 10 he spoke of the "application" of numbers as principles of movement, principles bestowed upon living beings by the soul. It is in this latter sense, Larsen argues, that Iamblichus said the soul comprises all the mathematicals and he concludes, "il n'est pas justifié de contester l'unité du livre." B. D. Larsen, Jamblique de Chalèce: Étude et philoogne (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 125-29.

12. DCMS 43, 19-44. Text: Εξωθεν δε διαγένεται προς της ειδήσεως και δειγματων παρ' αλλων την αρχην της ανακωμισης, οπτους αυτοι εις εαυτον προβαλλεται σατανον τον ουκ εις και ανεφεξεσθαι. οπως το το ήν ανακωμισης προευθυνης ποιησιν εις εαυτους και εις εαυτου. Αλλ' ουδε πληρες εις εαυτους, οπως το νεφελον, εν τω δε ξητει και ευθειων αυτην νοους κεφαλων τον γνωσεως εις πληρωμαν αυτου προερχεται. μερος τε και απειρος ανακωμισης εν μεροι διελειπεται ουδε απο του ωσιν εις το δημιουργηθη προορισμε, και εις τα μεταλυμαναι των μαθηματικων ειδων μελετηται.

This transformation was more than intellectual because mathematics permeated the soul's entire life (DCMS 69, 18-23). In strictly Platonic terms, the soul was a mathematical entity (Tim. 34-36; 43-44) and its immortal ochēma was also designed according to mathematical ratios. Iamblichus's view of mathematical images as living logos of the Nous shares little with our understanding of numbers as intellectual abstractions. For Pythagoreans the study of numbers was a religious exercise. Iamblichus says that "if we wish to study mathematics in a Pythagorean manner, we ought to pursue zealously its God-inspired, anagogic, cathartic and initiatory process."14 Hardly the prerequisites of mathematicans today! The requirements for a Pythagorean mathematician were far more demanding, for Pythagoreans accepted only those who were willing "to share their entire life with the community" (DCMS 74, 23-26).

For Iamblichus, mathematicas revealed divine mysteries. Specifically, he maintained that mathematics recapitulated the soul's descent and return, and since the soul was a mathematical entity, the performance of mathematical disciplines allowed it to see this process clearly. The soul's mental projection of mathematical images initiated a ritual activity that effected the soul's return to its true self (autos) if the mathesis was performed in a Pythagorean manner. As Proclus put it, in the performance of mathematics "the soul becomes at the same time seeing and seen."15

Mathematical activity exemplifies the Iamblichean standard for every theurgic apotheosis: that the embodied and self-alienated soul recover its identity (autos) by immersion in the other (heteros). The divinizing "other" was encountered in a theurgic rite, and each rite had to be appropriate to the condition of the soul who performed it; that is, to its degree and manner of self-alienation. Just as the material powers of the soul were divinized through material sacrifices, and the intermediate powers were divinized by visual or audible images, so the noetic powers of the soul were divinized through the mental imagery of mathematic objects. In each case, the "weight" of the rite was proportionate to the

13. Iamblichus argues that ta mathēmatika are not drawn out of sensible things by abstraction (kata apliōresin) but descend directly from the Forms which also give them their appearance in our imagination; DCMS 34, 7-12.

“weight” of the soul’s self-alienation; otherwise it would not have the proper effect. And in each case the soul was made divine through its imitation of the cosmogonic cycle: it went out of itself in a ritually controlled manner to return to the god within.

The structural similarity of mathēmātike to theurgy is not the only reason to suppose that mathematic elements made up the noetic suneithēmatikē. Iamblichus’s portrayal of the Pythagorean bios in De Vita Pythagorica suggests a direct correlation between ritual worship and mathematic disciplines. Iamblichus says that Pythagoras learned his mysteries from “barbarians,” in particular the Egyptians, in whose temples he spent twenty-two years, “studying astronomy and geometry, and being initiated in all the mystic rites of the Gods.” During his tenure with the Babylonians, Pythagoras was instructed by the Magi, “where he was educated thoroughly in their solemn rites, learned perfect worship of the Gods with them, and reached the highest point in knowledge of numbers, justice, and other mathematical disciplines.” These mathematical initiations were passed down by Pythagoras in symbolic and enigmatic forms yet, Iamblichus says, these enigmas were designed to illuminate those philosophers whose genius surpassed human understanding (huper anthropinen epinoian; VP 59; 27–60, 1; chap. 103).

The fact that Iamblichus’s portrayal of Pythagoras reflects the ideal life as conceived by Iamblichus more than it does a history of Pythagoras, makes it all the more useful for understanding Iamblichus’s theurgical agenda and the role of mathematics in ritual. The Iamblichean Pythagoras was primarily a revealer of mysteries. Iamblichus says: “Pythagoras proclaimed the purificatory rites of the Gods and what are called “mystic initiations” (teletai), and he had most accurate knowledge of these things. Moreover, the Pythagoreans say that he made a synthesis of divine philosophy and the worship of the Gods.” The synthesis of philosophy and ritual worship was precisely the agenda that Iamblichus took upon himself. He attempted to integrate the theia philosophia of the Platonic tradition with the therapeia of the gods that he, like Pythagoras, learned from the barbarian priests of Egypt and Chaldea.

The result of this synthesis, as read into the life of Pythagoras, was a thoroughgoing application of numbers to worship. Libations were to be made three times; Apollo delivered oracles from a tripod because the trias was the first number; Aphrodite received sacrifices on the sixth day, and Herakles on the eighth day of the month (VP 86, 1–8; chap. 154). Temples were to be entered on the right but departed from the left because the “right” (dexion) was the principle of the “odd number” and divine, while the “left” (aristeron) was a symbol of the “even number” and of what dissolves (VP 88, 3–6; chap. 156). Iamblichus also reports that Pythagoras taught the Scythian Abaris “physiology” and “theology,” which included a new form of divination. He says: “Instead of divination through the examination of sacrificed animals he taught Abaris divination through numbers, believing this to be purer, more divine, and more akin to the heavenly numbers of the Gods” (VP 54, 22–25; chap. 93). Abaris must have been spiritually ready for this teaching or Pythagoras would not have revealed it (VP 54, 24–26; chap. 93) for Pythagorean (i.e., theurgical) pedagogy required that each person perform only the kind of worship appropriate to his “nature” (phusis) and “power” (dunamis; VP 54, 28; chap. 93).

Iamblichus says that Pythagoras did not want to diminish Abaris’s desire for the truth but taught him that instead of divining through blood sacrifices he could more securely discover the divine will through arithmetic science (VP 83, 9–18; chap. 147). By means of it the soul was able to bring the mind into resonance with the numbers of the World Soul. Iamblichus says the mathematical mysteries (mathēmatikoi orgi-asmoi) of the Pythagoreans purified the mind and allowed it to participate in the gods (VP 122, 17–20; chap. 228). The purpose of Pythagorean “divination” (manitēkē) was not to predict the future but to discern and obey the will of the gods (VP 78, 6; chap. 138). For some in the Pythagorean community, blood sacrifice was the appropriate means for this, for others, the performance of mathematic mysteries. Indeed, as Walter Burkert suggests, there may have been a hidden connection between the mathematical tetraktus and the triktus, the altar of blood sacrifice. Burkert explains:


17. VP 13, 14–16; chap. 19; translation, slightly modified, by Dillon and Hershbell, Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life.


The tetraktys, "a tetrad" made up of unequal members, is a cryptic formula, only comprehensible to the initiated. The word inevitably reminds of triktyys, the "triad" of different sacrificial animals. Is the sacrificial art of the seer, involving the shedding of blood, superseded by a "higher," bloodless secret?21

For Iamblichus, the answer was clearly yes. The Pythagorean blos, which in large part was the theurgical bios, defined a continuity of worship extending from blood sacrifice to the sacrifice of numbers. In a passage from Pythagoras's On the Gods, Iamblichus says the "eternal essence of number" was praised as the "most providential principle of the universe, of heaven, earth and the intermediate nature." He concludes: "By means of these same numbers Pythagoras created a marvelous divination and worship of the Gods according to the numbers that are most especially allied to them" (VP 83, 5–7; chap. 147).

22. VP 82, 19–83, 1; chap. 146; translation, slightly modified, by Dillon and Hershbell, Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life.

If, as I have argued, mathematics formed an essential part of the worship of the gods, Iamblichus left no practical guide for its theurgic use. Proclus and Damascius provide the only references to a theurgy of numbers and even they give little concrete detail. In Platonie Theology IV where Proclus discusses the anagogic power of numbers he says:

The unifying numbers, in themselves, are unknowable. For they are more ancient than Beings and more unified than Forms, and since they are the generators of Forms they exist prior to those beings we call "intelligibles" (noëta). The most august of theurgies demonstrate this, since they make use of numbers capable of acting ineffably, and by means of them, they effect the greatest and most ineffable of operations.1

Proclus explains that unifying numbers are "monadic" and have two aspects: (1) as the numerical Forms of triad, pentad, heptad; and (2) as

unities or principles of these Forms. Thus, Proclus says, "each of them is one and many." What Proclus means may be explained by reference to Nicomachus’s distinction between “conventional” numbers, which are man's invention (e.g., \(a = 10, \ v = 20, \text{ and } \omega = 800\)) and “natural” numbers, which are more “primitive” and are expressed graphically, the number bearing an intrinsic relationship to its shape. Thus, for example:

\[
1 = a \\
2 = aa \\
3 = aaa \\
4 = aaaa
\]

With regard to the formal and henadic aspects of numbers the triad as henad would be imagined as \(\Delta\) (i.e., the unified triad, or triad in potential), and the actualized triad as \(\Delta\alpha\) followed by all the subsequent “triadic” numbers.

\[
\begin{align*}
6 & = \Deltaa \\
10 & = \Deltaaa \\
15 & = \Deltaaaa \\
21 & = \Deltaaaaa
\end{align*}
\]

(i.e., numbers which are “graphically” triangular). The same holds for the pentad which, as unified, is \(\Delta\alpha\alpha\alpha\alpha\) but in actualized form is

\[
\begin{align*}
12 & = \Deltaa\alpha\alpha \\
22 & = \Deltaaa\alpha\alpha \\
35 & = \Deltaaaa\alpha\alpha
\end{align*}
\]

and so on.5

2. Ibid., 101, 8–11.
3. It may be of interest to note that Proclus considered himself to be the reincarnation of Nicomachus. See Marinus, Vita Procli 28, ed. J. F. Boissonade (Leipzig, 1814). Latin translation with Greek text by Portus, in In Platonis Theologiam (Hamburg, 1618; reprint, Frankfurt am Main, 1960).
5. Cf. ibid., II, 8, 1–10, 1.

Although Proclus does not say how theurgical numbers were employed, he refers to them as the temporal measures of the cosmos and speaks of the power of Time to perfect souls.6 “Time proceeds according to number, and by number it measures the existence of all souls.”7 Given the fact that the proportions of Time—revealed in the heavens—were identical with the numerical proportions of the soul, the regulation of ritual energia with heavenly energia would tie the numbers of the soul to their ineffable unities. By performing rituals at precise times and in accord with appropriate constellations, the soul would be united with the gods.8 Iamblichus seems to suggest this mode of theurgy in the De Mysteriis when he discusses Egyptian astrology:

The Egyptians do not simply contemplate these things theoretically, but by means of sacred theurgy they report that they ascend to higher and more universal realms, superior to fate, even up to the Creator God, using neither matter nor employing anything else at all except the observation of the critical moment. (DM 267, 6–12)

In his Platonic Theology I, Proclus reports that the Pythagoreans made use of mathematics “for the recollection (anamnēsis) of divine principles”9 and “consecrated numbers and geometric shapes to the gods.”10 In his Commentary on Euclid Proclus describes the “rhythmic choruses of the heavenly bodies” (In Euclidem, 137, 13) that trace out copies of the “Intellectual Forms” (In Euclidem, 137, 16). He says:

Transcending all these forms are the perfect, uniform, unknowable and incomprehensible figures of the Gods (schēmata tōn theōn), which, being mounted on the intellectual figures, impose unifying limits upon all figures, holding all things together in their unifying boundaries. Theurgy, having represented their properties in the statues of the Gods, has amplified them in various ways. (In Euclidem, 138, 5–12)

To each god, he concludes, there are appropriate symbols and shapes (In

2. Th. PI. IV, 102, 4–5.
3. Ibid., 102, 4–5. In attributing to “time” such powers Proclus followed Iamblichus; see In. Tim., frag. 63 and commentary, in Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidencis, 172–75; 345–47.
4. This would be the theurgic fulfillment of Platonic paideia as outlined in the Timaeus 90b–d.
6. Ibid. 20, 11. In his commentary on Euclid's Elements, Proclus attributes this teaching to Philolaos (in Euclidem 173–74).
Euclidem, 138, 21–22). One may assume, therefore, that each god was associated with a geometric figure that appeared in the heavens “at critical moments,” and that these figures (constellations?) were employed at such times in some form of theurgical worship.

An extensive citation from Damascius supports this. In his discussion of the “figure” (schéma) of the One-Being of the Parmenides (145b, 3), after explaining that each of the gods has a shape, he says:

For why did the Pythagoreans consecrate to one God the circle, to another the triangle, to another the square, and to each of the others another rectilinear figure as well as their mixtures, as the semi-circle to the Dioscuri? Philolaos, who was wise in these matters, oftentimes assigned to one same God one or another figure in accord with one or another property of that God. In general terms it is certain that the circular figure is common to all the intellectual Gods qua intellectual, while the different rectilinear figures are the properties of each respectively in accord with their particular properties of numbers, angles and sides. For example, the triangle is the property of Athena and the square of Hermes—as Philolaos has already said. And of the square, one angle is the property of Rhea, another of Hera, and the other angles are associated with other deities. And this is the complete theological definition of figures. (Dub. et Sol. II [261], 127, 7–17)

Damascius adds that not all sacred figures need be enclosed and cites the helix which he also accepts as a “figure” (Dub. et Sol., 127–20–21). His second example of an unenclosed figure is that of the Egyptian god “Tet” represented as a vertical line with three, or four, horizontal lines, depending on the local cult: The inhabitants of Gaza, he says, consecrate this same figure (with one more horizontal line) to Zeus (Dub. et Sol. II, 128, 1–2):

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{12}} \]

11. In his commentary on Euclid, Proclus also cites Philolaos as the authority for attributing goddesses to the angles of the square. He says that since the square is associated with earth, its “angles” are tied to the life-giving goddesses: Rhea, Hestia, and Demeter (In Euclidem 173, 11–21).

12. Ibid., 128. See Chaignet’s reference to an article by Maspero who says that “tet” was a vulgarization of “ded” who was represented in Mendes and later in Heliopolis where Osiris was also designated by the “tet”: See Damascius: Dub. et Sol. 2:344.

Damascius concludes, citing the authority of the Oracles, that since the gods often reveal themselves in a single curved line, and since every line has a beginning, a middle, and an end, each of these may also be considered a “figure” (Dub. et Sol. II, 128, 3–7).

Sources are too few and fragmentary to reconstruct a coherent system of mathematical symbols employed in theurgy. In any case, given its practical and therapeutic purposes, the possibility that a coherent systematization ever existed should probably be ruled out. On the basis of the evidence, however, it may be inferred that the geometric figures of the gods functioned as contemplative icons, perhaps like the geometric mandalas of yogic disciplines. The comparison is intriguing, particularly in consideration of the mandala’s function. According to Mircea Eliade: “the mandala is at once an image of the universe and a theophany—the cosmic creation being, of course, a manifestation of the divinity. But the mandala also serves as a ‘receptacle’ for the gods. In Vedic India the gods descended into the altar—which proves the continuity between the tantric liturgy and the traditional cult.”

The continuity asserted by Eliade seems to be the same kind of continuity that Burkert suspected between the sacrificial triktus and the mathematical tetraktus. Both demonstrate the transformation of cults of blood sacrifice into mathematical forms that served the same function: to provide a receptacle (hupódochê) to receive and worship the gods.

In the case of sriyantra mandala of tantric worship the feminine or differentiated aspects of the cosmos were represented by triangles with their apex down:

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{13}} \]


14. Though the structural comparison between tantra and theurgy should not be pressed too far, the similarities between the two are striking. Tantra, like theurgy, may be defined as that which provides continuity or unfolding of divine gnosis (Eliade, Yoga, 200), and it was introduced to India in the fourth century C.E. with the argument that ritual practice was the only mode of worship capable of saving man in this age. Tantra incorporated aboriginal Indian elements as well as alien features, which led Eliade to suggest that it may have been introduced to India from “the great Western mystico-sophic current” (202). According to Eliade, the Buddhist tantras are divided into four classes which, like theurgy, are related “to the principal human types and temperaments” (201). As in Neoplatonic theurgy, these classes are graded and proceed from the more material and overt forms of ritual practices/persons, to the more spiritual and interior.
the masculine or undifferentiated aspect, was represented by triangles with apex up: △

and the two were intertwined: □

In theurgic “mandalas” the principles were the same but represented differently. Proclus reports that rectilinear angles proceed from the (masculine) principle of the Limit (to peras) and

produce the one right angle, ruled by equality and similarity to every other right angle; [they are] determinate and fixed in nature, admitting neither of growth nor of diminution: □ (In Euclidem 132, 9-12).

From the (feminine) principle of the Unlimited (to apeiron) come acute and obtuse angles that are subject to variations of more and less (In Euclidem 132, 9-12): □, □. The right angles, Proclus continues, are associated with the hypercosmic gods whereas the acute and obtuse angles are associated with the encosmic gods. The latter lead the soul down into generation while the former, remaining present in the latter as their principles, provide to the soul a connection with the gods above fate (In Euclidem 132-34). Since the soul contains all the mathematical, the geometric figures that it consecrates, draws, and visualizes would schematize the entire process of its separation from, and return to the gods.

In the De Mysteriis Iamblichus discusses the ritual use of number only incidentally in order to distinguish ritual objects that are in physical sumpatheia with one another, from the gods who are the causes of those sympathies. As causes, the gods were unaffected by the sympathies enjoined in the rites. The latter, Iamblichus says, served only to reveal, not affect, the divine principles. Others, however, believed that the benefits of sacrifice were caused by the objects employed in the rite. Iamblichus refutes this view by referring to the belief that numerical simpathies occur if some of those among us with the crocodile is related to the effect (of the sacrifice) to numbers—since the “sixty” associated with the crocodile is related to Hèlios” (DM 208, 7-9). Iamblichus refers to the Egyptian belief that the crocodile lays sixty eggs and lives sixty years, the number associated with the heavenly cycle of the sun. Because of this, some believed that rites involving the crocodile would command the presence of the sun god through their common numerical identity. 15

Although Iamblichus denied that the sympathy of crocodile and sun with the number “sixty” could effect the presence of the sun god, his refutation did not rule out the possibility that numbers were used in theurgy as a kind of organizational system through which rituals could be designed and performed. Dominic O’Meara’s study of Iamblichus’s Pythagorean texts, including the fragments preserved by Psellus: On Physical Number and On Ethical and Theological Arithmetic, supports this idea. 16 In On Physical Number Iamblichus explained that all things in nature not only were determined by number but were the concrete manifestations of number, including the stars, animals, plants, and stones. This also included all the rhythms of life: cycles of disease, reproduction, growth, and death. In short, the variety and vitality of nature was simply the concrete manifestation of numerical powers. Iamblichus distinguished intelligible numbers (noētōi arithmoi)17 from mathematical numbers (mathēmatikōi arithmoi)18 and then discussed natural numbers (phusikōi arithmoi), those involved directly in the shaping of matter. He says:

Physical number is found in the lowest things, things generated and divided in bodies. For the principles mixed in bodies, both in animals and plants, are physical numbers (phusikōi arithmoi), for each of these is born, grows, and dies at determined times. And the philosopher should fit the appropriate numbers to the causes in nature.


17. These would be the ineffable henads. Iamblichus describes them as “the highest and first.” On Phys. Numb. 6; O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived, 219.

18. These are numbers “seen in common precepts”; On Phys. Numb. 6-7; O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived, 219.
And since form (eidōs) is, in nature, the first and most important cause (for the being of all depends on it), thus such numbers as provide being to nature and are essential, these are connatural (homophūsēs) with forms. Iamblichus later identified odd numbers specifically as form-giving and even numbers as “appropriate to matter,” with their mixture creating the physical world. Even the human being was made of two numbers:

For since animals are made up of soul and body, the Pythagoreans say soul and body are not produced from the same number, but soul from cubic number \(6 \times 6 \times 6 = 216\), and body from the irregular volume (bōmiskos) \(5 \times 6 \times 7 = 210\).

The fact that bōmiskos also described the shape of a sacrificial altar was a coincidence unlikely to have been missed by Iamblichus. It brings to mind Burkert’s connection between the triktus of blood sacrifice and the Pythagorean tetraktus, yet it also points to something distinctively and paradoxically Iamblichean. For, although the theurgist’s physical body effected his separation from the gods, it was also the sacrificial altar (bōmiskos) by which he returned to them.

Iamblichus did not think that discursive conceptions of numbers and letters could influence the gods, but he firmly believed that cosmogonic and natural numbers were their energeia. Therefore, Iamblichus was careful to distinguish conventional numbers from the natural and theurgic. Evidence of Iamblichus’s caution is seen in his refutation of the numerical and grammatical theories of Amelius. Amelius theorized that since there were four elements (stoicheia) in the cosmos and four elements (stoicheia) in the word “soul” (ψυχή), the soul must be the “sum of number or the geometrical number” on the grounds that Plato said all geometric proportions exist among the four elements. According to Iamblichus this theory derived from human imagination and convention, not from divine inspiration. Amelius’s “proof” was that if one took the “extremes” of ψυχή, i.e., ψ and η, and substituted for ψ \(= 700\) its root, i.e., \(ζ ( = 7)\), one had, as a result, \(ζη\) or \(ζη\) = “the soul lives” (Proclus, In Tim. I, 275, 24–26). Such theorizing was rejected by Iamblichus:

For after all, “Body” (sōma) is composed of the same number of letters, and even “Non-Being” (mē on) itself; so that then Non-Being (mē on) would be the sum of number. And you could find many other words made up of the same number of letters, words for things base and even mutually contradictory, all of which it is surely not correct to mix and jumble up together.

In response to Amelius’s other conjectures concerning the “shape” of numbers, Iamblichus says:

Secondly, it is not safe to base any theories on the letters themselves; for these are conventional (thesei), and their shapes have changed between ancient times and the present. . . .

Thirdly, reduction of the Soul to the root numbers [i.e., \(ψ = 700\) to \(ζ = 7\)] and wasting one’s time on them transfers the speculation from one set of numbers to another; for the number seven in the units is not the same as that in the tens or that in the hundreds.

Dillon explains that Iamblichus was criticizing the practice of “ge-matia,” where each letter of the Hebrew or Greek alphabet was assigned a numerical value. In this theory, when the sums of the letters of two different words were equivalent they were considered en rapport. For Iamblichus, however, this kind of “hidden connection” was contrived and only a caricature of the true continuity and philia of existing things. Since numerical systems based on letters were merely “conventional” (thesei) and not “natural” (phusei), they could not provide the basis for theurgic ritual. If theurgists employed an arithmetic

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20. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived, 30.
21. Iamblichus later provides these numbers in his explanation of the arithmos kubikos and arithmos bōmiskos. Both were volumes, the former with all sides equal, the latter with all sides unequal; O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived, 49–58.
22. Ibid. 47–49; translation by O’Meara slightly modified.
23. The theory refuted is actually that of Theodorus, as Proclus reports, but Dillon suggests that Amelius may have shared the same theories and that Iamblichus wanted to avoid refuting Theodorus, his own pupil, so refutes Amelius; see Dillon, Iambliche Chalcidensis, 339.
24. These would have been the fire/air/water/earth described in the Timaeus (32bd).
25. The Greek word stoicheia meant “element” of language as well as element of the natural world.
28. Dillon, Iambliche Chalcidensis, 338–39. In this case Amelius (Theodorus) appears to be using an even more simplified gematria.
system to conduct theurgies, it would not have been based on an artificial gematria for this would contradict Iamblichus's rule that superior orders cannot be moved by their inferiors. To invoke the gods, one had to employ their speech as revealed in the cosmos and in their numerical powers.

Although Iamblichus denied that the discursive use of numbers was theurgic, he knew that as a numerical entity the soul eventually had to undergo a numerical transformation. Since all mathematical images ultimately had their “foundation” (epereismos) in the Forms (DCMS 34, 9) to imagine them—even discursively—was to enform one’s phantasia with their noetic energiae. Since these images were intrinsically connected to the noêta, if the soul had the capacity to coordinate its phantasia with these mathematic images it could create a subtle receptacle to embody them. Just as material souls were united with material gods through material sunthêmata, noetic souls were united with the immaterial Nous through mathematical sunthêmata. This form of theurgic might initially have been a discursive exercise: mathematic visualizations, but at a certain point the visualizations would spontaneously become visions embodied by the gods. This lifted the soul’s discursive energies into the numbers of the heavens described in the Timaeus, and the soul surrendered its false “unity” to the unifying action of the One. Noetic theurgy, therefore, penetrated to the core of the soul’s inversion, for the objectified unity of the soul—its self-identity—was the foremost obstacle that barred it from sharing in the objectifying unity of the One. Yet, paradoxically, this alienation was the sine qua non for the soul’s theurgic and participation in cosmogony.

It is possible that mathematics did not make up what Iamblichus calls “the simple and incorporeal form of worship purified from all generation” (DM 219, 8–9). Although I have argued that ta mathêmatika were the “intellectual offerings adapted to the hypercosmic gods” (DM 226, 9–10) I may be wrong. Iamblichus himself says the “summit” of hieratic worship was attained only rarely and that souls who reach it were beyond the limits of his discourse (whether he means book V alone, or possibly all of the De Mysteriis is unclear). He says: “Our present discourse, however, does not ordain laws for a man of this kind for he is above all law, but to those in need of a certain law it introduces this kind of legislation” (DM 231, 2–5). The noetic theurgist was “above all law” (kreitôn pantos nomou). Does this mean that such souls have left behind the rituals of the common man, as an “enlightened society” frees itself from the superstitions of a darker (and more ritualistic) age? This is how the enlightened scholar sympathetic to Iamblichus might read this passage. “Here,” he would argue, “here is the Plotinian dimension of Iamblichus’s theurgy!” Leaving to the side what a Plotinus might say, I would argue that the most elevated theurgist was “above the law” not because he knew better or had graduated beyond such superstitions. In light of Iamblichus’s view of cosmology, he was above the law because he was above its effects, having become their living embodiment. After all, since the laws of ritual reflected the order of the gods, a divinized soul would have been assimilated to that order and hence to the laws (nomoi) of hieratic worship. He was no longer under the law because he was the law.

We might reconsider the notion of a mathematic system for Iamblichian theurgy through the image of the theurgist as an embodiment of divine law. According to Iamblichus, all theurgic ritual, by definition, was rooted in ancient tradition; it could not be concocted to suit one’s mood or personal desires. Theurgic rites, in fact, appear to have been traditional acts of worship practiced for centuries in the Mediterranean world. The oldest and most conservative people, the Egyptians, were seen by Iamblichus as exemplary because of their preservation of god-inspired rites that were enactments of their myths.

Iamblichus was by no means intellectually naive; he was a leading figure in the most learned circles of his time. Yet he rejected anthropo-centric “demythologizing” of Porphyry and defended the sanctity and power of the ancient rites—regardless of our ability to explain them. Nevertheless, it seems that Iamblichus did embrace an underlying paradigm for these myths and rites, a master myth outlined by Plato and the Pythagorean interpreters of his dialogues. The cosmogonic myth of the Timaeus demanded great intellectual skill of its interpreters, yet for...

29. For a discussion of this problem in later Neoplatonism and Iamblichus, see Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 297–304.
30. A paradox reflected in the fact that its alienation was a false unity rooted in the body, the altar-shaped (bômiskos) number.
31. The relation between nomos and thesos for the later Neoplatonists is analogous to that between proknem and pronos. Both sustain the order of things as “law,” yet nomos has to do with the soul’s relations in the generated realm and thesos with its preexisting divine ratios. For a discussion of their distinction, see Ronald Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 38–46.
32. Philo of Alexandria, faced with the same challenge as Iamblichus—to justify the practice of traditional rituals according to Platonic principles—produced very similar arguments. For Philo, although the Patriarchs lived prior to the written law they had no need of it for they were, like the noetic theurgists, “living laws” (empsuchoi nomoi). See Philo, De Abrahamo, 4–6; Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 57.
Iamblichus this Platonic myth sustained a vital connection to the most primitive myths and rituals: Egyptian, Chaldean, Assyrian, and other ancient traditions of the Mediterranean. If there was a mathematical model of Iamblichean theurgy it would have been a Pythagorean schema reflecting the creative tensions of the One and the Many. These tensions, Iamblichus believed, were portrayed in the traditions of ancient and holy people, in their art, dance, sacrifice, and prayers, and would have been discovered as mathematical only after the fact of their cultural embodiment. Mathematical proportions simply outlined the intensity and valences of ritual patterns already established in nature and cult. Perhaps when a theurgist ritually embodied the numbers of a tradition he could translate this vital mathematics into other traditions. This may have put him “above all law” and free from the specific requirements of any tradition, yet since the theurgist became an embodiment of the law, it is more likely that he would have been subject to all traditions that preserved the divine arithmós, for in them he would have recognized and experienced divine authority.

I believe that Pythagorean mathematics made up the sunthémata employed in noetic worship because they exemplify both the transcendence and immanence common to theurgic sunthémata and because their exercise expressed the dynamics seen in all theurgy. Perhaps the most suggestive confluence of mathematics and theurgy may be seen in the enigmatic warning from the Chaldean Oracles: “Do not deepen the plane” (médé bathunês to epépedon). Hans Lewy explains this warning by referring to the Pythagorean theory of cosmogenesis described as the unfolding of dimensions from point to line to plane to volume, with the pyramid as the first body:

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According to Lewy, the oracle warns the soul to remain in the “plane,” the triad. As he explains: “The number three is in the Oracles the measure of the noetic and therefore the purport of the Oracular warning is that the mortal should not “materialize” his mental substance by extension into the realm of the somatic.”

33. Following the Aristotelian rule, adopted by Iamblichus, that what is first in ontology is last in generation.
34. CO, frag. 104, 88.

Assuming that Lewy’s analysis is correct, the question remains: How was the soul to avoid its fall into matter? How does the soul remain in the plane? The obvious response: “by not descending into volume,” may be correct, but it is insufficient and, if accepted prima facie, it would lead to a distortion of one of the central principles of theurgy. To eschew embodiment and the descent into volume would leave the tetraktus unfinished, unexpressed, and imperfect. To disdain the corporeal qua corporeal would alienate the soul from the activity of the gods who will to reveal themselves in their geometrizing descent into the world. To avoid the body tout court was a gnostic or dualist answer to the oracular warning. The theurgic answer, however, not only preserved the soul in the plane while completing the volume; I would argue that it kept the soul in the plane only by completing the volume. An examination of this paradox should reveal how thoroughly the Pythagorean teachings influenced Iamblichus, and how, today, they may still throw light on Neoplatonic theurgy.

From the beginning of this study I have argued that theurgy was cosmogonic activity, a mimesis of the gods in creation. Correlate to this axiom is the view that the ascent of the soul in theurgy was realized as a cosmogonic descent, that procession and return were not opposed to one another but that the soul’s return confirmed the divinity of its procession. Strictly speaking, this means that procession and return cannot be separated, either temporally or spatially, except in discursive thought. Theurgy, however, was not a conceptual enterprise. “It is not thinking that connects theurgists to the gods . . . but ineffable acts” (DM 96, 13–19). Therefore, only a hieratic performance was able to give the soul “the ineffable power of the gods” (hé arrhētos dunamis tón theón; DM 96, 19–97, 2). This arrhētos dunamis could not be grasped or explained, and in that sense it was irrational (ailogos). Yet it was an alogos power that generated logos, and in this sense it bears a profound similarity to the Pythagorean solution to the “scandal” of the irrational diagonal. Burkert maintains that prior to 460 B.C.E. “Pythagoreans” had discovered that the diagonal of a square with the side of “1” has an irrational value and therefore cannot be defined arithmetically. Nevertheless, it becomes defined
when it is geometrically performed, which means that the irrational becomes rational when it functions as a generative power. In the same way, a corresponding irrational power was understood to exist in the soul, a power that remained ineffable until it was revealed in theurgic performance: the "ineffable acts." The supposed "irrationality" of the theurgic rite, therefore, was consistent with the mathematical solution to the problem of incommensurates within the "unit square" and "unit cube." Like the irrational diagonal, the ineffable power of the gods was alogos with respect to discrete (arithmetic) reasoning yet became the source for a logos revealed in embodied (geometric) action.

Henri Joly argues that the geometric solution to the arithmetic problem of the irrational shifted the Hellenic philosophic tradition to an entirely new epistemological foundation, one that demanded an integration of epistemē with an elevated sense of technē. In the parlance of the later Neoplatonists, this would be the hierarchē technē, anterior to conceptual reflection, and thus capable of being performed by the soul. Against the background to this problem in the Pythagorean tradition, the theurgic solution to the warning of the Chaldean Oracles may support my hypothesis that noetic theurgies were, indeed, mathematical rituals. In any case, the Pythagorean principles will help to explain the raison d'être of theurgic rites.

In the geometric unfolding of the tetraktus, each dimension functioned as the principle (archē) and limit (peras) of the dimension that it contained and of which it was the boundary (horos). The "point" was the limit of the "line," the "line" was the limit of the "plane," and the "plane" was the limit of the "volume." In each stage the limit was "outside" and therefore "contained" what it limited. Damascius explains this process of dimensional unfolding in his Parmenides commentary:

The point (sōmeion), insofar as it limits, contains; it limits the length (mekos) without depth and contains it either from both extremes or only one, but it does not contain the whole length in itself—not entirely in itself—as a part is contained in a whole, or a figure in the limit which encloses it but as something limited is contained in a limit. For the Limit is always outside what is limited, as is the Unlimited, but the Unlimited is outside infinitely, while the Limit is outside only once. . . Thus, the body (sōma) is within the surface (epiphania), the surface is within the line (grammē), and the line is within the point, but not (literally) "in" it. (Dub. et Sol. II, 121, 13-21)

Damascius uses the terms "within" (eisē) and "in" (en) in the last sentence points to an important distinction between ontological containment, when subordinate entities are contained "within" their primaries, and empirical containment, when an object is spatially contained in another.

Now, in order for a volume to become manifest it must be limited by a plane; the plane, in turn, must be limited by a line; and the line must be limited by a point. Iamblichus says that a line should not be conceived as a "collection of many points" because the point qua point is of a different order—it is the arche of the line and, strictly speaking, has no dimension at all. The transition from point to line occurs only when a fundamental change takes place in the orientation of the point, to be precise: when it begins to flow. "The geometricians," Iamblichus says, "maintain that the line is the "flow" (rhîsis) of the point." To use the example of a cubic volume, the process may be exemplified as follows:

40. For a detailed investigation of the presence of the irrational diagonal in the soul based on the Timaeus (36), see Konrad Gaiser, Platon's Umgang mit Lehren (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett), "Die Spieße als Begrenzung des Körpers," 59-60.
41. A "unit square" and "unit cube" have all sides equal to 1. In the square the diagonal has a value of √2; in the cube the diagonal that traverses the volume has a value of √3.
43. Walter Burkert discusses the double sense of the term "irrational" (arrhētos) in the Pythagorean tradition and notes von Fritz’s hypothesis that Hippasus' "betrayal of the secret of the irrational" had to do with his revelation of the sacred dodecahedron, made up of regular pentagons with "incommensurate" diagonals of the value φ which came to be known as the Golden Section. Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, 488-63. Paul Friedrich, Plato and the Parmenides Commentary, trans., intro., and comm. Sir Thomas Heath (New York: Dover, 1956), 1:158. For the Neoplatonists, Euclid’s geometric definitions described the soul’s spiritual generation and ancestry.
1. The point as principle of all expression.

2. The point realizes its limiting power in the manifestation of the line.

3. The line realizes its limiting power in the manifestation of the plane.

4. The plane realizes its limiting power in the manifestation of the volume.

To return to the oracular warning, in the case of the human soul the Oracle states: "Do not deepen the plane"; that is, remain at the third level of descent and do not fall into a body, the volume. The theurgical solution to the warning now may be understood: the principal understanding of theurgy is that for the soul to remain a plane and free of volume it must act as a plane. That is to say, it must bestow limit to volume: it must descend (i.e., flow) into a body and rule it as its limit and archē.

In each successive degree of the tetraktus the superior dimension becomes the principle (archē) of the subsequent level and manifests its specific logos in its descent. Descent in itself was not wrong so long as it was measured. After all, the genesis of the world was the result of the descent of divine powers. Therefore, from a theurgical perspective, what the Oracle warned against was not descent in itself, but an unmeasured descent. Contrasting these two notions of descent in his analysis of the Laws (894a) Konrad Gaiser says:

The misunderstanding of theurgy by modern scholars may be explained by these two notions of "descent." Theurgy has too often been judged as an example of the latter kind, as a loss of rationality and corruption of the soul. In light of Iamblichus's Pythagorean principles, however, theurgy was the means for the soul to participate in "genesis" at the highest possible level.

In the cosmos conceived by Iamblichus one acted with the Demiurge or against him. The theurgist, of course, did the former. He embraced the Unlimited (to apeiron) in his descent/embodiment by assuming the role of the Limit (to peras). If he avoided this responsibility he forfeited his role as Limit and was condemned to an inferior dimension and the ignominy of having limits imposed on him by others: that is, by daimons who preserve the orders of genesis. In short, only by flowing into apeiron could the theurgist remain peras. Only by measuring himself into matter could he participate directly in the immaterial forms. If, as the Platonists maintained, "god is always doing geometry" (aei géometreî ho theos), then the theurgists were his instruments.


48. For this notion, see Plutarch, Moralia VIII, 718b-720c: "Question 2: What Plato meant by saying that God is always doing geometry."
The two kinds of descent outlined in the previous chapter may help shed light on Iamblichus’s distinction in the De Anima between souls who voluntarily and involuntarily enter bodies. Iamblichus subdivided the former group into souls who were (a) already free and entered the corporeal realm to preserve it and (b) those who were imperfect but were working toward perfection (Stob. I, 380, 6–14). The descent of this latter type of soul was neither entirely a corruption nor a creative participation in genesis though it was moving toward the latter. The great majority of souls, however, were embodied involuntarily and were completely verged toward apeiron. Nevertheless, in Iamblichus’s estimation, even these souls could participate in cosmogenesis if they limited their passions with material theurgies. The material rites laid the foundation for the soul’s final exchange of a life shaped by the perata of daimons, for a life bestowing peras upon apeiron, like the gods. The divinity appropriate to the soul guided each rite, and as the soul became increasingly aligned with cosmogonic measures, so did its awareness of the gods.

The most marked transition in the progress of the soul was the rare moment that it received a god as a guardian to replace its personal (oikeios) daimon (DM 280, 17–281, 1). In book IX of the De Mysteriis Iamblichus describes this transition in response to Porphyry’s question about discerning the “Lord of one’s nativity” (DM 278, 15–19). While Iamblichus did not reject the validity of ἀριθμητική (i.e., the “calculation” of astrological nativities) as a divine science, he said that it had been distorted by mortal conceptions (DM 277, 14–18). Iamblichus explained that one’s guardian daimon cannot be determined simply by finding the “Lord of the geniture” for the guardian is distributed to the soul through all aspects of its astrological portrait (DM 280, 2–6). Iamblichus maintained that the soul’s daimon was “more ancient” than the nativity and therefore could not be discovered by astrological calculations or identified with a particular section of the heavens. He says:

If we must to reveal to you the truth concerning one’s personal Δαίμων we must say that he is not distributed to us from one part of the heavens nor from any of the visible planets but from the entire cosmos—its multi-faceted life and its multi-form body—through which the soul descends into generation. And a certain individual allotment is imparted to us, allotted to each of our aspects, according to an individual jurisdiction. This Δaimōn, therefore, is established in the paradigm even before souls descend into generation. And when the soul selects him as its leader the Δaimōn immediately attends to his task of fulfilling the lives of the soul, and he binds the soul to the body when it descends. (DM 280, 1–13)

The ruling daimon mixed the soul’s immortal logos with the mortal lives received from the body in order to meet the particular demands of its
incarnation. The daimon served as coordinator of the soul’s descent into the material world.

The task of each soul was to align itself and its activities with its ruling god, and when this was achieved the guardian daimon gave way to a higher guide. Iamblichus continues:

[T]he Daimôn oversees the composite life of the soul [and body] and the individual life of the soul; and all that we think, we conceive due to the principles he has implanted in us. We do the things that he suggests to our mind, and he continues to govern human beings until, by means of sacred theurgy, the time comes that we are entrusted with a God as guardian and leader of the soul. For then the Daimôn either yields to the superior entity or hands over his jurisdiction to him or subjoins himself to him as a co-collaborator or in some other way ministers to him as to his Lord. (DM 280, 13–281, 4)

This was a privilege reserved for very few souls. The great majority were best served simply by fulfilling the dictates of their guardian daimons. It should be noted that despite Iamblichus’s occasional references to “evil” daimons, there was no evil daimon competing for control of the soul. Iamblichus explicitly states that the soul has only one ruling daimon and that he is good (DM 282, 1–5). To fulfill the charges of its guardian, however, the soul first had to recognize him and then develop a rapport. Recognition of the daimon was not gained by artificial means or human effort but was given directly and theurgically by the Lord of daimons (DM 283, 18–19). Iamblichus says:

The invocation of these guardian Daimones is effected through their one ruler God who, from the beginning, distributed individual Daimones to every soul, and in the sacred rites he reveals the individual Daimôn to each soul according to his own will. For, in the theurgic hierarchy, subordinate entities are always invoked by their superiors. Consequently, in the case of Daimones, one universal leader of those who are charged to rule over generation dispatches individual Daimones to every entity. And, when the familiar Daimôn appears to each soul, then he reveals his particular mode of worship as well as his name, and he also teaches the particular manner of invoking him. (DM 283, 19–284, 10)

In each embodiment, the daimon acted on behalf of the god until its “limits” (ta perata) had been realized by the soul. The soul’s freedom from the daimon—like its freedom from the “law”—was determined, paradoxically, by its degree of identity with it. The daimon was not left behind but was, as it were, digested and incorporated by the theurgist. In addition, insofar as daimons served a processional and dividing function in cosmology, the graduation to a god as overseer indicated that the soul was no longer identified with a “particular” self. When the soul became resonant with the ratios of the World Soul, it began to live for the entire world, and since daimons had jurisdiction over parts, not wholes, the soul then received a god for its leader.

The personal daimon revealed himself to the theurgist and taught him how to stay in contact, but to recognize one’s daimon demanded an ability to discriminate among the appearances (phasma) of invisible entities. In book II, chapters 3–9 of the De Mysteriis Iamblichus provides a diagnostic guide of the entities that appear in theurgic worship. Porphyry had asked how theurgists were able to distinguish among gods, archangels, angels, daimons, archons, and souls (DM 70, 10–82), and Iamblichus provided an exhaustive answer. He distinguished among the appearances of (1) gods, (2) archangels, (3) angels, (4) daimons, (5) heroes, (6) sublunary archons, (7) material archons, and (8) souls according to the ousia, dunamis, and energeia of each class. Iamblichus examined twenty different visionary qualities whose manifestations were diminished in each succeeding ontological class. Examining first the “uniformity” of appearances, then their “beneficence,” “immutability,” “beauty,” etc., Iamblichus concluded with a discussion of the “benefits” provided to souls by each class. H. D. Saffrey provides an excellent outline of these chapters, and Friedrich Cremer has covered the same ground to demonstrate the influence of the Chaldean Oracles.

Following the Iamblichean principle that energeia reveals ousia, the appearances of invisible entities were the energeiai that revealed their sources, the ousiai. In terms of human experience, however, the rank of the divinity that appeared depended on the soul’s receptive capacity (the epitēdeiotēs discussed in Chapter 7). Iamblichus, in fact, seems to


4. This is a standard Platonic teaching. In the Timaeus 90a–c Plato says that only by constantly “worshiping” the daimon who dwells with us can man partake of immortality.


In summary, Proclus adds:

[The presence of the Gods gives us health of body, virtue of soul and purity of mind. In short, it elevates everything in us to its proper principle. It annihilates what is cold and destructive in us, it increases our heat and causes it to become more powerful and dominant. It makes everything in the soul consonant with the Nous; it causes a light to shine with intelligible harmony, and it reveals the incorporeal as corporeal to the eyes of the soul by means of the eyes of the body.]

Iamblichus’s reference to corporeal vision as the means to see the incorporeal points to imagination as the medium of theophanies. By means of images the “eyes of the soul” (hoi tēs psuchēs ophthalmoi) clothed the gods in an interior space. Clearly, a contribution on the part of the necessary to reveal what was invisible, and Proclus explains that it was the soul’s “body of light” (augoeides sōma). He says:

The Gods themselves are incorporeal, but since those who see them possess bodies, the visions which issue from the Gods to worthy recipients possess a certain quality from the Gods who send them but also have something connatural (sungenēs) with those who see them. This is why the Gods are seen yet not seen at all. In fact, those who see the Gods witness them in the luminous garments of their souls (augoeidē tōn psuchōn periblemata). The point is, they are often seen when the eyes are shut. Therefore, since the visions are extended and appear in this different kind of atmosphere they are connatural with those who see them. However, because visions emit divine light, possess effectiveness, and portray the powers of the Gods through their visible symbols, they remain in contact with the Gods who send them. This is why the ineffable symbols of the Gods are expressed in images and are projected sometimes in one form, sometimes in another. (In Remp. I, 39, 5–17)

In summary, Proclus adds:


Each God is formless (amorphēs) even if he is seen with a form. For the form is not in him but comes from him due to the incapacity of the viewer to see the formless without a form; rather, according to his nature he sees by means of forms.8

The psychic organ that received the divine light was the pneumatic or luminous body. In his treatise On Dreams (De Insomniis) Synesius identified this body with the “imagination” (to phantastikon; 136a, 1) and described it as the soul’s “first vehicle” (to prōton ocheina; 137a, 2). It was within this imaginal body that the soul experienced its most profound illuminations. The imaginal body, however, should not be confused with ordinary imagination. Iamblichus distinguished not only the “god-sent” dreams from the “human” (DM 103, 2–10) but also the “divine appearances” given by the gods from the images concocted by man.9 The former possessed transformative power while the latter were merely reflections of embodied life. Just as the horizontal expressions of sunthēmata were distinguished from their vertical or divine dimension, so with the imagination. On the horizontal level phantasia was merely the play of the discursive mind, but if properly purified and trained, the vertical dimension that sustained it could be awakened. The imaginal body of the ordinary person, however, was “diseased” (Synesius, De Insomniis, 136d, 1) and until purified it could not serve as a vehicle for the god.

In reply to Porphyry’s questions about lights seen in divination Iamblichus explains the role of phantasia and catalogues, under the rubric of phōtagōgia, the various methods used to illuminate it. He explains:

The entire kind of divination that you describe, while of many kinds, is contained in a single power which may be called “drawing in the light” (phōtos agōgē). This power illuminates with divine light the aetherial and luminous vehicle surrounding the soul, from which divine visions (phantasai théiai) take possession of our imaginative faculty being moved by the will of the Gods. For the entire life of the soul and all its powers, when directed by the Gods, are moved however the Lords of the soul wish.

And this occurs in two ways, either when the Gods are present with the soul, or when they shine into the soul a certain advance

8. Ibid., II, 39, 28–40. 4. My translation of this passage is adapted from the translation of Jean Trouillard, La Mystagogie de Proclus (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), 42.
9. The phantasai of DM, book II, chaps. 3–9, are divine as are the visions described in DM 132, 11–15, but human imaginations are rejected as being nontheurgical (see DM 287, 1–3).
light coming from themselves. In each case, the divine presence or the illumination, they are transcendent [to the soul]. The attention and discursive power of the soul follow what takes place [cf. DM 104, 11] since the divine light does not touch them, but the imaginative faculty (to phantastikon) is divinely inspired because it is lifted into modes of imagination that come from the Gods, not from itself, and it is utterly removed from what is ordinarily human.10

The Neoplatonic doctrine of the imaginal body and its role in theurgical ascent exemplifies what Mircea Eliade has called a “mythical physiology.” In his well-known study on yoga Eliade explains that the descriptions of such “physiologies” are “not conceptualizations, but images expressing transmundane experiences.”11 It is in this sense that Iamblichus’s doctrine of the soul’s pneumatic or aetherial body must be understood, for he used physiological terms to describe experiences that transcend the physical realm. In effect, Iamblichus used “the eyes of the body” to awaken “the eyes of the soul.”

The similarities between the doctrines of the subtle body in later Neoplatonism and the yoga traditions are suggestive, particularly with respect to the role of “heat” as it relates to “breath” and the “channels” of the soul’s mystical body in yogic and theurgical practices.12 Iamblichus says the presence of the god heats the soul and effects a visual theophany. The divine heating occurred within the soul’s “mystical” body, yet the fact that this body was called pneumatic (pneumatikos), as well as aetherial (aitherodes) and luminous (angoeides; DM 239, 9–11) suggests that physical breath (pneuma) played a role in this heating and incandescence. Breath may have been the means through which the soul was translated to its mystical body and, once established there, homologized to the cosmos and Creator. Evidence from the Chaldean Oracles supports this. In fragment 130, the soul established in god is said “to breathe in the flowering flames that descend from the Father,”13 and fragment 124 speaks of liberated souls who are “thrust out” [of their bodies] (exóstères) by “inhaling” (anapnoo; trans. Majerck, 97). Psellus explains that this was not effected by the soul but by divine powers who “cause the soul to breathe far from the weariness and oppression of the body.”14 It is possible that Iamblichus’s legendary ability to levitate in prayer15 had its origins in these breathing techniques and that the story of his “levitation” (which he laughed off;16 may have derived from a misinterpretation of the phenomenon that occurred when the theurgist coordinated his breath and visualization. For example, the Mithras Liturgy states: “Draw in breath from the [sun’s] rays, drawing in three times as much as you can, and you will see yourself lifted up and ascending to the height so that you seem to be in midair.”17

The key to these pneumatic exercises was the belief that the soul’s aetheric body was directly connected with the sun, the source of light. It should be borne in mind that the radiation of this body was related, not only to the physical sun, but also to its hidden source. Plato’s reference to the sun as the image of the Good in the Republic (509b, 2–10) profoundly influenced the Neoplatonists who saw the physical sun as a revealer of the divine Nous. In a cosmology where nature was seen as a theophany of the gods it would be inconsistent if the sun did not play a central role in soteriological rites. Julian says that Helios was surrounded by the “fifth body” (pentpom sōma) with its summit being the rays of the sun,18 and Iamblichus identified this “fifth body” with aether (TA, 34, 13), the same aether that made up the soul’s subtle body. Thus, through its aetheric vehicle the embodied soul participated in the aetheric body of the sun in varying degrees of intensity. According to the Chaldean Oracles the leader god of each soul was identified with one of the solar rays, and fragment 110 says that the soul must discover its “ray” (ochetes) and perform the proper ritual in order to make its ascent. Fragment 123 says that the soul is relieved by heated breath, pointing again to the connection of breath and the sun. In the De Anima Iamblichus says that according to

10. DM 132, 9–133.9. Compare this mode of divination with that described at DM 117, 1–9 where the discursive mind is unaware of what takes place. In both cases, the cause for the divine inspiration is “the lights which come down from the Gods” (DM 117, 2).


12. A careful comparison cannot be developed here except to point to the terms and their functions in the respective spiritual practices. “Heat” (lava/yoga: thermon/theurgy) is awakened by, or directly related to, the “breath” (pneu/yoga: pneuma/theurgy). When sufficiently heated, it flows up the “channels” (radis/yoga: ocetas/theurgy) of the mystical body to divinize the soul. It may be possible also to compare the fiery goddess Hecate, invoked by theurgists, with the goddess Kundalini, invoked by yogins, since both were responsible for the salvation or punishment of souls depending on their purity and preparation for the encounter.


15. Iamblichus was reported by his servants to levitate more than 10 cubits and to take on a golden hue when praying; Eunapius, Philippotran and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists (458), trans. W. C. Wright (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921, 1964), 364–65.

16. Ibid., 365.


the Ancients (i.e., theurgists), souls are purified by all the visible gods “and of them all most especially by the sun.”

The connections between light, fire, the pneumatic body, and physical breath were also described in the De Mysteriis where Iamblichus measures the degrees of divine light by their effects on breath. He says:

Indeed, with respect to the subtlety of light, the Gods irradiate it to such a fine degree that the eyes of the body cannot receive it, and they undergo the same experience as fish when they are lifted up out of turbid and thick fluid into subtle and diaphanous air. In fact, those who contemplate the divine fire are not able to inhale the subtlety of it; they appear to fall into a swoon, to all appearances, and are cut off from their natural breath. (DM 86, 5-14)

This passage suggests some form of trance in which the theurgist’s breath was completely stopped. Such phenomena are not uncommon in yogic practices and Iamblichus may be describing the theurgic equivalent of yogic turīya, a “cateleptic” condition where the breath appears to stop. On the other hand, Iamblichus may simply be pointing out that when the human soul entered the subtlety of divine light it began to breathe, in Pselius’s terms, “far from the weariness and oppression of the body” (PG 1144c, 8-9). To “breathe,” that is to say, to “live” with the gods, the soul could not continue to breathe/live in an ordinary way. One could “inhale the sun’s rays” only with an augoeides Ὀλίβα, a solar body. Iamblichus adds that the light emitted by the archangels was also too rarefied for the soul to inhale but notes that the presence of angels produced a mixture of air that theurgists were capable of breathing (DM 86, 13-18). Since Iamblichus believed that human souls were able to live no higher than the rank of angels (DM 69, 12-14), perhaps this passage simply reiterates that position, employing “breath” as the index of the soul’s “life.”

Iamblichus’s description of the soul’s inability to endure the atmosphere of the gods is also reminiscent of Plato’s Phaedo. There, Socrates tells Simmias that humanity lives in the “hollows of the earth,” the “dregs of the starry aether,” unable or unwilling to emerge to the true surface of the world (109c):

We are too feeble and sluggish to make our way out to the upper limit of the air. If someone could reach to the summit, or put on wings and fly aloft, when he put up his head he would see the world above, just as fishes see our world when they put their heads out of the sea. And if his nature were able to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. (109c)

For Platonists the mythic geography of the Phaedo was a map of the soul. It was possible for the soul to live in resonance with divine ratios, suspended in perfect equilibrium (109c) on a “true earth” (110b, 5) “as pure as the starry heavens in which it lies” (109b, 9); or the soul might live in the “dregs of that aether” (109c, 2), in anatropic dissonance, alternately attracted and repelled by the flux and reflux of sensible matter.

The theurgist emerged from this perversity and heaviness to behold the true heaven, true light, and true earth and live in direct contact with the divine causes. He achieved this condition by means of sunthēmata that purified his luminous body and translated him to the divine. Since the luminous vehicle (augoeides ochēma) was solar in origin, when it was purified it returned to the sun. Damascus explains that the theurgist was made divine “when the radiant vehicle journeys upward to the sun . . . when we are established in the soul of the sun” (Dub. et Sol. II, 255, 17-18).

It is almost certain that the cultic expression of theurgy centered on the worship of the sun. Julian says that his devotion to Helios was perfected through the teachings of Iamblichus, and his Hymn to the Mother of the Gods testifies to the importance of the sun in the apotheosis of the human soul. The drama of Attis was the drama of the human soul in its descent into generation. Like human souls, Attis was the lowest of divine beings, and although he was “as pure as the Milky Way” (171a) he was troubled by passion when he joined with matter. Like human souls, Attis entered the generated world “following the will of the gods” (171b), but this obedience came at the cost of his equanimity. The descent, in other words, was a sacrifice willed by the gods and performed by Attis, and his subsequent “castration” symbolized the completion of his mission. In metaphysical terms, the castration of Attis represented the limiting of the soul’s unlimited propensity, the bestowal of peras upon apeiron, which is the act of demigurgy and theurgy par excellence.

The apotheosis of Attis, significantly, was effected by Helios. Julian says: “After bringing a halt to his unlimited procession, Attis brought this chaos into order through his sympathy with the cycle of the equinox

19. Stob., 1, 455, 2.
20. Eliade, Yogi, 57.
since the great Hēlios controls the most perfect measure of his motion within due limits” (171c). The myth portrayed this demiurgy as an ongoing activity, for the cycle of Attis did not happen in the past, nor was it ever finished. Thus, Julian says: “And never did this happen, except in the manner that it happens now . . . for Attis always yearns for generation, and he is always cutting short the unlimited through the limited cause of the Forms” (171d).

The role of souls as suggested in the myth of Attis was demiurgic, but once embodied—and souls were always entering bodies—their divine nature had to be received from without. The sun, therefore, was the initiator in the recollection and return of souls. In his manifestation as physical light and chief among encosmic gods Helios served as administrator for the cult of “material” souls, yet in his noetic expression Helios’s invisible rays defined the mathematic ratios invoked in the cult of noetic souls.22 “[For Hēlios,” say the Pythagoreans, “is the great geometer and arithmetician.”23 Julian explains the role of the sun as follows:

Consider this clearly: Hēlios, by his vivifying and marvelous heat, draws up all things from the earth and calls them forth and makes them grow, separating, I believe, corporeal things to their highest degree of tenuity, and he makes things light that naturally would sink. These things should be taken as sure signs of his unseen powers. For if among corporeal things he can effect this through his corporeal heat, how would he not draw and lead upwards the souls of the blessed by means of the invisible, wholly incorporeal, and divinely pure essence established in his rays? (172b)

For Julian the worship of Helios was a theurgical mystery. He continues:

If I should also touch on the ineffable mystagogy (hē arkhē mystagogōgia) which the Chaldean, divinely frenzied, celebrated to the God of the Seven Rays—he who lifts up the souls of men through himself—I would be describing unknowable things, indeed, entirely unknowable for the vulgar, but quite familiar to the blessed theurgists. (172d–173a)


Julian’s religiosity should not be taken as a sure index of Iamblichus’s views; certainly not with the same confidence that one may draw from Proclus, Simplicius, or Damascius.24 Nevertheless, the role of the sun, or rather, the sunthēma of the sun, as symbol of the noetic fire and Demiurge, was almost certainly the central mystery of Neoplatonic theurgy. Proclus worshiped the sun three times a day, at rising, noon, and setting.25 In his Timaeus commentary he spoke of the demiurgic powers of the hidden sun described in the Oracles: “The truer sun measures the All together with Time, truly being . . . Time of Time.”26a And in his Parmenides commentary he says: “[The sun is] the analogue of the One, established in it secretly and inseparably” (1045, 6–9).

In the later Roman Empire the sun became increasingly important not only as a god appropriated for the emperor cult but also in the most spiritual worship. Tractate XIII of the Corpus Hermeticum suggests that the sun played a key role in the highest mysteries, and the Hermetic apotheosis exemplifies several theurgic characteristics. Tat, the disciple of Hermes, learned to “regenerate” his soul and complete the tetraktus of intelligent generation (i.e., the “measured descent” described in Chapter 19). At this point, Hermes tells him: “You now know, my child, the way of regeneration. When the Decad comes into being, my child, your spiritual birth has been established” (CH X, 10; 204, 21–24).

Being stabilized by the God, O Father, I visualize for myself, not with the vision of the eyes but through the Powers, in intelligible activity. I am in heaven, in earth, in water, in air. I am in animals, in plants, in the womb, before the womb, after the womb, everywhere! (CH XIII, 11; 205, 3–7)

Hermes explains to Tat that by completing the decad he has entered into contact with the One since “the Decad is in the One, and the One is in the Decad” (CH XIII, 12). The decad was the Pythagorean symbol of the actualized tetraktus, the manifestation of all principles in the cosmos. Having been reborn into this “body,” Tat sees himself in all things, an experience amenable to a theurgical interpretation for, according to Iamblichus, the soul may return to the One only if it has

24. There was understandably a greater tendency to dogmatism and theological uniformity in the Neoplatonism of a political figure like Julian than in spiritual teachers like Iamblichus and Proclus. For an excellent discussion of this issue see A. H. Armstrong, The Way and the Ways: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in the Fourth Century A. D., Vigiliae Christianae 38 (1984); esp. 6.


26. See CO, frag. 185, 117.
been homologized to the All. The soul must first "see itself in all things" before it enters the immortal body measured by the gods. At the culmination of his ascent Tat asks for the final mystery and Hermes, significantly, does not explain it—the divine powers perform the mystery through him. They sing a mystery oriented to the sun. Hermes instructs Tat to "bow down at the setting and rising of the sun" (CH XIII, 16, 207, 11–12) and sing a hymn to the "intelligible light" (to noēlon phōs; CH XIII, 18, 208, 5) to celebrate the union of the will of the soul with the will of the Demiurge. Hermes sings to the Creator: "The Powers that are in me sing these things; they chant out the universe. They complete your will, your plan as it proceeds from you and returns to you as the [completed] universe. Receive from all existing things the spiritual sacrifice" (CH XIII, 19, 208, 13–16).

Whether or not the authors of this Hermetic tractate formed part of a "theurgic" community, or any community at all is a question that will not be addressed, yet the motifs involved—(1) Pythagorean mysticism; (2) homologization to the cosmos as a means of release; (3) participation in demiurgy; and (4) the central role of the sun in the ritual act—were all characteristics of theurgy as conceived by Iamblichus. The evidence suggests that theurgic mysteries were solar mysteries, for the goal of all mantikē and theurgic ritual was "the ascent to the intelligible Fire" (DM 179, 9–12) and theurgists, Iamblichus says, "are true athletes of the Fire" (DM 92, 13–14).
There are two kinds of madness, one resulting from human illness, the other from a divine disruption of our codes of conduct.

—Phaedrus (265a)

Divination (mantiκε) in the late antique world was the art of bird watchers, gut-gazers, dream interpreters, trance mediums, and others to predict the future and determine the will of the gods. Divinational practices were an integral part of the Greco-Roman world and provided Iamblichus with striking, yet universally recognized evidence that divine powers exist beyond the human soul. In the De Mysteriis the phenomena of mantiκε became the exempla of theurgy, furnishing Iamblichus’s hieratic Platonism with a familiarity that it did not yet possess. At the same time, by arguing for the philosophical legitimacy of divinational rites—under the rubric of theurgy—Iamblichus provided a theoretical justification for well-known religious practices of the Greco-Roman world.

Iamblichus’s interpretation of mantiκε was perfectly orthodox for a Platonist, since Plato himself had already pointed to a connection between divine madness (theia mania) and divination (mantiκε; Phaedrus 244a–c). For Plato, “man’s greatest blessings come by way of madness,
Iamblichus argued that theurgical divination should be carefully distinguished from inductive techniques aimed at making predictions or diagnosing illnesses, and he also distinguished it from the natural prescience of animals to predict earthquakes or rain. Such presentiments arose from a sympathy with natural elements or from acute sense perception, but they were fallible and did not have the same function as divine mantikē (DM 162, 16–163, 11). Iamblichus admitted that human souls, like animals, receive impressions of coming events—what today would be called ESP—but he maintained that this was divination of a second order and fell short of divine stability and truth. Most significant, it did not transform the soul. “This intuitive faculty,” Iamblichus says, “has nothing in it that is truly blessed” (DM 288, 18–19). As a consequence of having appropriated the phenomenon of mantikē into his theurgical program, any aspect of popular divination that did not meet Iamblichus’s criteria for theurgy was not considered true divination.

According to Iamblichus, the function of divination was the deification of the soul:

Divine mantikē alone unites us with the Gods, for it genuinely gives us a share of the divine life, has a share in prognosis and divine intuitions, and makes us truly divine. It truly bestows the Good on us, because the most blessed intuition of the Gods is filled with all the good things. (DM 289, 3–8)

The divinatory elements and techniques might be modified according to the needs of the time and the soul, but the divine function of mantikē remained constant:

There is one correct definition and principle for all forms of divination and it has nothing to do with irresponsibly divining the future with things that lack foreknowledge. Rather, it is to view from [the perspective] of the Gods—who contain in themselves the limits of the entire knowledge of reality—the divination allotted throughout the whole world and all the lives defined in it. This cause is primordial and eminently universal, possessing in a primary way (protōs) what it bestows to its participants. Certainly, it possesses the truth necessary for divination and anticipates the essence and cause of events from which it necessarily and accurately yields foreknowledge. Let us take this kind of principle


2. DM 288, 9–11; 163, 11–13. Iamblichus, again, follows Plato; cf. Phaedrus 244cd; Republic 516d.
universally as the cause for all divination and from which we may scientifically discover all its species. (DM 101, 15–102, 11)

The foreknowledge (prognòsis) given in divination was not knowledge of particular events. It was, rather, an immediate knowing, “possessing in a primary way (protès) things that happen serially in time. Like the noësis of the gods, this primary knowing was unreflective and therefore was not “knowledge” in a discursive sense. It lifted the soul from particular knowing to the level of the gods where all events, past and future, were simultaneously contained. Theurgic prognosis was literally a pro + gnòsis, an ascent to the archè of knowing and thus, to that which precedes knowing. Yet, as the archè of knowledge, prognosis contained all its species, so the information received in divination, although accurate, was merely incidental to the soul’s ascent to the archè. Knowledge of the future was not an essential characteristic of theurgic mantikè. Iamblichus says: “Whenever it is necessary for the soul to exercise virtue, and ignorance of the future contributes to this, the Gods conceal the things that will happen in order to make the soul better” (DM 289, 17–290, 1). Divine mantikè did not serve human desires; it existed solely “for the sake of the salvation and ascent of souls” (DM 290, 2–3). Nor was mantikè an “artifice or invention useful for the conduct of life” (DM 100, 5–6). “It is not a human work at all,” Iamblichus says, “but divine and supernatural and sent down to us from heaven” (DM 100, 6–8).

The differences between Porphyry and Iamblichus are most clearly defined on the topic of divination, for both used the phenomenon to distinguish their forms of Platonism. Porphyry defined the piety of the philosopher by contrasting it with the false wisdom of the diviner. He says: “The philosopher ... is detached from exterior things ... and has no need of diviners or the entrails of animals. For the goods about which divisions are concerned are the very things from which the philosopher strives to detach himself.” In his letter to Anebo, Porphyry maintained that the dramatic effects observed in divination were not indicative of the soul’s exaltation but of diseases caused by “black bile, drunkenness or the fury of mad dogs” (DM 158, 7–10). Porphyry said that the ekstasis that threw the soul out of discursive awareness was a degenerative phenomenon and that the “not-knowing” condition of the mantis indicated a privation of knowledge, not an ascent to its principle. The issue is significant, for if theurgy translated the soul to an ineffable possession, what would distinguish this from a derangement and loss of intelligence? Indeed, this issue continues to lie at the heart of current debates over the value of theurgy in the history of Platonism. Iamblichus recognized its importance and responded by distinguishing two kinds of ecstasy:

From the beginning, it is necessary to divide ecstasy into two species: one is turned toward the inferior [and the other reaches up to the superior]; one is filled with foolishness and delirium, but the other imparts goods more honorable than human wisdom. One degenerates to a disorderly, confused and material movement, but the other gives itself to the cause that rules over the very order of the cosmos. The former deviates from understanding because it is deprived of knowledge, but the latter because it is attached to beings that transcend all human understanding. The former is unstable, the latter unchangeable; the first is counter to nature (para phusin), the latter is beyond nature (huper phusin); the former makes the soul descend, the latter raises it up; and while the former entirely separates the soul from participation in the divine, the latter connects the soul with the divine. (DM 158, 10–159, 6)

These contrasts are crucial for understanding Iamblichus’s defense of theurgy and they represent his clearest refutation of the implications of sorcery raised by Porphyry and those of “irrationalism” brought by modern scholars. To an untutored observer a deranged ecstasy para phusin might appear the same as a divine ecstasy huper phusin, but they were fundamentally opposed, and the De Mysteriis represents Iamblichus’s attempt to clarify this opposition. In a subsequent passage he makes the same kind of distinction with respect to phantasia, contrasting the imagination stirred up by diseases with divine imaginations (theiai phantasiai; DM 160, 9–11) sent by the gods. Iamblichus’s criterion for determining whether the ecstasy was divine or deranged was whether or not it had a beneficial and stabilizing effect on the soul.

It is significant that Plotinus used the term ekstasis only once in a posi-

3. For “knowledge is separated [from its object] by otherness. But prior to the act of knowing another as being itself ‘other’ there exists a spontaneous ... uniform conjunction suspended from the Gods” (DM 8, 4–6).


5. The distinctions that follow elaborate upon the distinction already made by Plato in the Phaedrus. “There are two kinds of madness,” Socrates says, “one resulting from human illness, the other from a divine disruption of our codes of conduct” (Phaedrus 265a, 9–11). I follow the conjecture of Westerink for the lacuna that precedes kai (DM 158, 12). See the apparatus of des Places’s text and translation of Iamblique: Les mystères d’Egypte (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1966), 133.
tive sense and even then, Armstrong says, the manuscript may be in error. Ekkasis, the "standing outside oneself," would not have played a part in the spiritual discipline of one whose soul was already equivalent to the Nous. For Plotinus and Porphyry, ekstasis could only be a degenerative act, falling out of one's true self, which was equivalent to falling away from the divine Nous itself. Hence, Porphyry saw mantic phenomenon as a derangement and loss of the "sacred sobriety of the gods" (DM 160, 7).

In contrast, because of his embodied psychology, Iamblichus believed that "standing outside oneself" was altogether necessary for the salvation of the soul. The human "sobriety" extolled by Porphyry was simply not enough; Iamblichus tells him: "You should in no way regard human sobriety as comparable to divine sobriety" (DM 160, 6–8). Theurgic ekstasis was Iamblichus's answer to Plato's theia mania, and he saw the doctrine of the complete descent of the soul as its correlate. Because of the soul's hypostatic disjuncture from the gods, ekstasis was a sine qua non for apotheosis. The gods came to the soul from without, exōthen, and to attain a divine life the soul had to undergo an ecstatic transformation and "exchange." Every theurgist had to become a mantis.


Conclusion

For my part I would rather
receive one letter from Iamblichus
than possess all the gold of Lydia.
—Pseudo-Julian

What was it about Iamblichus that attracted the respect and veneration of Platonic thinkers from the fourth century to the Renaissance? Why did the emperor Julian regard Iamblichus as the equal to Plato? And why did a student describe Iamblichus as the "great glory," "universal blessing," and "savior" of the Hellenic world? The slavish cheerleading of an enthusiast? Why then did later Platonists like Proclus and Damascius give Iamblichus's teachings more authority than even the teachings of Plotinus? Was Iamblichus's influence due simply to the "loss of nerve" among late antique intellectuals—as many would have us believe—or did he, perhaps, outline a compelling and comprehensive vision of a world that we no longer understand?

In light of the pressures confronting Platonists in the fourth century, Iamblichus's unknown student may have been correct to see his teacher as the soter of the Hellenic world. Under the leadership of Plotinus and Porphyry, the influence of Platonicism had receded to an intellectual elite that was becoming increasingly alienated from the common man. Following the social and economic changes of the third and fourth centuries, the loyalties of the latter were being drawn away from the traditional cults of old Hellenism, and increasing numbers of people were adopting new identities as participants in the mystēria of Christ. This was certainly true in the Antioch of Iamblichus's time, and although pagan philosophers were still respected, their authority was gradually being transferred to Christian bishops who offered salvation to all regardless of their social or intellectual class.

It would be tempting, but incorrect, to see Iamblichus's soteriological

praxis as a reaction to this state of affairs, as his attempt to accommodate Platonism to the changing times. It is tempting because Iamblichus's theurgic reinterpretation of Platonism fulfilled the requirements of popular religion while preserving the esoteric disciplines of a privileged few. The former aspect has usually drawn attention, but it is the latter that is of greater importance. In one sense theurgy was the logical correlate to the law of arithmogonic procession; namely, that the higher and more unified a principle, the more extensive or more piercing (drimatera) its effects. Because theurgy provided a more direct and simplified participation in the One, it had a wider circle of application and was as available to the common man as to the intellectual. Rather than falling outside the circumference of Platonism—as many have suggested—theurgy penetrated to a deeper center, one that extended the boundaries of the Platonic world. To say that Iamblichus preserved the esoteric disciplines of the Platonic school, however, is not quite correct, for in his estimation those disciplines had already been lost or distorted by his predecessors.

Iamblichus broke away from the teachings of Porphyry and Plotinus in order to reestablish—in theurgical Platonism—what he believed to be the true teachings of Plato and Pythagoras. Iamblichus thought that he had inherited a kind of gnosticized Platonism from Porphyry, with its attendant consequences: (1) a cosmological dualism with matter viewed as evil; (2) the human soul equated with the World Soul and the Nous; and (3) a desacralized and demonic cosmos from which the soul, in Porphyry's view, should seek its permanent escape. The impact of these views on popular audiences may or may not have been significant, but it was far more important to Iamblichus that they were mistaken and therefore incapable of leading souls to a genuine transformation and apotheosis.

In a manner that was traditionally Platonic, Iamblichus turned to the "Egyptians" and the "Chaldeans"—that is, to barbarian wisemen—for the authority to change the direction of his philosophical tradition. The degree to which theurgy reflects genuine Egyptian cult practices may be significant, but it is not the central issue. At issue is Iamblichus's belief in a sacred tradition. Only a tradition received from the gods could play the role of authoritative "other" to the fallen soul and fallen society. Deference to Egyptian wisdom in this sense was already a topos in the Platonic dialogues where "Egypt" functioned as an ideal culture against which Plato measured his own. The role of Plato redivivus, as seen in the Chaldean Oracles, cannot be underestimated either as an important influence on Iamblichus's development of theurgic Platonism. As divine logia, the Oracles also functioned as an authoritative "other" capable of saving the soul.

The influence of Pythagorean thought on Iamblichus was perhaps most critical, as it provided him with the conceptual framework and the theoretic justification for the practice of theurgy. Although Iamblichus was an advocate of conserving traditional pagan religions, he discovered in Pythagoreanism a revolutionary method to identify himself with the "old ways." Using Pythagorean cosmological principles as his standard, Iamblichus discovered theurgical dimensions in a variety of religious practices. While each cultural embodiment of the gods was unique in its myths and rituals—and therefore untranslatable by man—each possessed a common theurgic power. As a theurgist, and one who had coordinated himself with the numbers of creation, Iamblichus had the ability to become unified with the gods in a variety of cultural guises. The cult simply had to meet his Pythagorean standards, one being that the soul's apotheosis was the result of its homologization to the arithmoi of the World Soul. These unchanging mathematical proportions were the constants in the shifting valencies of Iamblichean theurgy. Plato too had spoken of a "great power of geometric equality amongst gods and men" (Gorgias 508b) and for Iamblichus the arithmoi, in their theological, mathematical, or material expression were the invisible foundation of every theurgy.

The most distinctive cosmological feature of theurgy was the central position given to the sun. For Iamblichus, Helios played the key role in the apotheosis of the soul: first awakening it through the senses and then leading it noetically to the eternal arithmoi. As Plato says in the Timeaus: "God lit a fire which we now call the sun . . . that it might give light to the whole of heaven, and that animals, as many as nature intended, might participate in number" (Tim. 38bc). And as choreographer of the heavens, the sun led souls into their mathematical bodies. The Epinomis says: "But this is the greatest boon of all, if a man will accept his gift of number and let his mind wander freely over the whole heavenly circuit" (977b).

Like Plato, Iamblichus attempted to uphold the "old ways" of traditional religions by interpreting them according to a cosmological and arithmetic schema. Yet, even more than Plato, Iamblichus preserved
these schemas in their own cultural expressions, believing that the power of these rites could never be explained intellectually; they had to be enacted and embodied. In this, particularly, Iamblichus differed from his Platonic predecessors, especially where it concerned the capacity of the human intellect.

The role of the intellect in the soul’s salvation was a recurring motif within the *De Mysteriis*. While Plotinus allowed that each soul already contained the *Nous* but was “unconscious” of it, Iamblichus made the unconscious presence of the *Nous* and the One radically distinct, ontologically other, and therefore inaccessible despite all efforts of the soul. To reach the superior hypostases the soul needed the aid of superior entities and these were received from without (εξώθεν).

One consequence of Iamblichus’s embodied psychology was that to reach the gods *all* the energies engaged in the soul’s descent had to be ritually reengaged and transformed into theurgic receptacles: a world ritualized into the *energeia* of the gods. In one sense, the differences between Plotinus and Iamblichus might seem insignificant since the Iamblichean gods (like Plotinus’s undescended soul) were always present and available to any soul able to receive them. However, because the Iamblichean soul was anatropic it was unable to receive this aid, which is why the Egyptian/Chaldean element becomes important. For Iamblichus, the only way the soul could receive the gods was by preparing the proper receptacles, the knowledge of which was preserved by the priests of sacred races like the Egyptians and Chaldeans. According to Iamblichus, their mystagogy was a reflection of cosmogony, and their receptacles of the gods recapitulated the act of creation. Apotheosis was realized only through the soul’s mimicry of cosmogony, and therefore an “escape” from the cosmos apart from a more causal and responsible involvement in it not only was undesirable, it was impossible. Such a notion could arise only from an exaggerated sense of personal importance, and an escape of this kind did not result in freedom but in bondage to an anatropic fantasy.

Iamblichus argued that theurgy provided everyone, regardless of intellectual training, a way of returning to the gods by preparing their receptacles, however crude or subtle these needed to be. A soteriological cult of this kind might easily degenerate into a form of fetish worship if the ritual receptacles (the *suntithemata*) became objects of veneration in themselves. This may account for Iamblichus’s harsh condemnation of the “image makers” who attend to the dregs of matter rather than to divine causes (DM 171, 5–18). Iamblichus reserved some of his most severe criticism for these men, no doubt because the integrity of theurgy was vulnerable to the degenerative worship they encouraged. Conversely, a sterile intellectuality that abstracts itself from nature was the weakness to which Plotinus’s model was vulnerable, and Iamblichus criticizes this attitude throughout the *De Mysteriis* as a form of intellectual hubris.

At the conclusion of the *De Mysteriis* Iamblichus sums up the goals of Egyptian theurgy, claiming that “theurgists do not address the divine *Nous* over trifling matters but only concerning things that pertain to the purification, liberation, and salvation of the soul” (DM 293, 5–8). From the theurgies performed by “material” souls with heavier *suntithemata* to those performed by “noetic” souls in the more subtle vehicles of mathematical images, the purpose of every theurgic ritual was the purification, (καθαρσίς), liberation (απολύσις), and salvation (σώτερια) of the soul. Iamblichus’s complaint to Porphyry is as relevant today as it was when Iamblichus wrote his apology for theurgy. He says: “One should not introduce mistakes when making a true judgment of reality, for in the case of other sciences or arts we do not judge their works based on distortions that occur in them” (DM 92, 4–7). I believe that Iamblichean theurgy and the ritual practices of the later Neoplatonists have suffered from just this kind of misunderstanding. Because theurgy has erroneously been portrayed as an attempt to manipulate the gods it has been dismissed as a debased and superstitious form of Platonism. It was nothing of the kind. Rather, Iamblichus’s prestige in his own and subsequent eras was due to his success in creating—like his fictional Pythagoras—a synthesis of worship and divine philosophy. In theurgy the highest thought of Platonic philosophy was fully integrated with common religious practices, and the immaterial gods were connected to the lowest sublunary daimons: in sum, heaven was joined to earth through the common mathematical structures of Pythagorean science. The Pythagorean solutions that mediated the One and the Many were translated by Iamblichus to the tensions pulling at the fourth century; the result was a comprehensive vision of a cosmos connected everywhere by numbers and accessible to anyone who ritually embodied them. This theurgical vision shaped the thinking of later Platonists such as Syrianus, Proclus, and Damascius, and its influence also extended beyond Platonic circles and may well be reflected in the sacramental theology of Christian thinkers. Indeed, the Church, with its ecclesiastical embodiment of the divine hierarchy, its initiations, and its belief in salvation through sacramental acts, may have fulfilled the theurgical program of Iamblichus in a manner that was never concretely realized by Platonists. In a sense that has yet to be examined,
the Church may well have become the reliquary of the hieratic vision and practices of the later Platonists. Even if theurgy were limited to Platonic circles, its significance would call for a more careful examination than it has received. It is my hope that this study has made some contribution to that end.

6. See James Miller, Measures of Wisdom: The Cosmic Dance in Classical Antiquity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) for an excellent description of theurgical principles enacted in the liturgy of the sixth-century Orthodox church (pp. 515–17). One important difference between Platonic and Christian (pseudo-Dionysian) theurgy, however, is that for Christians their ekklesia replaces the physical cosmos of the Platonists; it is a theurgy in some sense opposed to the cosmos, an idea entirely at odds with lamblichean theurgy.

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